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Abstract 
This thesis examines the nature of war and its impact on society in the English civil war, known as 
the Barons’ War, which was waged from1264-67 between King Henry III and a baronial 
opposition led by Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester. This is the first dedicated major study of 
the civil war as a war rather than as a political or constitutional event. While several of the war’s 
important campaigns have received individual study, the broader issues of the war, like the state 
and use of castles and town defences, guerrilla warfare and the impact of these on society have not 
received the same attention. Military history in general has received comparatively little study from 
the early to mid-thirteenth century and this thesis seeks to examine potential military developments 
between the civil war of 1215-17; the wars of Edward I in the late-thirteenth century and the 
Barons’ War’s possible impact upon these. Chapter one contextualizes the military experience and 
the types of men engaged in the civil war; the methods of recruitment and the general ‘customs of 
war’. This discussion will inform the discussion in the rest of the thesis. While castles were a 
crucial aspect of medieval warfare their role in 1263-1267 remains little studied, despite a 
considerable body of surviving documentation relating to them. Chapter two will therefore focus on 
the role, state and struggle for control of castles, particularly royal castles on the eve of the war. 
Chapter three will examine their use and effectiveness in warfare, the techniques and problems of 
besieging them and, in particular, will utilize a number of illustrative case studies of major sieges in 
the conflict. The fourth chapter will examine the previously unexamined role of town defences in 
the war, particularly their state and effectiveness. In chapter five, the thesis will bring a fresh focus 
by discussing the use of the wilderness by both sides as a tool of resistance, with its principal focus 
on the war waged by the Disinherited after the battle of Evesham until 1267 and its impact and 
significance. The final chapter examines the nature of warfare at a very local level, exploring how 
the issues and events described in the former chapters impacted on communities and also more 
local participation in waging war as well as examining the blurred lines between warfare and crime.  
The appendices include a discussion of the involvement of Robert de Ferrers, earl of Derby in the 
largely unexplored events of the siege of Gloucester in 1264. 
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 Introduction  
This thesis aims to provide the first dedicated study of the nature of warfare during the Barons’ 
War of 1263-1267, and its impact on society. While this will involve discussion of the military and 
political significance of the major battles of Lewes, 1264, and Evesham, 1265, I have chosen not to 
include specific analysis of the engagements themselves, as these have already been the subject of 
detailed scholarly study. Rather the focus will be on the wider aspects of the war which to date 
have attracted far less study.1 The first chapter will contextualize the military experience and the 
types of men engaged in the civil war alongside methods of recruitment and the general ‘customs 
of war’. The castle was a key aspect of medieval warfare, but its role in the hostilities of 1263-1267 
remains little studied, despite the survival of a considerable body of relevant documentation. 
Chapters two and three will therefore, utilising a number of illustrative case studies, examine the 
state of royal and seigneurial castles on the eve of the war, their use and effectiveness in warfare, 
together with the techniques and problems of besieging them.2 The fourth chapter will examine the 
hitherto unexplored role of the towns and their defences during the war. In chapter five, the thesis 
will provide a fresh focus to the study by examining the waging of war without castles, particularly 
the use of the wilderness by both the royalists and Montfortians, with special focus on the war 
waged by the Disinherited after the battle of Evesham until 1267. The final chapter examines the 
nature of warfare at a very local level, exploring how the issues and events described in the former 
chapters impacted on communities and also more local participation in waging war as well as 
examining the blurred lines between warfare and crime.  A case study examining the involvement 
of Robert de Ferrers, earl of Derby in the siege of Gloucester in 1264 is given as an appendix. The 
conclusion will bring the above discussions together and will also examine the wider questions 
surrounding the development of the war as a military conflict and its shape in comparison to 
preceding civil wars. 
 
                                         
1
 D.A. Carpenter, The Battles of Lewes and Evesham 1264/65, (Keele: Mercia Publications Ltd, 1987); D.C. 
Cox, ‘The Battle of Evesham in the Evesham Chronicle’, Historical Research, 62 (1989), pp.337-345. 
2
 I will use the term seigneurial in preference to comital or baronial during this thesis as this term 
encapsulates all levels noble society and many of the issues discussed here are general to the nobility 
unless otherwise stated. 
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The Barons’ War in Historiography 
The war between Henry III and a powerful group of magnates demanding reform, traditionally 
known as the Barons’ War, has attracted an extensive historiography. From the pioneering work of 
Blaauw, to the detailed studies of Powicke, Jacob and Treharne, the primary focus was on the 
constitutional significance of the Provisions of Oxford in the development of representative 
institutions, while new generations of scholars such as Carpenter, Maddicott, Stacey, Ridgeway and 
Jobson have helped contextualise the conflict within a radically revised understanding of faction 
and the nature of political power in thirteenth-century England. 3 The role in the war of individual 
groups, such as the Midland knights and the Montfortian bishops, have been studied by Fernandes 
and Ambler respectively, while the part played by key individuals such as Simon de Montfort and 
the Lord Edward have been well addressed, not least in biographies by Maddicott, Prestwich and 
Morris.4 Knowles’ 1959 thesis on the Disinherited remains an authoritative account of the rebel 
faction, providing invaluable details on known rebels appearing in connection to the Dictum of 
Kenilworth, their relations to each other and the impact of the royal policy of disinheritance.5 Yet 
the nature of the war more broadly and its impact on society has received far less attention. In 
terms of military history, the Barons’ War finds only brief treatment in the major survey works of 
medieval warfare.6 Several individual campaigns have received more detailed attention, 
                                         
3
 W.H. Blaauw, The Barons’ War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 1871); E.F. Jacob, 
Studies in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion, 1258-67, (Oxford: 1925).R.F. Treharne, The 
Baronial Plan of Reform, 1258-1263: including the Raleigh Lecture on history delivered to the British 
Academy, 1954, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1971); F.M. Powicke, Henry III and the Lord 
Edward, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1947); H.W. Ridgeway, ‘The Politics of the English Royal 
Court 1247-65, With Special Reference to the Role of Aliens’, (Unpublished D.Phil. thesis: University of 
Oxford, 1984); R.C. Stacey, Politics, Policy and Finance under Henry III, 1216-1245, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); A. Jobson, The First English Revolution: Simon de Montfort, Henry III and the 
Barons’ War, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012) 
4
 M. J. Fernandes, ‘The Role of the Midlands Knights in the Period of Reform and Rebellion 1258-67’, 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, King’s College, University of London, September 2000); S.T. Ambler, ‘The 
Montfortian bishops and the justifications of conciliar government in 1264’, Historical Research, 85 
(2012), pp.193-209; J.R Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); 
M. Prestwich, Edward I, (London: Yale University Press, 1997); D.A. Carpenter, ‘Simon de Montfort: 
The First Leader of a Political Movement in English History’, History, 76 (1991), pp.3-23; M. Morris, A 
Great and Terrible King: Edward I and the forging of Britain, (London: Hutchinson, 2008); C. Burt, 
Edward I and The Governance of England, 1272-1307, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
5
 C.H. Knowles, ‘The Disinherited 1265-1280: A Political and Social Study of the Supporters of Simon de 
Montfort and the resettlement after the Barons’ War’, (unpublished Ph.D., University of Wales, 1959). 
Though containing a good general account of the war, however, Knowles’ focus was not military. 
6 The focus of Sir C.W.C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle Ages, A.D. 378-1515, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1885) and Sir C.W.C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2 vols 
(London: Methuen, 1924 2nd ed.) was primarily on battle, and he concentrated on the battles of Lewes 
and Evesham themselves, rather than the war as a whole. Understandably, the war of 1263-1267 finds 
only brief mention in F. Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages: 
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particularly the crucial battles of Lewes and Evesham by Carpenter, the battle of Northampton by 
Treharne and the campaigns of Roger Leybourne by Lewis.7  A similar treatment of the war as a 
whole is still lacking and many smaller, yet in many ways no less significant conflicts such as the 
sieges of Gloucester and Pevensey have gone without full study. In particular, the role of castles 
and their use in the war has largely gone unexamined.8  This absence is perhaps most surprising as 
the amount of available material for the 1260s is far higher than it is for the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries. R. A. Brown’s seminal analysis of Angevin royal castle building policy ends in 
1217, and was continued by Eales up to 1224. 9 Wild’s article on the siege of Kenilworth in 1266 
remains, however, the only dedicated study of the role of a castle and its garrison during the war.10  
The absence of such studies reflects the comparative neglect of English warfare from 1225 
until the Welsh Wars of Edward I in 1270s-80s. For while the loss of Normandy in 1202-1204 and 
the invasion of Prince Louis and the war of 1215-17 have received detailed analysis, major studies 
                                                                                                                           
from the eighth century to 1340, trans., S. Willard and R. W. Southern, (Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, 
1997, 2nd edition; and in P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans by M. Jones, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984). More recently J. France’s Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000-1300, 
(London: UCL Press, 1999, are valuable for providing a broad military context for the war, engaging with 
the key themes of sieges, types of soldiers, tactics, technology and proprietorial warfare. This still 
remains a very broad work, and while in touches upon both the battles of Lewes and Evesham the war is 
not covered in any detail and these mentions are primarily as illustrations of a general theme. This is 
equally the case for general studies of medieval English or Anglo-French warfare that cover this period, 
most notably, M. Prestwich’s Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English Experience, (London: 
Yale, 1996), which focuses upon broad themes and trends in English military history.  
7
 Carpenter, The Battles of Lewes and Evesham; R.F. Treharne, ‘The Battle of Northampton, 5th April, 1264’, 
in Simon de Montfort and Baronial Reform: Thirteenth-century essays, edited by E.B. Fryde, (London: 
Hambledon, 1986), pp.301-11; A. Lewis, ‘Roger Leyburn and the Pacification of England 1265–7’, EHR, 
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of warfare in the thirteenth century tend to concentrate on the reign of Edward I.11 The principal 
exception, Walker’s study of the Welsh wars of Henry III, which provides an excellent overview of 
those campaigns and the organisation of English armies during Henry’s reign, remains 
unpublished. The 1260s have received no studies comparable to, for example, Watson or Cornell’s 
work on Edwardian castle garrisons in Scotland during the Scottish wars, or Simpkin’s 
examination of the role and recruitment of the aristocracy in Edwardian armies.12 
The study of town fortifications has undergone an important renewal over the past two decades, 
with the original pioneering work of Turner now revised and expanded by Palliser, Creighton and 
Higham, who have radically reshaped out understanding of the nature of town defences.13 In 
contrast, however, to continental scholarship on the role of cities and towns in warfare, English 
towns remain understudied.14 
Several aspects of the war have already attracted some discussion. Jacob’s detailed work on the 
legal records of the period of reform and rebellion provides important insights into the methods of 
waging war and its effects in localities. Although elderly, it has remained the foundation for further 
work in this field by Carpenter on the peasantry and King on clerical violence during the war.15 The 
one area in which the military dimension of Henry III’s reign has been well studied is in the terms 
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of service and recruitment of forces, most particularly knights.16 Michael Powicke’s Military 
Obligation in Medieval England, for example, devotes two chapters to knight service under Henry 
III as well as to the reissues and modifications of the Assize of Arms over the course of the reign. 17  
This subject is similarly explored by Critchley, Waugh and Jones while much recent work has been 
done on the recruitment of retinues by Simpkin and Spencer for the reign of Edward I.18   
A military study of the Barons’ War provides a valuable case study of mid-thirteenth century 
English warfare, building on the work of Walker and providing a link to research conducted on the 
Edwardian campaigns later in the century. The aim of this thesis therefore is to provide a dedicated 
look at the war through a holistic approach. Individual aspects of the conflict, such as castle 
garrisons and local violence could, with some justification, be treated as separate theses in their 
own right. The object of this study, however, is to examine how the different aspects of the civil 
war were inextricably intertwined, and studying these as a whole permits a much clearer view of 
their impact on society. 
 
Sources 
Sources for the period of the Barons’ War fall primarily into two categories, royal administrative 
sources and narrative accounts, usually contained in monastic chronicles. There is an abundance of 
English government material, of which a considerable amount has been published. The principal 
four series of greatest use are the Patent Rolls, Close Rolls, Liberate Rolls and Fine Rolls. The first 
two are the enrolled writs dispatched by the king’s government to its officials and as such are an 
invaluable source as to the activities of the crown and its perception of events. The Letters Close 
were used for conveying more confidential information than the Letters Patent. The Liberate Rolls 
are a record of writs issued concerning the allocation of payments for wages of royal servants and 
works on castles, manors and supplies. The Fine Rolls record the fines due and paid to the king by 
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individuals. A fifth major published record is the Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous, a 
compilation of different inquisitions held by crown officials which were then summarised. These 
range from court cases concerning homicide to a vital source for the war, the Inquisitiones de 
Rebellibus, a record of rebel lands seized in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham. These records 
contain many valuable details on the rebels themselves and their actions.19 Much record material, 
however, remains un-transcribed, unedited and untranslated in the National Archives in Kew. The 
Pipe Rolls, as yet only published up till 1223, record the payments made to the Exchequer from 
different counties as well as expenditure by royal officials such as castle constables.20 The 
Chancery Miscellanea series records expenditure by the royal government on a wide variety of 
subjects, and the King’s Remembrancer Rolls contain some surviving campaign expense accounts 
submitted by royalist generals. The surviving judicial eyres (JUST1) carried out after the war, 
which sought to punish the rebels in accordance with the Dictum of Kenilworth, are another vital 
source of information on rebel lands and activities. 
The most pertinent points to remember with these sources are that their point of origin is the 
royal government and as such they are subject to the limitations such a position entails. While some 
local material does survive in the form of manorial court cases and monastic chronicles, these are 
vastly outweighed by the amount of surviving royal government records. For example, while we 
may enjoy a reasonable coverage of sources concerning royal castles, we have virtually nothing on 
their seigneurial equivalent. These royal records were, however, subject to disruption by the war, 
particularly in the period from the escape of the Lord Edward in May 1265 until after the battle of 
Evesham, when the king and Montfort were trapped in the March of Wales. Montfort’s control of 
the apparatus of royal government after the battle of Lewes also means that the voice we hear in the 
records from 15 May 1264 until after 4 August 1265 is that of Montfort and his advisers rather than 
that of the king in whose name they are issued. An act described as being against the peace in this 
period is therefore likely to be referring to those committed by a royalist, while a reference to that 
effect on either side of this time period will be likely referencing a Montfortian.  
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The principal narrative accounts of the civil war are the Pershore Flores Historiarum, the 
annals of Dunstable priory, the chronicle of Thomas Wykes, the Dover-Canterbury continuations of 
Gervase of Canterbury, the chronicle of the mayors and sheriffs of London and Robert of 
Gloucester’s chronicle.  The Pershore Flores Historiarum is a continuation of Matthew Paris, 
which as Carpenter has demonstrated was composed for much of the war at the instigation of the 
abbot of Pershore, Eleurius a former royal servant. From some point in 1263 to December 1264, it 
was written prior to the defeat of Montfort at the battle of Evesham. The account from January 
1265 onwards was then written retrospectively after the battle of Evesham prior to the chronicle’s 
transfer to Westminster.21 The Flores, while pro-reform and Montfortian, also expresses sympathy 
for the royal family.22 It provides a valuable contemporary voice and shows wide awareness of 
events, particularly in the West near the March. The Dunstable annals were largely interested in the 
internal affairs of the priory apart from during the Barons’ War. Pro-Montfortian, it particularly 
lauded of Montfort’s victory at the battle of Lewes and asserted that only the lands of aliens had 
been looted during the rebellion in 1263. Gransden judges the annals to be ‘on the 
whole…accurate’ and the author makes use of official documents, such as royal proclamations, to 
inform its account. The annalist does, however, have a tendency to fall into cliché when describing 
events of which he demonstrated only a limited knowledge, most particularly at the siege of 
Gloucester in 1264.23 Thomas Wykes’ chronicle is royalist in tone, although not uncritically so.24 
Thomas became a pensioned canon at Osney abbey in the late 1270s and after 1272 he composed 
the section of his independent chronicle covering the Barons’ War while still serving as a secular 
clerk, probably based at London. He was an associate of Philip of Eye who would become the 
chancellor and had also served Richard of Cornwall, the king’s brother. He demonstrates his own 
experience and knowledge of the region of East-Anglia from whence he seems to have originated.25 
Wykes’s royalist stance is particularly valuable as he reports events that other, more pro-
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Montfortian accounts tend to ignore or pass over swiftly, such as the siege of the Tower of London 
in 1267.26 The Canterbury/Dover Chronicle is an independent source from the time of the war. The 
Dover manuscript is incomplete due to damage but it offers detailed knowledge of events in the 
South-East of England. Its account of the siege of Rochester in 1264 is particularly full, providing 
timings and even the ingredients used in Montfort’s fire ships.27 The chronicle composed by Arnald 
fitz Thedmar, an alderman of London, is contemporaneous to the war and demonstrates, due to fitz 
Thedmar’s situation and eye for detail, vivid descriptions of events in London. The text itself is 
extremely unusual in that fitz Thedmar was not a churchman and he represents a rare secular voice. 
Work by Ian Stone has demonstrated fitz Thedmar’s own ambiguous role and feelings towards the 
events of the war and there are strong indications of the alderman censoring his own writings, 
either in reflection of the changed political climate or simply changing his opinions on events. For 
example, his manuscript shows evidence of deletion regarding previously favourable remarks 
concerning the Oxford parliament in 1258.28 The final major source, Robert of Gloucester’s 
metrical chronicle, is unique in being the only vernacular account of the war and is one of the 
earliest surviving Middle-English texts. Robert’s narrative often appears to draw on first-hand 
knowledge of the events, particularly those at Gloucester, where he gives precise names and details 
of persons and places, He recounts, indeed, that he was sitting in Gloucester on 4 August 1265 
when the storm that followed the battle of Evesham broke.29 He also demonstrates very good 
knowledge of events in Oxfordshire.   
A number of other narrative accounts survive from the war, though these are usually 
considerably shorter than the above sources or are of varying reliability. The interrelated chronicles 
of Furness and Stanley are very brief but provide a very rare northern perspective on the war and 
contain many local details.30 The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough draws on a separate 
contemporary account of the war, Lawrence argues, which contains fresh details on the assault on 
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Northampton, the siege of Rochester and the battle of Lewes.31 The annals of Winchester and 
Waverly and the Battle Chronicle both contain very short accounts of the war and are otherwise 
principally focussed on events in their houses. All three though provide useful local details, such as 
the Winchester annals’ account of Simon the Younger’s attack on Winchester in 1265.32 The annals 
of St. Werburg’s abbey in Chester likewise focus mainly on local events but they include important 
information as to the fighting in the region and the defensive preparations in the town.33 The 
chronicle of William Rishanger, and another which was formerly attributed to him both draw 
heavily on the Flores and were written in the early fourteenth century. The attributed chronicle in 
particular displays some chronological confusion, though it contains interesting details on 34 the 
siege of Kenilworth not found elsewhere, which may indicate the use of another earlier source. 
Pierre Langtoft’s chronicle is likewise later, but contains some unique snippets of information on 
the fighting in the region of Lincolnshire and South Yorkshire in 1266.35 The accounts of the Bury 
Chronicle and the Barnwell priory chronicle both provide a narrative of events in the Fens during 
the Disinherited’s occupation of the Isle of Ely. The Bury Chronicle retains a broader interest in 
events but its primary focus remains the abbey.36 In Scotland, the Gesta Annalia II provides a 
useful, if brief account of events north of the border, and reveals some of Alexander III’s efforts to 
assist his father-in-law, Henry III in the war.37 The Melrose Chronicle is a compilation of material 
including the Opusculum of Simon de Montfort which seeks to portray the earl’s sanctity, probably 
rendering it the most fervently pro-Montfortian of all the narrative sources. It contains, however, 
useful accounts of a Scottish diplomatic mission to the Lord Edward during the war and the 
presence of Anglo-Scottish lords at the battle of Lewes.38 
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Most of these accounts are monastic in origin, written in Latin and are primarily pro-
Montfortian in leaning, influenced by ‘contemporary propaganda disseminated especially by friars 
and clerks in minor orders’ who supported Montfort’s cause.39 Montfort’s favourable standing 
amongst the English Church pre-dated his death with his connections to Franciscans, including the 
theologian Adam Marsh, and to reformer bishops such as Robert Grossteste. His death at Evesham 
and the reputed miracles associated with his bodily remains indicate his continuing popularity in 
these circles, despite a vigorous royal clamp down on the nascent cult.40 The war in fact sparked in 
a number of chronicles a sudden surge in interest concerning wider events where previously 
internal community politics and relations with neighbouring settlements had been the primary 
preoccupation.41 These narrative sources have the advantage of often reporting otherwise 
unrecorded local events of the war and provide a glimmer of light on different parts of the country. 
Unfortunately this also means that a number of regions simply lack any chronicle coverage, most 
noticeably the north of England, and as a result we know a lot less about events in this region than 
we do in the south. Geographically restricted and weighted with a pro-Montfortian bias, the extant 
narrative sources are thus a valuable if constrained source of information for the period. 
One of the major problems this thesis has faced is the highly diffuse nature of the material, 
with references to places and individuals scattered through the government record material and 
narrative accounts. Two databases were compiled as an attempt to address this issue, the principal 
and largest of these being a list of all those mentioned as being on the rebel side in the war, what 
events they were mentioned as being at, where their lands were and to whom they were connected. 
This also provided a list of references to the various record series both published and un-published 
for each individual. This method allowed the easy cross referencing of places and individuals in the 
war. This technique, however, yields comparatively fewer results for the royalists because the 
majority of material, principally the judicial sources on the war, focuses on the actions of the 
rebels. The exception to this is the period between the battles of Lewes and Evesham, discussed 
above, when royalist actions tend to be reported more frequently. The result is that while we know 
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a good deal about what the king did, we know less in some cases about the names, composition and 
actions of the royalists than we do the rebels. For prominent individuals and castles the entries from 
the different sources were tabulated chronologically to provide itineraries for the former and 
histories of expenditure and ownership for the latter. 
This thesis will therefore bring together the above points with the intention to provide an 
important fresh look at the nature or war and its impact on society during the English civil war of 
1264-67. 
 22 
 
 
1 English Society and War 
How were men who fought on both sides in the civil war raised and equipped and what did they 
know about fighting?  In this chapter we shall examine the military organization of mid-thirteenth 
century England, the nature of contemporary warfare in Europe at this period, and the extent of 
actual military experience possessed by the participants in the civil war prior to its commencement. 
The latter discussion will explore the experience of war in Gascony and Wales as well as the place 
of the pitched battle in medieval warfare and the importance of tournaments in providing military 
training. Finally, we shall examine the ‘customs of war’ and their application in the thirteenth 
century. This will provide a framework for the further discussion of specific conventions of war, 
such as those relating to siege, discussed in the subsequent chapters. The analysis in this chapter 
will form the contextual backbone to the discussions throughout the rest of the thesis. 
The Wars of Henry III  
This section will examine the military conflicts of Henry III’s reign and their impact in shaping the 
understanding and experience of warfare amongst the participants in the civil war.  
The principles of warfare in the mid-thirteenth century had changed little from that of the 
previous century. In Contamine’s words: 
In its most usual form medieval warfare was made up of a succession of sieges accompanied by 
skirmishes and devastation, to which were added a few major battles or serious clashes whose 
relative rarity was made up for by their often sanguinary character.1 
This assessment can be applied confidently to warfare in both Gascony and Wales, the two 
principal theatres for military experience open to the opposing sides in the civil war prior to 1264.  
Since his accession in the midst of the civil war of 1215-17, Henry III had been engaged in the 
perennial tasks of the kings of England of ensuring his borders with Scotland were secure, 
countering the ambitions of the princes of Gwynedd in the English controlled March, stamping 
ducal control over Gascony, as well as trying to restore the Angevin Empire in France lost by his 
father King John. By the time of the Barons’ War, Henry’s categorical failure to fulfill this last 
ambition had been confirmed in 1259 by the Treaty of Paris. Poitou had been lost in 1224, but 
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Henry had since then launched three campaigns in France. The first in 1225, nominally under the 
command of his then teenage brother Richard, had some success, but an expedition into Brittany in 
1230 was, in Studd’s view ‘costly, wasteful and politically useless’.2 In 1242, Henry came to the 
aid of his father-in-law Hugh de Lusignan, count of La Marche in Poitou. According to Matthew 
Paris’ unimpressed account, Henry’s Poiteivin allies abandoned him when the Anglo-Gascon force 
confronted the French royal host at the bridge at Taillebourg. Henry was forced to withdraw to 
Saintes and there a fierce skirmish erupted from which the Anglo-Gascon force, including Simon 
de Montfort, emerged with some credit.3 Henry’s army was then driven back to Gascony in a sorry 
state when threatened by a French encirclement at Saintes.4 Disease, however, eventually 
compelled the French army to retreat. The Taillebourg campaign’s failures further hardened 
English attitudes against supporting their king’s ventures on the continent and it ended Henry’s 
active attempts to win back the Angevin empire by force. 
Efforts to bring the duchy of Gascony under firmer ducal control nevertheless continued. In 
1248, Henry appointed Simon de Montfort as his seneschal in the province with a promised carte 
blanche to restore order and fifty knights to assist him in doing so. The considerable ferocity of 
Montfort’s campaign in the duchy resulted in the Gascon lords accusing Montfort of utilising 
excessive force, and eventually prompted his recall by Henry III. Henry led a new and successful 
expedition to the duchy in 1253 in order to address the growing threat posed by the influence of 
rival claimants to the duchy, including by Alphonso X of Castile. The Castilian threat was ended 
with the agreement in 1254 of a marriage alliance between Alphonso’s half-sister, Eleanor, and 
Henry’s eldest son the Lord Edward.5  
The nature of the warfare in the duchy was largely shaped by the diffusion of largely 
autonomous or independently minded local nobles and their plethora of local feuds. These factors, 
coupled with the nobles’ resentment at attempts to impose a centralised ducal authority, resulted in 
campaigns that were focussed upon the capture of seigneurial castles, such as that of Castillon in 
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March 1251, and involved frequent raiding by both factions.6 In 1250, Simon Montfort’s summed 
up the nature of this warfare in a letter to Henry, complaining that the nobles ‘will do nothing but 
rob the lands, and burn and plunder, and put people to ransom, and ride by night like thieves by 
twenty or thirty or forty in different parts’.7 It is in this environment that Montfort acquired much 
of his military experience.  
 
England itself had experienced warfare in the decades since 1217. Most rebellions, however, like 
that of the earl of Aumale in 1220-21, were small scale and swiftly crushed.8 The siege of Bedford 
in 1224 (a huge siege not rivalled until Kenilworth over 40 years later) and the Marshall Rebellion 
in the 1230s were more serious conflagrations.9 Unlike France, however, private war was 
prohibited in the kingdom and by 1263 England had been mainly at peace for 30 years.10 With the 
exception of local conflicts, life in England, therefore, provided little in the way of direct military 
experience for the vast majority of the participants in the Barons’ War.11  
Henry III had been involved in expeditions into Wales since the age of 15 or 16, launching 
campaigns against Welsh inroads into the March in 1223, 1228, 1231, 1245-7 and 1257. His 
campaigns, unlike his son’s were principally reactive, rather than intended at a permanent conquest 
of the country. Llywelyn ap Iorwerth of Gwynedd contested English control of the March and the 
campaigns fought up until his death in 1240 were aimed at regaining and defending territory from 
him. From 1246 onwards following the death of Dafydd ap Llywelyn, English military power in 
Wales waxed and lost territory was regained, but in 1256 Llewelyn ap Gruffudd of Gwynedd 
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inflicted a series of reverses upon the English and reclaimed substantial tracts of Wales.12 Henry 
III’s response in 1257 was castigated as ineffective and tardy by Matthew Paris and did much to 
bring the grievances of the baronage to a head in 1258.13 The late 1250s and early 1260s crucially 
saw continuing warfare in the Marches, principally between the Marcher lords and the Welsh of 
Gwynedd. After his investiture with the lands of the earldom of Chester in 1254, the Lord Edward 
also began campaigning in Wales. The political turmoil of the years leading up to 1264, however, 
allowed Llewelyn freedom to continue his conquests largely unhindered. The brief English 
expeditions, such as the Lord Edward’s in 1263, were at best only able to shore up territory under 
threat rather than reclaim lost ground.14   
Conducting warfare in Wales presented a number of challenges. The wooded and mountainous 
terrain allowed Welsh light troops to strike swiftly and then retire before superior English heavy 
cavalry could arrive. Ambushes were common. The Marchers adapted to utilise light troops, 
particularly lightly armoured horsemen and archers who could rapidly respond to any incursion and 
who were also proficient at conducting raids into Welsh territory. These raids, however, tended to 
have less economic impact than their Welsh equivalents due to the less agrarian nature of Welsh 
society. The Marchers also made use of the fragmented political landscape of Wales to make 
alliances with local rulers while increasingly the crown focussed upon building castles to hold 
down territory.15 King Henry and Hubert de Burgh’s construction of the powerful fortress at 
Montgomery in 1223 demonstrated the emphasis by the English crown on the strategic use of 
castles in containing the Welsh, something taken to its logical conclusion during Edward I’s later 
campaigns of conquest.16 Yet, while these fotresses provided protection for those inside castles, 
they had little effect in deterring sudden Welsh raids.17 The Welsh too possessed castles but, as 
Walker comments, ‘they seldom or never attempted to hold them when the enemy appeared in 
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strength’, preferring instead to melt into the surrounding countryside.18 The Welsh themselves, 
under the princes, possessed comparatively sophisticated siege technology that they could employ 
against Marcher castles.19 The result of the ongoing instability in Wales was that Marcher society 
remained highly militarized compared to England. By the 1260s, castle guard in the March, for 
example, remained due by service in contrast to the growing trend in England to commute it for 
money. In addition, many Marcher tenants held their land by service as muntatores, lightly armed 
horsemen. The March’s greater militarisation is further suggested by the large number of tenants 
that the Marchers could field on campaign. Thomas Corbet, for example, in 1263 received a letter 
of protection for himself, his son, brother and another twenty-three men, of whom at least sixteen 
are confirmed to have held land from him. Roger Mortimer similarly received protection for 
himself and thirty-four men, of whom at least half were his tenants in the March. In 1287, Edward I 
could order large numbers of men from Marcher lordships into the field at short notice, raising 400 
infantry from the lordship of Clun and 200 from Oswestry. The greatest Marchers, like the earl of 
Gloucester, could raise ‘veritable personal armies’.20 The Marcher lords, who were to play such an 
important part of the Barons’ War, were thus able to call on significant numbers of experienced 
troops who were highly skilled in the lightening raid and use of rough terrain. They were equally 
aware of the limitations of castles.21  
To the north, Scotland and England were enjoying an unprecedented period of peace, despite 
coming close to blows in 1244 over Alexander II’s French marriage and again in 1258 over the 
seizure by the Comyn faction in Scotland of Alexander III and his wife Margaret, the daughter of 
Henry III. This peace, however, was more a product of successive dynastic marriages and 
Alexander II’s realisation of the limits of Scottish military power against the English following the 
war of 1215-1217 than any military action of Henry III. The English show of force at Newcastle in 
1244, however, may have provided a useful reminder to the Scots.22  
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Crusading, particularly the crusades of 1240 and 1248 provided a potential avenue for English 
knights to gain military experience. Much like the situation in Gascony, however, it was more than 
a decade since the last major campaign, and even then English participation was relatively limited. 
Richard of Cornwall and Simon de Montfort joined the 1240 crusade to the Holy Land along with a 
small number of others who would go on to fight in the Barons’ War, but neither saw major action. 
In 1248, William Longspée led a number of English on crusade but involvement was generally 
limited. Participation was curtailed in part by Henry’s request to the pope to delay an English 
expedition by a year, a deadline that subsequently continued to be postponed.23 Longspée and many 
of the English with him died at the Battle of Mansourah in 1250 and the earl was remembered as a 
crusading hero.24 By contrast there was little direct English military involvement in the Albigensian 
Crusade, 1209-1229 (some fighting continued to the 1240s), though these were the wars in which 
Montfort’s father Simon was to gain his reputation for military skill and brutality in equal 
measure.25 Henry’s reluctance to become involved may partly be explained by the fact that 
Raymond VII of Toulouse was his cousin. The only other significant English foreign military 
involvement, this time in Italy, occurred in 1238 when Henry III dispatched a force under Henry de 
Turbeville to assist his brother-in-law, the Emperor Frederick II. Turbeville himself was dead by 
the time of the civil war and the men who comprised his force are not mentioned.26 The campaigns 
in Wales and Gascony therefore provided the principal venues for direct experience in warfare for 
the majority of combatants in the civil war. 
 
 Pitched Battle 
By the 1260s there had not been a major battle in England since Lincoln in 1217, while at 
Taillebourg and Saintes, Henry III had declined both the opportunities to arise in France. Major 
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battles indeed were the exception rather than the norm in medieval European warfare. Gillingham, 
in his study of Richard I’s generalship, comments that ‘what is certain is that he [Richard] did not 
adopt a battle seeking strategy’ despite fighting several major battles, while his father, Henry II, 
never fought one.27 Engaging in a major battle was a huge risk for they were highly unpredictable 
affairs and defeat could easily spell complete disaster for the loser. The Roman writer, Vegetius, 
whose influential treatise on warfare, De Rei Militari, was in wide circulation by the thirteenth 
century, in fact specifically warned against engaging in battle. Pitched battle was not to be fought 
unless on very favourable terms or after ‘every expedient tried and every method taken before 
matters are brought to this last extremity’.28 Many medieval commanders, whether they had read 
Vegetius or not, seemed to have held to this view. For commanders such as William Marshal, as 
Gillingham notes, ‘the intention was not to seek out the enemy’s knights and meet them head-on in 
a clash of arms. On the contrary, the aim was to send his armed forces in the wrong direction, and 
then, in their absence, destroy his economic resources’.29 Offering battle was not usually desired by 
experienced commanders in the thirteenth century unless on very favourable terms. Morillo argues 
that ‘foreign’ or ‘external’ wars were fought around the possession of castles and territory and as a 
result the adoption of Vegetian strategies was the “natural” mode of those involved.30 He makes an 
exception to this, however, by stating that civil wars were not about the conquest of territory, but 
rather were ‘aimed at eliminating rivals for control of a central authority whose presence and role 
were uncontested’, and as a result were liable to witness an active battle seeking strategy. One of 
the examples he cites for this is the battle of Evesham and the Lord Edward’s active attempt to 
bring Montfort to battle.31 We will discuss Morillo’s contention further in the conclusion but it is 
worth highlighting that the battles of Lewes and Evesham were rare events, not just in terms of 
English military experience, but in a European context as well. None of those involved in the battle 
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of Lewes had any experience of conducting an engagement of that size, thus discipline, 
communication and co-ordination all would have been deeply problematic for the complex 
patchwork of forces fielded. For some, however, the tournament field provided some relevant 
military experience. 
 
The Tournament 
The tournament, which still principally took the form of an open field melee between opposing 
teams of knights, was an important venue for acquiring military experience in the thirteenth 
century. Whereas the tournament in England had been licensed by Richard I from 1194, 
tournaments were usually prohibited by Henry III, who was apparently uninterested in the activity. 
Such prohibitions though did not stop the baronage’s attempts to organise them.32 The continental 
tournament circuits continued to flourish and a number of young English knights, including the 
Lord Edward and William de Valence, frequented them.33 Edward may have used the tournament 
circuit to recruit foreign knights into his retinue, the presence of whom in 1263 prompted much 
resentment amongst his former associates the Marchers.34 The nature of the tournament encouraged 
the development of the tactics of fighting as a body of horsemen. Edward and his associates had 
considerable practice fighting together on the tournament field and it is therefore perhaps 
unsurprising that it was Edward’s division of the royal army, includeding the Marchers, which 
engaged first at the battle of Lewes and routed the Londoners.35 The royalist advantage due to their 
tournament experience was even noted by the author of the Song of Lewes who declared that; ‘may 
the knighthood that praises the tournament, that it may thus be rendered ready for battle, learn how 
the party of the strong trained men was here crushed by the arms of the feeble and unpractised’.36 
The contrast was perhaps somewhat disingenuous, as the nobles fighting with Montfort were no 
less attracted to the tournament than their royalist compatriots. 
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Knights, however, were not the only participants in tournaments. An ordinance from 1292 
stipulated that each knight was to bring no more than three squires, each of whom must wear the 
device of their lord; neither knights nor squires were permitted to carry pointed swords, knives, 
clubs or sticks, only broadswords. Footmen or grooms were forbidden to carry the above weapons 
but the list of prohibited weapons was expanded to include stones, while spectators were barred 
from wearing armour.37   
Where tournaments did take place in England during Henry III’s reign they often saw teams 
divided on regional lines, either the knights of Northern England versus those of the South or 
Englishmen versus Aliens, and both types were ‘liable to develop into real battles’.38 These could 
be conducted with sharpened or blunted weapons, and death or serious injuries were not 
uncommon.39 An illegal tournament in 1241 descended into a free-for-all mêlée resulting in the 
death of Gilbert Marshal and one of his followers, as well as the serious wounding of many 
others.40 The mêlée for the tournament held to mark Edward’s debut in 1256 at Blyth became so 
fierce that many important men, including Roger de Quincy, earl of Winchester and Roger Bigod, 
although distinguishing themselves ‘exerted themselves beyond their strength to such a degree that 
their muscles were torn and they never afterwards recovered their health’.41 Even the more 
regulated jousts could be fatal. At the Round Table held in 1252, Roger Leybourne killed one of 
the king’s household knights, Arnold de Montigny, when his sharpened lance went beneath the 
protection of Arnold’s helmet and into his throat. Foul play by Roger was suspected in this instance 
as Arnold had broken Roger’s leg in a previous tournament. When the lance head was extracted 
from Arnold’s throat it was found to be ‘very sharp’ and ‘as broad as a knife’, in violation of the 
required use of blunt lances.42 The potential for uncontrolled violence inherent in tournaments was 
a source of serious concern, particularly during the war. In early 1265, with the Montfortians now 
politically ascendant, two tournaments were proposed between the sons of Montfort and the de 
Clare brothers, first at Dunstable and then at Northampton.43 While the former event was 
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technically prohibited by Henry III, it is more likely that it was blocked at Montfort’s instigation. 
The individual most likely to benefit from an outbreak of fighting between these two parties was 
Henry himself. The growing antipathy between the sons of Montfort and the de Clare brothers, and 
the potential for bloodshed between the allies, was probably the primary motivation for Montfort’s 
refusal. 
The tournament remained a crucial training ground for elements of English knighthood prior to 
the war. The limitations imposed by Henry III in England do, however, leave in question the spread 
of this experience amongst the ranks of the knighthood. The number of knights who chose or who 
could afford to spend time on the continental tournament circuit in the decade prior to the war is 
unknown. It is possible therefore that tournament experience may have been limited to those 
knights in the retinues of the richer, tournament inclined lords such as the Lord Edward, the sons of 
Montfort and William de Valence.  
 
Military Experience 
Attempting to assess the comparative military experience of the Montfortians and royalists prior to 
the civil war is difficult, for lists of those serving in campaigns have not survived as they have done 
for Edward I’s wars in Wales and Scotland. The surviving scutage rolls, recording those knights 
quit of paying scutage in return for military service for a particular campaign,  only list knights and 
barons and not those in their service or from other layers of society.44 Scutage and Pipe Roll lists 
also record not ‘service provided but rather service asked for’.45 Individuals who provided military 
service for their immediate lord or as part of the posse comitatus are usually invisible in the royal 
records and no relevant seigneurial records survive. Our view of the available military experience 
of each side is thus heavily weighted to the upper end of society and even then it is incomplete.  
The Patent and Close Rolls are the two main sources for acquiring the names of those who 
definitely participated in the campaigns of Henry’s reign. Out of 654 recorded individuals, eighty-
one men who served on the 1257 campaign in Wales were subsequently known to have fought in 
the civil war. Of the eighty-four who fought in Gascony in 1254, thirty-nine individuals (including 
two who it is unclear if it is the father or son) were also in Wales in 1257. While any conclusions 
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must be tentative as this number by no means denotes a fully systematic trawl of all records, it 
does, however, suggest several points. Eight men chart campaigning experience back twenty-two 
years to the Taillebourg campaign; two of these, Humphrey de Bohun and Richard of Cornwall 
were involved in campaigns as far back as the Brittany expedition of 1230. Three, Simon Montfort, 
Richard of Cornwall and Philip Basset had been on the 1240 crusade. All but two of these men, 
Simon and Peter de Montfort, were royalists during the civil war. The youthful composition of 
Montfort’s army at Lewes was remarked upon by the Song of Lewes and while the author may be 
guilty of over emphasising this, Table 1:1 does suggest a generational divide in support.46  
Military Experience Prior to the Barons’ War (P = Present; B = Baronial; R = 
Royalist) 
Names Brittany 1230 
Crusade 
1240 
Gascony 
1242 
Wales 
1245 
Crusade 
1248-9 
Gascony 
1254 
Wales 
1257 Loyalty 
Bohun, 
Humphrey de  
P 
 
P P 
(1244) 
 
P P R 
Bigod, Roger 
(earl of 
Norfolk) 
  
P 
  
P 
 
R 
Montfort, 
Simon de 
 
P P 
  
P 
 
B 
Basset, Philip 
 
P P 
   
P R 
Berkley, 
Maurice de 
  
P 
  
P P R (him or 
son?) 
Montfort, 
Peter de 
  
P 
  
? P B 
Cornwall, 
Richard of 
P P P  
 
  R 
Courtenay, 
John de 
  
P P? 
1244 
 
P P R 
Molis, 
Nicholas de 
  
P 
  
P P R 
Table  1:1 Individuals with the most Recorded Military Experience Prior to the Barons' War47 
Not surprisingly the predominantly royalist Marcher lords and the members of the king’s 
household knights had considerable recent experience from the on-going struggle with the Welsh. 
On the baronial side, Montfort retained a core of support from men who had served alongside him 
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in Gascony; at least four out of eight of his inner circle were definitely in Gascony from 1248 
onwards.48 Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester also brought a number of men from the March, such 
as John Giffard, with experience of fighting the Welsh.49 There does seem however to be a distinct 
experience weighting in the favour of the royalist faction at the war’s outset.  
How experienced then were the principal leaders of each side at the outbreak of the war? This next 
section will examine the military experience of Henry III, the Lord Edward, Montfort and Gilbert 
de Clare and assess its impact upon them. 
The Military Experience of Royalist and Rebel Leaders 
Henry III was never praised as a knight or military leader as Montfort was and he seems to have 
had very little interest in either the tournament or hunting. As such, Ridgeway concludes that 
Henry ‘was essentially a man of peace, kind and merciful’ and ‘although he ordered important 
improvements to many royal castles, he had no military ability,’ and ‘hated campaigning’.50 These 
issues have a tendency to obscure a key point about Henry by the commencement of the Barons’ 
War: he was a highly experienced commander. He might not have distinguished himself in the way 
men like Montfort had, but he had long and sometimes hard experiences to draw upon, particularly 
when it came to mobilising and supporting his forces. While Henry could be easily led, was over-
ambitious, stubborn and indecisive in some of his actions, he should not be considered 
incompetent. He might lack the decisiveness of Simon Montfort or the Lord Edward, but his record 
during the war demonstrates solid and cautious decision making and a generally effective choice of 
his captains and castellans. In 1236, Henry had inscribed over the new door into his Painted 
Chamber in Westminster Palace the motto ‘He who does not give what he has, will not get what he 
wants’. This statement perhaps provides an interesting insight into the king’s attitude towards his 
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policies and endeavours.51 Reflected in his stubborn streak that was so clearly evidenced in his 
pursuit of the Sicilian affair, this attitude could also pay dividends on campaign in the right 
circumstances, as his siege of Kenilworth shows.52 The campaign up to Lewes was, indeed, one 
that demonstrated consistent good sense. His base at Oxford allowed him to strike east or west. He 
appreciated the strategic value of Northampton, took the town by assault and his reduction of the 
midlands was only interrupted by Simon’s attack on Rochester. Henry’s final weeks of freedom 
were spent securing the ports for his reinforcements from the continent. Even if the inspiration for 
these moves came from his advisers, he was still wise enough to listen to them. 
Henry III’s actions in the lead up to the battle of Lewes were careful and sensible. Scouts 
detected the advance of the Montfortian army on the 13 May and Henry secured his army from 
surprise attack by utilising the defences of Lewes Priory and the castle. The ability of Henry to 
retreat to this fortified base when the battle went ill had a great impact upon the negotiations of the 
Mise of Lewes when to avoid a siege of the priory Montfort agreed to the free departure of the 
Marchers and Northern royalists.53 The raid on Henry’s army at Grosmont in 1233, when his 
army’s horses and baggage were stolen, probably taught him the wisdom of a fortified base. In 
Henry’s choice at Lewes one might also detect the influence of the writings of the Roman military 
expert Vegetius.54 It is unknown if Henry himself possessed a copy but his son Edward was in 
possession of one of the earliest extant vernacular translations of it in the war’s aftermath.55 The 
defeat at Lewes may have had less to do with Henry’s generalship than ill fortune and the fog of 
war.  
Edward had enjoyed some military experience in Wales and Gascony prior to the war. The 
amount of direct experience he was able to gain from Gascony is uncertain as the duchy continued 
to be primarily run by royal officials even during his visits. Edward’s exposure to any military 
action so young would probably have been under close supervision. The duchy was rocked by 
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renewed revolt in 1255 shortly after Edward’s arrival, forcing the 15-16 year old prince to seize 
towns, fortify castles and order the construction of ships, while trying to bring in supplies from his 
lordship of Ireland. Henry III rapidly dispatched reinforcements to his son’s aid, but he and his 
officials also intervened in Edward’s military decisions. When, for example, Edward ordered the 
razing of La Reole’s church following its occupation by Gascon rebels, some delay was apparently 
introduced allowing Henry III to write to his son forbidding the church’s destruction.56 Edward can, 
however, be shown to have been active in Wales in 1257, 1260 and 1263 attempting to relieve 
castles and reverse Welsh gains. It was here that he began to forge his alliance with the Marcher 
lords.57 Edward’s Lusignan uncles, to whom he was close, had also gained considerable experience 
on both the tournament circuit and in effectively helping to crush rebellion in Gascony in 1253.58 
Between these men and his uncle Montfort, Edward had a strong cadre of advisors in the years 
prior to the war. His time abroad on the continental tournament circuit in 1260-1 must also have 
been valuable experience in commanding men, particularly companies of knights.59  
 
Simon Montfort’s military reputation has been trumpeted by both chroniclers and historians.60 
Before the war, Matthew Paris in 1248 termed him ‘a man of Mars (vir Martius), famous and 
experienced in warfare’ and to Guillaume de Nogent he was ‘a man strenuous in arms and most 
skilled in the science of arms’.61 Probably gaining his first experience of warfare at the tail end of 
the Albigensian Crusade in the following of his elder brother, Montfort served in the Brittany 
campaign of 1230, fought briefly alongside the Emperor during his journey to Rome in 1238 and 
went on crusade in 1240-1. He fought at Saintes in 1242 and went to Wales in 1245 with Henry 
III.62 Experienced on campaign he was, but as Maddicott points out there was ‘very little fighting’ 
in Brittany, the Holy Land or Wales and neither did his actions ever make their way into chronicle 
accounts on these occasions. His reputation is in some ways ‘a minor mystery’.63 The distinction he 
won against the French at Saintes in 1242 is the first major praise he is recorded as receiving and 
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he built upon this during his tenure as seneschal of Gascony from 1248. Gascony seems indeed to 
have formed the core of his practical experience and gained him a reputation enticing to younger 
knights and made him a natural choice as the commander of baronial forces. His experience in 
siege craft prompted the Westminster continuator of Matthew Paris, to remark on his skill in this 
field.64 It is noticeable, however, that Montfort’s experience was primarily of the Anglo-French 
style of warfare, rather than the Anglo-Welsh. This is perhaps reflected in his chastisement of 
Humphrey de Bohun the Younger at Evesham when Montfort proclaimed that the infantry should 
go before the cavalry. 65 Montfort’s tactical ability was probably sound, but his grasp of Anglo-
Welsh warfare perhaps less so, as a large portion of his infantry was now formed of light Welsh 
troops whose preferred method of warfare was to avoid fighting heavily armed knights in the open 
field. Humphrey the Younger, son of the earl of Hereford, may have appreciated this fact better 
than his general (or he was simply unable to persuade the infantry forward). 
Montfort’s military leadership through the war frequently displayed elements of boldness. 
Montfort’s assault on the Royalist armies at Lewes and at Evesham displayed the sort of decisive 
aggression of his father at Muret in 1213, particularly the same use of a sudden cavalry charge 
against an outnumbering foe at Evesham.66 Montfort’s military achievements often relied on the 
successful outcome of calculated risks, however, as much as any special skill he possessed as a 
general. In late 1263, his force only escaped capture by the royalists outside London after the 
timely intervention of sympathizers within the city.67 While Montfort’s victory at Lewes against the 
superior royal army was a considerable feat, it was a gamble indicative of Montfort’s own strategic 
weakness.68 Despite his successful manoeuvres to seize the high ground, the early royalist success 
in the routing of the Londoners nearly spelt disaster and the Montfortian victory was in a large part 
due to the Lord Edward’s division’s over-enthusiastic pursuit of the Londoners as much as Simon’s 
own skills as a general. Montfort was the archetype of the ‘fortune favours the brave’ character. 
Henry III by contrast, was to be cursed by ill luck on his military endeavours, from disappearing 
allies to errant divisions of his own army.  
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Gilbert de Clare, out of all the major military leaders in the war, seems to have had the least 
opportunity to gain much practical military experience prior to its outbreak other than perhaps as a 
boy in the company of his father. Experienced retainers of his father no doubt provided advice and 
he would have benefitted from his time in Montfort’s company after joining his party in early 
1264.69 The marcher John Giffard, who held lands in the orbit of the Clares, joined Gilbert’s retinue 
sometime after the battle of Lewes. Giffard seems to have been one of the Montfortians’ most 
effective commanders. He spearheaded efforts to take Gloucester castle twice, in 1263 and 1264, 
and seized Warwick by surprise in 1264. His shift to the royalists along with Gilbert de Clare was a 
heavy blow to the Montfortians as Giffard helped harass Montfort’s army through its march in 
Wales, even to the point where he tried to tempt Montfort to pitched battle outside Monmouth 
castle.70 
Knowledge of and experience in warfare was a feature of most of the major generals on both 
sides at the war’s outbreak, with the exception perhaps of Gilbert de Clare. It is worth noting, 
however, that very few had any experience of fighting pitched battles. For Montfort, the 
skirmishing and sieges of Anglo-Gascon warfare was his primary experience of warfare, whereas 
for Henry III and many of his followers, including the Lord Edward and the Marchers, as well as 
for some Montfortians like John Giffard, their primary experience was in fighting in the wilds of 
Wales. It is these experiences that helped shape the behaviour of the combatants during the war.  
 
The Nature of the Forces 
In the mid-thirteenth century, English armies were split between three principal elements; royal 
forces, baronial forces and shire levies. The first two groups can be further subdivided between 
those serving for pay and those serving on the basis of military tenure. We shall start by examining 
the royal forces and its components before moving on to the shire levies and finally the retinues of 
knights and magnates.   
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The Familia Regis 
The closest thing to a standing army in England was the military household of Henry III, the 
familia regis. There have been a number of studies of the familia regis under Henry III’s 
predecessors, most notably J. O. Prestwich’s work on the military household of the Norman kings, 
Chibnall’s in depth examination of mercenaries in the household of Henry I and Church’s study of 
the household knights of King John.71 The most detailed study to date of Henry’s III’s military 
household remains R.F. Walker’s unpublished thesis on the Welsh Wars. This section will draw 
upon Walker’s discussion, but will have a tighter and more detailed chronological focus on the 
immediate lead up to the outbreak of war and the forces available during its course. 
Henry III’s household comprised a mixture of knights, sergeants and crossbowmen. It was not 
a large body in peacetime, probably consisting of only a few hundred men all told. Most of these 
men were deployed where needed as small groups in garrisons, almost always in Wales.72 Designed 
principally as a small but flexible rapid response force, the household retained an importance in the 
Welsh campaigns, as Walker remarks, ‘far greater than mere numbers would appear to show’.73  
On the battlefield Henry’s household were responsible for defending the king’s person, 
particularly against potential capture. No English king had died on the battlefield since Harold 
Godwinson in 1066 but Henry I had been struck on the head by an assailant at the battle of 
Brémule in 1119 and the capture of King Stephen at the battle of Lincoln in 1141 graphically 
revealed the risks faced by a monarch fighting in the front line. Joinville’s account of the battle of 
Mansourah recounts how the knights and sergeants of Louis IX’s familia regis stayed in close 
proximity to the king to guard him. The sergeants were also utilised to serve as the king’s personal 
messengers in the height of battle.74 The History of William Marshal provides perhaps the most 
vivid portrayal of the role of household knights on the battlefield. The Marshal was lambasted for 
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abandoning Henry the Young King’s side during a tournament, and thereby risking the safety of his 
lord, in order to gain prisoners for ransom.75 
 
The knights of the ‘familia regis’ 
Henry’s household knights were international in composition, with men drawn not only from 
Henry’s continental possession of Gascony but also from Poitou, Flanders and even Burgundy.76 
They were retained with either an annual fee, if they had spent a longer period in royal service, or 
by wages, which could vary from 1-2s per day.77 Its composition was fluid with its numbers 
increasing dramatically at a time of war.78 Henry’s retinue indeed reached its peak in the Welsh 
campaign of 1228 when it boasted at least seventy knights but over the course of the reign averaged 
thirty two members. Following the Provisions of Oxford in 1258 and the concurrent drive to reform 
Henry’s finances, the number of those in his familia receiving fees fell from thirty nine to nineteen. 
With his reviving fortunes in 1261-2, the familia exploded in number once more to sixty seven, 
with a total of thirty six knights receiving fees for the first time.79 Walker calculates that in 1260-1 
£4,116, 14s and 5 ½d went on fees and wages of knights and sergeants ‘besides part of £4000 odd 
paid to knights, sergeants and crossbowmen in the two years 1259-61’.80  
 
Table  1:2 Knights Fees, 1258-67 based on Walker, ‘Welsh Wars’, p.71. 
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Year No. of knights fees being paid No. of new fees being paid
1258 19 2
1259 15 1
1260 15 1
1261 61 36
1262 67 10
1263 31
1264 7
1265 8
1266 10 1
1267 7 1
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While comprised partially of foreigners, much like King John’s, the familia regis by 1261 
contained a large number of English tenants-in-chief or their kin.81 The Welsh Marchers had a 
tradition of serving in the royal household and several Anglo-Scots lords were also present from 
1261 onwards, including Robert de Brus and John Comyn, lord of Badenoch.82 The familia were 
frequently utilised as both field commanders and castle constables in Wales and elsewhere. A 
survey of those constables Henry III appointed in 1261 unequivocally demonstrates Henry’s 
reliance upon current or former members of his household in securing the royal castles. 
 
Appointed Constable 
Castle Household = HH 
Reynold son of Peter Southampton HH 
John de Muscegros Exeter HH 
John de Grey Hereford HH 
Alan la Zuche Northampton HH 
William de Grey Lincoln HH 
Ralph Russel Salisbury 
Philip Basset Sherborne and Corfe HH 
Philip Basset Hadley HH 
William la Zouche Guildford HH 
James de Audely Bruges, Shrewsbury 
Philip Marmion Norwich, Orford HH 
John Balliol Nottingham 
John de Plessetis Sauvey 
Peter de Percy York 
Adam de Jesmond Newcastle HH 
Eustace de Balliol Carlisle HH (former) 
Robert de Walerand Canterbury, Rochester HH 
Mathias de Mara Colchester HH 
Philip Basset Oxford HH 
Aymo Turemberd Windsor 
John Lovel 
Cambridge, 
Huntingdon? HH 
Adam de Monte Alto Lancaster HH 
 
Table  1:3 Constables appointed 9 July 126183  
 
Although records of appointments of constables become more chaotic in the period of late 
1263 to May 1264, household knights remain prominent amongst royalist constables. Philip Basset, 
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Nicholas de Molis, John de Muscegros, Alan de la Zouche and John de Grey were among those 
who served in this capacity during these months.84 It is extremely hard to gain a fully accurate list 
of who was in the familia regis during the war because of disruption of record keeping and the 
capture of Henry III, and we are accordingly forced to rely on the earlier information from 1261-3. 
By 28 January 1267, the overstretched royal finances were clearly no longer capable of sustaining 
the payment of fees and these were stopped. Some fees were renewed in October, but by contrast 
these were for men ‘who were actually on the king’s service, so that at the end of our period’…‘it 
looks as if the whole system of money fees was being reviewed.’85  
 
‘Servientes-ad-arma’ 
There were two sorts of sergeants in royal service; the sergeants (servientes) and the sergeants-at-
arms (servientes-ad-arma). Sergeants-at-arms were professional soldiers and like the knights of the 
familia regis formed a group of trusted and skilled armed retainers. Like their knightly counterparts 
they also received robes and other gifts and could sometimes hold ceremonial positions within the 
household.86 In reflection of their more specialised status these men could earn the high wage of 
between 9d. and 12d. per day, depending on whether they were mounted.87 Sergeants were less 
well paid, the infantry receiving between 2d.and 3d. per day and those with horses from 6-7d. 
Unlike sergeants-at-arms these men could be recruited for a specific campaign, although some may 
have been retained on a permanent basis. The terminology referring to these groups is not always 
entirely clear and depends as much upon the context in which a scribe was writing as anything else. 
King’s sergeant (serviens regis) would seem to have been another term used to denote sergeant-at-
arms but the same men could also be referred to as simply sergeant.88 For example, the Carlisle 
garrison under Eustace Balliol that served throughout the war, consisted of two knights each paid at 
2 shillings a day; one sergeant with a barded horse, 12d.; fourteen esquires, at 6d each; nine foot 
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crossbowmen, 3d.; thirty six foot archers, 2d.89 Two noticeable points about this account are the 
equipment of the sergeant and his wages. At 12d a day the individual is clearly in reality a 
sergeant-at-arms but here he is simply labelled a sergeant, even though equipped with a barded 
horse, he came closer to having a knight’s equipment.90 If we examine Roger Clifford’s recorded 
garrison of Marlborough castle in 1266 we see this variability in equipment more clearly:  
- 4 knights with barded horses 
- 4 sergeants-at-arms with barded horses 
- 12 sergeants with un-barded horses 
- 54 footmen 
= £63. 10s.91  
 
To muddy the water further, however, the entry for the wages of the Newcastle garrison between 
1265-66 lists sergeants-at-arms in the garrison but gives their wages as only 3d a day.92 Whether 
this is a scribal error or perhaps indicative that the term was sometimes applied loosely is unclear. 
Records of wages rather than the terminology used in the sources are a more reliable guide to the 
status of these men. Sergeants-at-arms helped form the backbone of royal garrisons, though they 
were often only in very small numbers as the examples above indicate. In peace time Windsor 
often had only four sergeants-at-arms as a permanent garrison.93 Even in late-1265 to early-1266 
Newcastle’s waged garrison contained only ten sergeants-at-arms.94  
Examination of the surviving names of sergeants quickly highlights the international nature of 
the men in Henry’s service. Not confined to the lands listed earlier, these men were drawn into 
Henry’s service from Provence to Hanover. In 1252 there was even a Henry ‘the Saracen’ serving 
in Gascony.95 These men seem to have worked in small units of varying size, sometimes ten to 
twelve or as few as four men under some form of officer. This individual or a king’s clerk 
appointed for the task would often ‘draw pay from the exchequer for the whole force or for a 
section of it serving in the same place’.96 The clearest proof of the existence of this organisation 
during the war is in the Patent and Liberate Roll entries for the Tower of London’s garrison in 
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1267. The men listed in both sources are split into four groups each under one individual, with the 
rest in the group labelled under the heading ‘and his fellows’.97 
John de Berkham  Robert de Boyval 
and ‘his fellows’, and ‘his fellows’ 
Rabas (Rabate]  William de Boyval 
Giles Martin  Robert le Eveske 
Baude de Jorny  Gerard le Alemaund 
Adam de Waudon,  
 John Oureslond alias Houresland 
Bertin de Steynewell, William del Ploich 
William du Bois, Jakenin Moran 
Stephen de Richelbrech  John de Fekenet 
and Isaac de Berkham  Tassard le Boleneys 
  Jakenin de Boyval 
  William le Quarter 
Adam de Greigii/Gregun    
and ‘his fellows’ Ambeshas 
Lawrence Ungrewel, ‘And his fellows’ 
John le Neym John de Attinsham 
Jakenin de Lungevill Peter de Lungevil 
Ingram de Ringesham Rouland 
Thomas Hareng John de Ysek 
Janettus de Anderwik Ewerwin 
Everard de Tylloy Robert de Hanoveu 
John de (?) Leonire Joyres 
Hugh de Tilloy Jakenin Haneveu 
  Hugh le Provencal 
  Guion Boife 
  James de Haneben/(Haneveu?) 
Table  1:3 King's Sergeants in the Tower of London 1267 
One of these men at least, William Boville, may have served in Gascony in 1254 and Wales in 
1257.98 The list provided of the sergeants-at-arms of the Tower in 1267 is unusual, both in their 
number, reflecting the crucial strategic situation of the Tower during de Clare’s renewed rebellion, 
and in the naming of those concerned.  
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The King’s Crossbowmen 
The king’s crossbowmen were similar to the king’s sergeants and there was ‘no difference in 
status’ between the two groups in the household.99 In the 1240s, Henry III’s ‘keeper of the king’s 
sergeants’, one Halengret, was also a crossbowman by profession.100 In 1259, one Martin le 
Balister was named as a king’s sergeant, as was a Picard le Balister who was amongst the royalist 
garrison of Windsor Castle in 1264. In the Liberate roll several individuals, including Nicholas de 
Wyncele, are referred to variously as both sergeants-at-arms and king’s crossbowmen.101 The 
specialised status of these men is reflected in both their small numbers and often in their surnames. 
The garrison lists of Nottingham and Scarborough castles in late 1264 each contain two men with 
the surname le Balister or le Arblaster. Much like those men listed as Porter or Tailor, these 
individuals were recognised by their profession. Powicke’s study of the Angevin defence of 
Normandy in the late twelfth to early thirteenth centuries characterises these men as ‘the élite of the 
military profession’.102 They received rewards for their service, including robes, oaks from the 
royal forest and even occasionally estates.103 In the Newcastle garrison, mentioned above, the 
garrison contained one mounted crossbowman serving for eighty days who was paid 12d a day, 
possessed two horses and was accompanied by two grooms.104 This may be an individual named as 
Kempe the Crossbowman who actually held land near Newcastle, probably by gift of the king.105  
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(Image has been removed due to Copyright restrictions) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  1:1 Joshua Conquering the City of Ai, Macieowski  Bible, c.1250, Pierpont 
Morgan Library, New York. Ms M 638 f.10v 
Visual depictions of crossbowmen from the mid-thirteenth century indicate they could be well 
armoured with helms and mail coats. The French Macieowski Bible, dating from c.1250, shows a 
crossbowman well armoured in mail and utilising the shelter of a compatriot’s shield during an 
assault on a town.106 The same can be likewise seen in an illustrated copy of Vegetius’ De Re 
Militari given to the Lord Edward c.1265-72.107 Their crossbows varied in size and power between 
ad unum pedem (for one foot) and those ad duos pedes (for two feet) although it is unclear by the 
mid-thirteenth century if this still denoted the method of spanning or simply the power of the bow 
in question.108 A whole industry in castles such as St. Briavell’s and the Tower were responsible for 
manufacturing the bolts for these.109 These specialists helped form a small core of professional 
experienced troops both in garrisons and on expeditions. Roger Leybourne’s campaign into Essex 
against the Disinherited in 1266 for example, as well as boasting thirty knights and several hundred 
archers, also contained seven sergeants-at-arms, seven king’s grooms and seven king’s 
crossbowmen.110  
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Shire Levies 
While the household troops formed a small disciplined core which could be supplemented by 
mercenary troops, the shire levy remained an important means of raising large numbers of men for 
campaigns. These levies were frequently called upon during the civil war. At the site of the Battle 
of Lewes approximately 1500 bodies buried in three pits were discovered in 1810, most of which, 
due to the low recorded death toll amongst the knights, were probably infantry levies or Scots sent 
to Henry III.111 They were also mustered to repel the queen’s threatened invasion in the summer of 
1264, the siege of Richmond in 1265 and the campaign against the Disinherited in East Anglia in 
1266. The reign of Henry III had witnessed a series of statutes of arms in 1223, 1225, 1230, 1233, 
1238, 1242 and 1253, most prior to the launching of a major royal campaign. These statutes 
marked significant developments in the organisation of the shire levies. The 1242 de forma de 
pacis conservanda stipulated that in each hundred there would be one or two constables who were 
charged with checking the equipment of the men of the hundred and who would be in turn 
answerable to the sheriff for their state.112 In London and probably several other towns like 
Canterbury, the city militia was organised on the basis of the city wards. Appointed alderman, men 
like Arnald fitz Thedmar, provided their ward’s banner and ensured that each ward was raised and 
its array checked.113 The city as a whole in the war served under the appointed constable and 
marshal of London, Thomas de Piwelsdon and Stephen Buckerel, and followed the city standard.114 
Although we lack direct evidence for the organisation of other town militias in England they were 
probably raised along the same lines. The power for raising the levies lay with the king alone, but 
the system could be easily abused by groups on both sides if the local constables raised men 
without official authorisation. The Marchers’ assault on Hereford in late 1264 was accompanied, 
according to an inquisition late that year, by the posse of Shropshire led by the royalist sheriff.115  
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The levies were restricted to forty days service, but were sometimes pressured to serve for 
longer during the civil war. Simon the Younger’s siege of Pevensey in 1264 initially relied on the 
posses of Surrey and Sussex, but by 27 November firm orders were issued by the Montfortian 
government that they were to be disbanded and not to be distrained or harassed, due to both their 
labours during the siege and in the defensive efforts of the summer.116 Montfort, heavily reliant 
upon the good will of the populace for his support, may well have feared the potential for a 
backlash from pushing the service of the county posses too far beyond the forty days.117 For the 
sustained royalist siege of Kenilworth, detachments of men from different regions were probably 
sent for the forty day period, with fresh ones being raised to replace them at periodic intervals. 
Northampton’s recorded contribution to the siege was only forty men, a lot less than the full 
number of men it could raise under the 1242 statute’s terms that stipulated all men from 15-60 
years must bear arms.118  
It is important to remember, as Carpenter remarks, that ‘village society was highly 
militarized’.119 The 1242 de forma listed the expected equipment brought by men in the event of a 
muster according to the value of their lands or chattels. The 1253 statute innovatively spread this 
burden further by insisting that vills provide the bows, arrows and light weapons (levibus armis) at 
their own cost and retain these for the use of the vill. Michael Powicke argues that this is the ‘first 
evidence of communal responsibility for arms’.120  
The question arises what sort of proportion of the eligible populace was expected to fall into 
each category? The richest group (£15 of land or 60 marks of chattels) were the wealthy sergeants, 
as from 1241 the assumption of knighthood by those possessing lands yielding £20 per-annum 
became obligatory, regardless of whether such land had previously been classified as a knight’s fee 
or was held in chief or not.121 Those groups below the £15 boundary were sergeants and wealthy 
peasants. 
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Land Value Equipment 
£15 Hauberk, helmet of iron, a sword, knife and horse 
£10 haubergeon, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife 
100s a doublet, a helmet of iron, a sword, a lance, a knife 
40s-100s sword, bow, arrows, a knife 
less than 40s scythes, gisarmes, knives and other small weapons 
Chattel Value 
60 marks Hauberk, helmet of iron, a sword, knife and horse 
40 marks haubergeon, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife 
20 marks a doublet, a helmet of iron, a sword, a knife 
10 marks sword, bow, arrows, a knife 
Less than 40s-10 marks scythes, gisarmes, knives and other small weapons 
Table  1:4 Wealth and Arms122 
Carpenter’s study of the involvement of the peasants of Cambridgeshire and Buckinghamshire 
recorded in the Dictum Eyres draws on information from the Hundred Rolls for their wealth. None 
of the numerous examples he cites would have exceeded 40s-10 marks.123 The probability is that 
the majority of men mustered would have been in the last category. This explains Montfort’s 
stipulation on 9 July 1264 that those coming to the coast should be the ‘best men, mounted and 
foot’, noting in particular that they should be equipped with lances, crossbows, bows and axes.124  
The popular appeal of the muster that summer was mentioned by fitz Thedmar, who describes 
‘innumerable people’ travelling to the coast on both horse and foot. On 4 October 1264, the ‘poor 
men’ of Suffolk were excused from attending due to the burden it placed upon them and instead the 
army was to be composed of the ‘knights, free tenants and all others who are able to bear arms and 
have tenements by which they can be sustained’.125 Quality rather than quantity of recruitment was 
apparently the preferred approach of Montfort.  
The shire levies were a key component of the forces raised in the Barons’ War and were 
utilised heavily by both sides. Not only did they provide large numbers of men but the 
militarization of village society meant that they were equipped to conduct the war at a local level as 
well. Out of all the groups discussed in this chapter, the shire levies are also the one we know least 
about, despite on some occasions providing the bulk of the forces present. Military experience is 
impossible to trace and we can only see some of their local actions in the surviving eyre returns.126  
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Nevertheless it is important not to ignore or sideline the involvement of these forces in the conduct 
of the Barons’ War.  
 
Archers and Archery 
Archers (saggitarius) are a relatively hard body to trace during the Barons’ War. While the 1242 
De forma required anyone with either land valued at between 40-100s or 10 marks in chattels to 
possess a bow, it also stipulated that ‘all others who can do so, shall have bows and arrows outside 
the forest; those within the forest bows and bolts’.127 How large a section of the population was 
expected to be equipped with bows is unclear. The tactics of mass archery later to be employed by 
medieval English armies are not apparent during the Barons’ War and the decades preceding it. 
Crossbowmen remained better paid than a conventional saggitarius, receiving daily 3d compared 
to 2d in Roger Leybourne’s account of the expenses of Nottingham garrison of 1267.128 While 
royal government manufactured large quantities of crossbow bolts at its major castles, by contrast 
the 1253 assize of arms had made it the responsibility of the vills to provide their bows and arrows, 
and their manufacture remained principally vill based during the war.129 Nevertheless, archers did 
play an important role in the composition of English armies. Roger Leybourne’s accounts for his 
campaigns of 1266-7, particularly against the Cinque Ports and into Essex, record the use of 
hundreds of archers. In 1266, 527 were used in the assault against Winchelsea and 500 in Essex. 
They seem to have been primarily from the Weald.130 In 1264, the ambushes by Weald archers on 
the royal host’s march through the Weald to Battle Abbey and the subsequent killing of the king’s 
cook, Master Thomas, drove Henry to have 315 local archers rounded up and beheaded at Flimwell 
and then to fine the abbot of Battle because some had been his tenants.131 Montfort likewise placed 
an equal emphasis upon the provision of bows and crossbows alongside other weapons in the 
summer of 1264.132 The ratio of archer to non-archer is impossible to accurately assess as most of 
these archers have made it into the records because they were in receipt of royal pay and we cannot 
accurately compare them to the numbers of men serving in retinues or as part of the county posse. 
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The impression these examples provide though is that English armies did prefer to maintain a very 
sizeable percentage of bowmen at the period of the war. 
Archers serving for wages were also relatively regularly employed in castle garrisons during 
the war. Eleanor countess of Leicester took twenty nine archers, who had served with her son 
Simon the Younger at the siege of Pevensey, into the garrison of Dover where she was residing.133 
Similarly twenty archers were employed in the Nottingham garrison, a ratio of 2-1 over the waged 
crossbowmen.134 Those men serving for wages would probably have worn the livery of their lord; 
those in royal service presumably wore the king’s. Roger Leybourne’s campaign expenses for 
Essex in 1266, for example, record 200 tunics purchased for stipendiary archers serving in his 
force.135  
That bows and crossbows were in wide circulation in England at this period is quite evident 
from legal records, which feature multiple cases of death caused either accidentally or deliberately 
by men armed with bows or crossbows. In one incident on 23 April 1264, a member of the abbot of 
Kirkstall’s household was accidentally shot and slain in the darkness by a fellow when they rushed 
outside to fend off a band of robbers trying to plunder the abbot’s cattle.136 In another undated 
domestic dispute, two brothers, armed with bows and arrows, assaulted a tavern, broke down the 
door and one was killed by being shot with an arrow by the son of the owner.137  
The reasons for this preference are not too hard to conceive. As defensive weapons crossbows 
were especially useful. Missile weapons were also a way to make the otherwise lightly armed and 
ill trained peasants militarily effective on a battlefield. Archers were capable of moving swiftly 
through cover, could kill horses at a distance with their arrows and could be used to devastate the 
lightly armoured troops in an opposing army. Accounts of the 1224 siege of Bedford, for example, 
record many casualties inflicted upon the attackers assaulting the outer bailey.138 At Rochester in 
1215, King John executed the crossbowmen in the garrison, while during the first siege of 
Gloucester in 1263 a carpenter equipped with a crossbow killed a squire. After the castle’s 
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surrender the man was thrown from the keep in revenge.139 This latter example in particular may 
help partially explain an intriguing point, namely the apparent dearth of knights recorded as killed 
by arrows or crossbows. While better armour quite probably contributed to this, the brutal 
treatment meted out to archers and crossbowmen if they caused heavy casualties or killed higher 
status individuals may reveal a reluctance to target such individuals because the kin, followers or 
lord of the killed man might well seek revenge.  
Retinues 
The retinues and forces that the earls, barons and knights could field were an important component 
of armies during the Barons’ War. The comparative paucity of source material for seigneurial 
retinues in the early to mid-thirteenth century has left the topic understudied in comparison to work 
done on the retinues from the end of thirteenth century. This issue had resulted in the 
underappreciation of both their numbers and role in the civil war. The existing studies of the mid-
thirteenth century retinues of William de Valence, Simon de Montfort, Roger de Quincy and Roger 
Bigod have focussed primarily upon the knights in their service.140 This focus is largely the product 
of the limitations the reliance upon charter witness lists imposes. While these provide information 
on the inner circle of a lord’s familia, it usually only does so for those of knightly class. In the same 
manner as the king’s familia, men of lower status formed part of a lord’s retinue as well. The nature 
of military retinues from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries has attracted considerable debate.141 
In particular there has been discussion as to the comparative fluidity of their membership over 
different campaigns; the changing composition of these retinues from ones primarily based around 
men-at-arms to mixed forces of men-at-arms and archers by the time of the Hundred Years War; 
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and the change from annuities and tenurial bonds to contracts of indenture.142 In particular, Andrew 
Spencer has demonstrated that by the 1290s, due to the demands of the wars in Scotland and 
France, comital military retinues came to be composed of men on five grounds; ‘familial 
relationship; ties of service; tenurial relationship; ties of neighbourhood and military 
practicalities’.143 While Spencer argues that this is in many ways identical to the composition of 
retinues in the fourteenth century, the point can be stretched further back in time as all these issues 
are equally applicable to seigneurial retinues of the 1260s, although we are not blessed with the 
same available information. 
Seigneurial retinues can be subdivided into those of earls, bannerets and knights bachelor 
(lesser knights).144 The principal division, however, is between the military retinues of earls and 
bannerets, which had a number of knights serving in them, in contrast to those of knights bachelor, 
who might have at most one.145 These retinues, comprised of knights, sergeants and other 
individuals, provided small but significant groups that helped form the core of most forces on both 
sides during the war. Both types of retinue were composed of those serving either for pay or 
through teneurial obligations. Just as with the familia regis, this could include knights serving for 
an annuity though these are far harder to detect due the general lack of surviving seigneurial 
accounts. As Stenton remarks, ‘the household knight is an elusive person’ as his lack of lands 
means he rarely appears in many of our records.146 Additionally, as Simpson notes in his study of 
Roger de Quincy’s familia, given the variety of methods of referring to individuals, particularly 
less prominent ones, it can prove ‘difficult to establish a coherent sequence of biographical facts 
about some members’.147 He notes that the inner circle of those apparently closely associated with 
the earl consisted of a mixture of the earl’s relations, stewards and administrators; some of whom 
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possessed ‘modest’ lands while others ‘appear to be landless men perhaps receiving a form of 
salary.’148  
While the discussion of comital military familias has focussed upon knights, these were only a 
small part of a retinue. Ridgeway’s study of the retinue of William de Valence up to 1272 
estimated ‘an average annual strength of a dozen or so knights’ and provides ten names for the 
period of the war.149 These knights might also provide their own knights, and presumably sergeants 
and squires as well. Simpkin’s study of average retinue sizes of knights bachelor based on horse 
inventories for Edward I’s campaigns (which sadly do not exist for the civil war) calculates for the 
earliest date, 1282, an average of 5.5 mounted individuals per-retinue leader. Of this figure, only an 
average of 0.8 of those in the retinue were knights, 4.7 being of sub-knightly status.150 Simpkin’s 
examination of the company sizes of bannerets and bachelors recorded in the Wardrobe book in 
1297 shows bannerets averaged a company of thirteen men (knights and lower) while a bachelor 
managed 3.2. These figures remain roughly consistent in Simpkin’s survey up to 1303-4.151 This is 
in line with the average size of a banneret’s force in the late twelfth century, estimated by 
Prestwich from the figure given by William Marshal of 15 bannerets providing 200 knights for 
Henry the Young King’s tourneying retinue in 1179, yielding an average of thirteen knights per 
banneret.152 Given that the number of knights was decreasing during the thirteenth century, many 
of those who might have been knights in the twelfth may have been classified as sergeants by the 
late thirteenth century.153  
Hugh de Neville’s testament in 1267 provides an insight into a contemporary knight bachelor’s 
retinue. Hugh, a former rebel who had surrendered at Axholme in 1265, had subesquently gone on 
crusade to Acre. There he made provision for four individuals: his page, Jakke the Palmer, Pain, 
whom he described as ‘my man’ and who was at that point beyond ‘the sea of Greece’, and another 
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two men, Lucel le Cu and Beverle, who were presumably already with Hugh.154 Hugh had a 
military retinue of at least four men (with a chaplain and clerk as well), which match the figures 
given by Simpkin for Edward I’s reign. This was also the retinue maintained by a man in 
apparently straightened financial circumstances as a result of the war and the cost of his crusade, 
according to a letter to him from his mother.155 Hugh’s military retinue size and composition could 
be viewed then as essentially a basic core of personnel that a knight would take on campign with 
him, albeit in Hugh’s case in the special circumstances of a crusade. 
Civil war conditions might affect numbers within retinues in several ways. The figures 
provided by Simpkin concern those retinues raised to meet an expected number of men for a 
foreign expedition, while military retinues during the civil war could potentially draw on all of a 
lord’s available resources, as they were fighting closer to home. Some retinues might suffer 
depreciation due to the split loyalties of their followers, but more men might also be realistically 
mustered for short periods, including men serving as infantry. Potentially a lord could call out all of 
his tenants. While we have little evidence from the war for the numbers of tenants serving with 
their lords, evidence from prior to 1264 suggests this could yield very large numbers of men. In 
1253, for example, William of Kyme was accused before the king’s court of sending 300 of his 
men to raid the lands of William Bardolf at Awick and Coteland in Lincolnshire with Benedict his 
sergeant appointed as their constable.156  
Applying the above points to the pre-exisiting studies of comital military familias provides a 
clearer context to the number and types of men forming these retinues. In the retinue of William de 
Valence, for example, if, for the sake of argument, we apply to each knight the 1282 figure of 5.5 
men,157 (including sergeants, squires, perhaps other retainers, as a core military retinue like Hugh 
de Neville’s), what starts as a list of ten knights swiftly expands to be an armed retinue in 
Valence’s service of 60-70 men and perhaps higher. Such a figure would lend credence to 
Guisborough’s claim that John de Warenne, Valence and Guy de Lusignan fled the battle of Lewes 
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with 700 chosen armed men of their household and familia.158 For the greater lords the numbers are 
far higher. The Lord Edward reportedly boasted a retinue of 200 horsemen prior to 1258, a very 
high number that would have done much to contribute to his financial difficulties.159  
The retinue of Gilbert de Clare provides a useful example of the composition of a comital 
retinue and its potential fluidity during the civil war. A survey of those named as associates of 
Gilbert de Clare during the war up to 1267 renders seventy nine names (excluding clerks). Eighteen 
are listed as yeomen, two as esquires, and twenty-one as either knights or bachelors, of which 
eighteen are of the latter. Five individuals whose status is unclear are classified as in Gilbert’s 
household, familia or service. One individual was Gilbert’s bailiff and another two men were 
involved in the seizure of rebel lands after Evesham on Gilbert’s behalf and five more are recorded 
as acting as his messengers.160 As Simpson remarks of de Quincy’s household, ‘the pattern of the 
familia is kaleidoscopic and changes constantly as men are drawn into it and pass beyond it’.161 
Most of our information for de Clare’s retinue comes from the post-1267 standoff at London and 
lists of those being pardoned for their part in his rebellion. Twenty-four of those listed in 1267 were 
rebels who had apparently received de Clare’s protection prior to or at London and were included 
in the terms of the peace deal. Some men had a longer association with de Clare, such as Sir Robert 
Hadris of Kent, who had served with him at Rochester in 1264 but who is not explicitly labelled as 
part of de Clare’s familia.162 Sixteen were labelled as being at London, but unlike others in the 
same list are not given an association with the earl. The Banastre brothers, Richard and William 
were part of John fitz John’s garrison at Windsor in 1265 and seem to have subsequently joined up 
with de Clare’s forces at London, receiving protection as a result.163 A William Atwell of Berkshire 
followed a similar path through the Windsor garrison and eventually became associated with de 
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Clare at London.164 De Clare’s retinue by this counting boasted at least twenty one knights by 
1267, a significant force. When the Disinherited arrived at Southwark it was to Gilbert de Clare and 
his army that the citizens of London turned to repulse them.165 The seventy nine individuals we 
have named, when factoring in twenty one knightly retinues averaging perhaps 5.5 men per-retinue, 
along with others in de Clare’s service, could have potentially mustered 200 men, probably a lot 
more depending upon the number of tenants he could bring out. The considerable military power 
that de Clare could raise is also demonstrated by the apparently great strength of the forces that the 
earl and his close ally, John Giffard, could muster. During Montfort’s final months trapped beyond 
the River Severn in 1265, the force at Giffard’s command was seemingly large enough to deter 
Montfort from accepting offers to battle.166  
The military retinues of magnates and knights were significant in forming the backbone of the 
forces of each side during the Barons’ War, but they are very difficult to trace in the surviving 
source material. The focus upon knights tends to overshadow the full numerical resources available 
in these retinues. Even when the great magnates were absent, a grouping of enough barons and 
knights could yield a significant field force. The inquest in 1265 following the Marchers’ attack on 
Hereford in November 1264 breaks their army down into distinct groups. It lists fourteen principal 
participants of knightly rank or higher, although some, such as Ralph Mortimer were probably part 
of a family member’s retinue (in this case his father Roger’s). These men brought with them ‘their 
men’, while Hamo Lestrange, royalist sheriff of Shropshire, brought ‘his posse of Shropshire’. 
Further, many men of the Liberty of the Prior of Leominster accompanied them. The marshal was 
identified as John de Turbeville. Together, this ‘great army’ arrived at Hereford ‘with banners 
displayed’.167 In essence the inquest identifies the principal components making up the army; 
fourteen or less retinues, probably containing a mixture of tenants and waged men, the shire levy 
and some men from the liberty of Leominster. Armies in the Barons’ War were heterogeneous 
affairs, the true scale of which is usually obscured by the focussing of records on landholding 
knights.  
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Mercenaries/Stipendiaries 
Distinguishing between a mercenary and a stipendiary can be a difficult task. Knights, sometimes 
foreigners who served in a retinue for wages or a fee rather than on the basis of tenurial links, are 
most usually referred to as stipendiarius rather than mercenarius. Both sides recruited knights from 
abroad. In 1261 for example, Henry III summoned help from the Count of St. Pol, with sixty 
knights; the long term Gascon troublemaker Gaston de Béarn with ten knights and mounted 
crossbowmen, and from Richard Munbeliard of Burgundy for three or four knights.168 Henry seems 
to have encouraged the recruitment of crossbowmen from Gascony, for as well as Gaston, two 
other Gascon lords, Galliard de Solio and Bertram de la Dils were also summoned, each to come 
with ‘good crossbowmen’.169 The Count of St. Pol was summoned again in 1267 to help break the 
standoff at London and the arrival of these troops seems to have had a key role in resolving the 
conflict. On this latter occasion the count was granted £324 for the expenses ‘of himself his 
knights, sergeants and esquires and for loss of horses for the time that he was with the king in his 
service in England’.170 It is hard to decide whether we should classify these men as mercenaries or 
stipendiaries. The term mercenary retained certain moral overtones that harked back to the 
notorious bands of Flemings, Routiers and Brabancons in the employ of kings such as Stephen and 
John, whereas those summoned by Henry III, like St. Pol, tended to be drawn from either his 
continental domains or from foreign allies often through the agency of Queen Eleanor.171 In effect 
these men were mercenaries though, or at least would have included those serving purely for pay.  
Montfort also made use of foreigners in his service, despite the considerable anti-alien 
sentiment in England during the war. His treaty with Llewelyn in 1265 granted him the service of 
Welsh infantry. A group of eleven men, possibly knights, who departed the rebel garrison of 
Kenilworth castle on 14 November 1265, possess continental names and were probably Simon’s 
stipendiaries.172 Robert of Gloucester, in an otherwise unsubstantiated statement, claimed that 
Gilbert de Clare had turned against Montfort in part due to his use of foreigners as castle 
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constables.173 There is little direct evidence for this, but the Flores remarks that when Montfort 
celebrated Christmas at Kenilworth in 1264 his familia was reported to have ‘no less than 140 
stipendiary knights’.174 As Maddicott points out, ‘the profits of war gave Montfort the means to buy 
up men and service’ and his military experience and reputation had in the past ‘often given him 
access to formidable numbers of mercenaries’.175 The downside of mercenaries, however, was that 
their service was acquired by money. If the money ceased they might well depart or plunder the 
countryside. Such a problem was likely for Montfort when trapped beyond the River Severn in 
1265 and this was also vividly illustrated in the Lord Edward’s 1263 raid on the treasure in the 
New Temple to pay his foreign knights.176 
The royalists made use of groups of Welsh mercenaries, particularly during the post-Evesham 
period. Roger Leybourne’s account records the use of Welsh scouts (Walenses exploratores) when 
campaigning in Essex in 1266.177 A surviving fragment of a record of Welsh mercenaries hired for 
an undated campaign in Henry’s reign provides an insight into the recruitment and organisation of 
these Welsh contingents. Recruited on a local basis, each company could vary in size from between 
a score to over 300. These were usually led by one or two constables, often mounted, sometimes 
with a barded horse, as well as one or two standard bearers. The majority of the men in the 
surviving documents appear to be from Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire; Calidcot for example 
raised a company of twenty footmen led by a constable on an unbarded horse. Turbeville controlled 
Coity provided one constable with an unprotected horse (nudas), one standard bearer and 369 
footmen.178 The smallest contingent, the Forest of Dean’s, provided only twelve men of the Forest, 
at a wage of 3d a day. These were presumably skilled archers as they were paid a higher wage than 
normal for that profession.179 The most noticeable feature of this recruitment was the sheer 
numbers often recruited. Most of these companies were between a hundred and three hundred 
strong, and these figures are only what can be identified from the remains of the documents. In 
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1242, perhaps the date of these records, Henry III requested as many as 4000 Welsh men to be 
recruited and sent to him for the campaign in Gascony.180 Much as under earlier English kings, the 
Welsh provided a ready source of good infantry willing to serve Henry III for pay, a resource 
which Montfort also tapped into in 1265.181 That the Welsh were unpopular in England is 
noticeable in the records. Montfort’s allies were slain by the locals in Tewkesbury as they fled 
Evesham, while one man accused of burglary in Windsor successfully shifted blame by claiming 
that Welshmen were serving in the area at the time.182 
A final type of stipendiary employed during the war was the engineer (ingeniator). These 
specialists were responsible for building, maintaining and deploying engines and other methods of 
siege warfare.183 A few of these men are traceable in royal service. Master Henry the king’s builder 
was responsible for making shields and providing other materials for the siege of Kenilworth.184 A 
Master Gerard the Carpenter was tasked with building two engines in Newcastle in November 1255 
and appears to be still in the king’s service in 1262.185 Some of the king’s crossbow makers seem to 
have doubled as overseers of the manufacture of siege equipment. John Malmort, maker of the 
king’s quarrels at St. Briavells, for example, was charged with making barbetains in 1260-1.186 A 
Master Peter the Engineer and his assistants were recorded in the expenses of Roger Leybourne at 
the assault on Sandwich in 1266.187 At least one engineer, a Master William, is recorded in 
Montfort’s service through the surviving accounts of the Countess Eleanor. He may have 
participated in the Montfortian siege of Pevensey and had some connection to Montfort’s engines 
defending Kenilworth.188 The Flores’ description of Montfort’s engines at Kenilworth as being 
‘Unheard amongst us and unseen’ might suggest Simon’s employment of foreign engineers, some 
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of whom he may have recruited as a result of his military campaigns in Gascony.189 Whatever their 
origin, these men provided a vital service to both sides during the war.  
 
‘Customs of War’ 
The concept of ‘customs of war’ has received major study in the past couple of decades by, for 
example, Strickland, Gillingham and Keen.190 This section examines the fundamental aspects of 
these customs in order to provide a contextual framework for their further discussion in relation to 
the topics of the following chapters.  
The capture rather than the killing of knights was a noticeable feature of both the battles of 
Northampton and Lewes in 1264, but in contrast both battles also saw very heavy casualties 
amongst the infantry.191 This behaviour was in line with the customs of war during the thirteenth 
century, which were influenced by the status of the participants and the region warfare was 
conducted in. Noble combatants could expect to be taken prisoner for ransom rather than killed, 
because the killing of fellow knights risked breaching a reciprocal code of behaviour, potentially 
endangering the killer and his compatriots in the future. It furthermore robbed the killer of a 
potentially lucrative ransom. This code did not usually apply to commoners, unless perhaps they 
were rich merchants, and they could be killed out of hand on a battlefield.192 At Saintes in 1242, 
both sides took prisoners but no knights are mentioned as killed.193 In Gascony, Montfort had 
captured and imprisoned but not executed rebel nobles like Gaston de Béarn. Even in Wales, where 
there was a history of executing even noble prisoners, such behaviour was becoming less common 
in the thirteenth century and several men are recorded as being taken prisoner and ransomed. Guy 
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de Brien, for example, was captured by the Welsh and ransomed back in 1257.194 Following the 
baronial victory at Lewes the royalists were ordered by Montfort to release without ransom those 
rebels captured at Northampton and to bring them before the king.195 Eight months after Lewes, in 
January 1265, the royalist knights John Bracebridge, Hugh de Tywe and John de Craunford were 
still receiving demands for the release of four prisoners they were holding at Shrewsbury castle.196 
Some of the Montfortians did well out of the proceeds of the ransoms of those royalists captured at 
Lewes. Hugh Despenser for one was paid 700 marks by Peter de Petrapont for Peter’s release.197 
The unequal distribution of ransoms in Montfort’s favour began increasingly to sour the 
relationship between Gilbert de Clare and Montfort between 1264 and 1265.198 
By the time of Evesham the enmity between the royalists and Montfortians had reached such a 
pitch that most of the Montfortian knights were slain on the field of battle and their army harried 
mercilessly, many reportedly pursued into the church and killed.199 Simon himself was killed, 
mutilated and his head mounted on a spear and paraded before being sent to Roger Mortimer’s wife 
at Wigmore.200 This is a stark contrast to the maximum of three knights reported killed at Lincoln 
in 1217.201 Executions for the crime of lèse majesté, as Strickland points out, occurred in the 
decades leading up to the war. In 1238, for example, a squire who attempted to assassinate Henry 
III was executed by being dragged apart by horses, his body cut in three and sent to different parts 
of the realm. This, however, was not at a time of war.202 A recently discovered narrative of the 
battle of Evesham recounts that a number of royalists swore an oath to deliberately cut their way to 
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Montfort and ensure that he did not leave the battlefield alive.203 The destruction of the Montfortian 
army and most particularly the mutilation of Montfort’s remains were a highly unusual event and 
one that even the royalist chronicler Wykes was disturbed by.204 The following chapters will 
consider in more detail how ‘customs’ of war were applied in the different theatres of the war and 
how these too might have changed.  
Conclusion: 
This chapter has attempted to present an overarching view of the nature and experience of warfare 
and its organisation in England at the civil war’s commencement. While England itself had enjoyed 
a remarkable period of domestic peace, military experience was available, especially in Wales from 
1257 onwards and on the tournament scene. Three distinct groups emerge who possessed the most 
active military experience prior to the war, the Marcher lords, the familia regis and the affinity of 
Simon de Montfort. The royalists appear to have had an early advantage, enjoying the military 
experience of both the Marchers and familia regis, as well as a preponderance of the older nobles. 
English society itself was highly militarized with both sides easily able to raise forces from a 
composite mixture of tenants, paid retainers and impressed levies. Small armies could be raised on 
an ad-hoc basis with some ease, of which the non-knightly component was of more significance 
than the numbers provided in royal records would suggest. The following chapters 3, 5 and 6 will 
provide additional discussion on this issue in relation to castle garrisons and local violence. These 
points were the foundations which underpinned the nature of warfare at the commencement of the 
civil war in 1264. 
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2 The Role and Significance of Castles and Towns 
before the Barons’ War 
When William of Newburgh dubbed the castles of England as the ‘Bones of the Kingdom’ in the 
late 1190s he did not exaggerate.1 Little had changed in the following seventy years to alter the 
validity of that view. The castle remained a fundamental lynchpin in both the military and 
administrative control of England in the 1260s, while the importance of English towns in the war is 
inextricably linked to that of the castles. Both were, as we shall examine, vital military objectives 
due both to the resources they commanded and their geographical significance. As such, they were 
crucial in determining the priorities of each side and thus the course of events in the civil war. 
Castles and towns therefore fundamentally shaped the nature of war in this period. First, we will 
study the role, nature and importance of castles at this period, as well as their physical state prior to 
the conflict. Second, we will apply the same approach to English towns, though a discussion of the 
state of town defences is reserved for Chapter 4. Third, we shall examine the struggle for control of 
the royal castles and the methods used to obtain it by both parties from 1258 until December 1263.  
 
‘The Bones of the Kingdom’: Castles in mid-Thirteenth Century 
R.A. Brown has argued that the ‘castles policy’ of royal governments since Henry II’s reign sought 
to redress the balance of military power in the crown’s favour by taking select seigneurial castles 
into royal hands; destroying key rebel castles and resuming control of royal fortresses from de facto 
alienation by noble custodians. In addition, expenditure on royal castles was increased and up to 
1224 the tendancy was, as Eales notes, for ‘the concentration of resources on selected key sites as 
on the accumulation of fortresses’. The result was a growing disparity between royal and 
seigneurial fortifications in terms of the strength of their defences.2 Architectural developments 
during Henry III’s reign saw an increasing emphasis upon heavily defended curtain walls and 
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gatehouses, with new gatehouses built at Shrewsbury, Bristol, Winchester, Nottingham, Corfe and 
Deganwy and with especially sophisticated works on the Black Gate at Newcastle-upon-Tyne and 
at Dover. Barbicans were also built in Henry III’s reign at Bristol, Dover, Lincoln, Marlborough, 
Scarborough, Shrewsbury and Windsor. As the defence of the gatehouse was emphasised, so too 
was the defence of the curtain wall from assault. Timber palisades were rebuilt in stone and at 
Windsor, Winchester, Nottingham, York and the Tower of London the number of mural towers 
were increased.3 These developments stand in contrast to the continuing French emphasis on the 
importance of the ‘donjon’ in castle designs. French architectural influences were evident, 
however, in the English royal keeps that were rebuilt during the reign, including the unusual 
quatrefoil design at York in 1245.4 Timber fortifications, however, remained commonplace even in 
major royal fortresses, for example, at Nottingham castle the outer bailey remained palisaded. 
Despite this, with the conversion of the defences of the middle bailey to stone, Wykes described 
Nottingham as having ‘no peer in the kingdom of England’.5 
The estimated average minimum yearly expenditure on castles under Henry II was £650, which 
rose to £1000 under John. During Henry III’s reign this average was £1,500, though inflation in 
building costs helps explain part of this increase.6 During Henry III’s minority, particular efforts 
were focussed upon resuming royal control over royal castles in the wake of the civil war.7 Despite 
these early efforts, over the course of his reign Henry opted to transfer on a temporary basis a 
number of royal castles into the hands of certain nobles. He did this not only to alleviate the burden 
of their maintenance on the already indebted Exchequer, but also to reward his supporters. 
Kenilworth, for example, which Henry’s father John had done much to reinforce, was granted to 
Simon de Montfort for his lifetime; Pevensey to Peter of Savoy and The Peak to the Lord Edward.8 
These factors combined saw the number of castles in royal hands dropping over the course of the 
reign from fifty-eight at its beginning to forty-seven at its end; a sharp contrast from the ninety-
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three held by John in December 1214.9 Henry’s main expenditure was therefore principally 
focussed upon a smaller group of castles than his predecessors, concentrating particularly on 
strategically vital fortresses such as the Tower of London, Dover, Gloucester and Windsor.10 In 
contrast, little real effort was made to maintain the lesser royal castles; as Brown comments ‘to 
restore their original timber defences would have been pointless: while to rebuild them in stone 
would have involved heavier outlay than their military importance could justify.’11  
Spending on Dover was exceptionally high. In the thirty five years following the unsuccessful 
sieges by Prince Louis in 1216 and 1217, Dover castle had ‘well over £6000’ spent upon it by both 
Hubert de Burgh and Henry III, including extensive defensive improvements to the gates and 
curtain walls.12 Likewise, Windsor had substantial defensive improvements made over the course 
of the reign including the completion of the curtain wall in masonry and new D-shaped towers.13 
Much work under Henry III, however, was focussed on improving the royal apartments and 
domestic arrangements in several castles, particularly at the Tower of London, Windsor and 
Winchester.14 These works included at least two heads dating from c.1250, a wall painting of the 
apocryphal miracles of the Virgin from c.1240, panels of a seraph and a prophet in the ceiling of 
the Painted Chamber and a Zodiac in the lower ward.15 By 1263, the author of the Flores felt 
compelled to note as an aside in its account of the developing crisis, that Windsor was the ‘most 
beautiful’ castle and at ‘the time there was no more splendid within Europe’.16 There had emerged 
by the 1260s a core of strategically placed castles upon which royal government concentrated its 
resources. This expenditure resulted in the formation of a ‘super league’ of royal fortresses which 
both physically displayed royal power and served as a strong point for a garrison.17  
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In contrast to their royal counterparts, the full number and scale of many seigneurial castles are 
nearly impossible to properly ascertain by the period of the civil war, due both to the lack of 
surviving financial accounts and the natural degradability of timber which leaves scant surviving 
archaeological evidence.18 The increasing resource gap, however, between the nobility and the 
crown meant that by the 1260s only the wealthiest of the magnates could afford castles on the scale 
of the great royal fortresses. The defences of many of these castles, in Pounds’ view, ‘were of little 
military significance’.19 Most seigneurial castles remained at least partially constructed in timber 
and could be little more than a manor complex surrounded by circuit of earth and timber defences 
and a ditch.20 The example from 1274 of Eaton Bray castle demonstrates this disparity as it was 
described in the inquisition post-mortem of George Cantilupe as ‘a manor, enclosed with moats and 
walls, and two drawbridges’ including ’a bridge [across the moat] towards the park, weak, with 
drawbridge and gate …[un]roofed and shaky’.21 While doubtless its defences were ample 
protections against opportunistic raids, the description given is not of a major fortress, in the style 
of Warwick and Beeston, capable of withstanding the latest techniques in thirteenth-century siege 
warfare. Timber did not entail that these were unimpressive buildings, but they remained more 
vulnerable to siege engines and fire than their stone counterparts.22 On the other hand, the timber 
and earth defences of old sites could potentially be put back into operation fairly quickly at the 
outbreak of war and for a low cost in comparison to their stone equivalent.23 The smaller role of 
these fortifications in comparison to the past, however, is reflected in the apparent lack of any 
condemnation or orders concerning their destruction by the royal government after the war. The 
emphasis in the reissue of Magna Carta in February 1218 was upon the demolishment of 
‘adulterine castles built or rebuilt since the start of the war.’24 As Coulson notes, in the aftermath of 
the Barons’ War there was ‘no tidying up of the castellated detritus as had followed 1154, 1176 and 
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1217’ and the issue of such fortifications makes barely, if any, impact on the comparatively far 
greater amount of surviving legal records covering 1264-7.25  
Coulson has strongly argued against treating castles as purely military installations as well as 
the imposition of artificial definitions of what did and did not constitute a ‘castle’.26 Asserting that 
castles were primarily administrative centres rather than being designed principally for war, 
Coulson notes that ‘surviving ornate early “keeps”’ including the White Tower (London), 
Colchester, Norwich and Rochester, to name a few, were ‘very evidently meant to be imposing, not 
to be defended’.27 In his view, noble architecture ‘was militant not military’ and it ‘was generated 
by status-aspiration more than by fear of violence’.28 Creighton stresses that the siting of many 
castles had more to do with the symbolism of power than strategic considerations.29 The discussion 
in the next chapter will examine this more fully, but the non-military interpretation of castles has 
some compelling points in its favour in the context of the Barons’ War.30  
 
The State of Royal Castles Prior to the Barons’ War 
The sustained period of relative domestic peace that England had experienced from the late 1230s, 
coupled with the strained financial resources of the crown, meant that by 1260 a number of the 
royal castles were in an increasingly parlous state of both repair and supply. The sudden interest 
displayed by the baronial council in the state of the royal castles after 1258 and also by Henry III, 
following his resumption of power, demonstrates both a contemprary acknowledgement of the 
potential for armed conflict by each side and the perceived importance of the royal castles in that 
event. At Scarborough castle, an inquisition in May 1260 discovered that there were holes or worse 
in the roofs of the great hall, great chamber, wardrobe, kitchen and stables. The hall in the inner 
bailey was omnino est discoperta, the keep was lacking four doors and twenty nine windows, the 
beams were broken and the floors of the corner towers of the keep were putrifacta et defecit. The 
wall circuiting the keep was collapsed in many places and the crenallations and alures of the walls 
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facing the town were in many places deteriorantur et magna indigent reparacione. To complete the 
sorry picture two of the bridges were putrefacte pro mangna parte and the castle was lacking in 
crossbow quarrels and all necessary arms for its munition.31 In June that same year, the sheriff of 
Yorkshire was ordered to begin the repairs ‘where absolutely necessary against the coming winter’ 
as well as spending £12 on repairing breaches in the wall.32 Scarborough was not alone in being in 
a less than optimal state in 1260. Between 1258 and 1260, Northampton castle was reported to be 
lacking roofs on several turrets and instructions were issued that the west wall, which was 
apparently close to collapse, was to be patched with timber.33 It is unknown how far these repairs 
had progressed prior to the war, though there are signs that at least Scarborough had been rendered 
defensible.34 Northampton castle possibly suffered further damage in the assault in 1264 and on 21 
April the new sheriff was ordered to repair the bretaschias, barriers and ditches. By November, 
fresh orders were issued to repair the buildings of the castle ‘which threaten to fall down’.35 The 
maintenance of the majority of royal castles, with perhaps the exception of those like the Tower of 
London and Windsor which served as royal residences, was not a priority in peace time and as such 
it is not unreasonable to assume that many, like Scarborough and Northampton, were in a poor state 
of repair by 1260.  
During 1261, Henry III maintained efforts to render the royal castles defensible as he prepared 
the ground work for securing his return to personal rule. An inquest carried out before Matthew de 
Mare’s brief tenure as constable of Sherborne in January to February 1261, witnessed that at the 
castle ‘all buildings, walls and everything else’ were ‘in a ruinous state (in debili statu)’. Corfe 
appears to have been in better repair, in part perhaps due to the order issued in September 1260 for 
the repair before the winter of the ‘the king’s buildings’ ‘which have fallen down’. Its equipment 
was less impressive, with the inquest recounting that ‘on the platform above the chapel at the top of 
the great chamber’ there were ‘two rusty hauberks, three pairs of large, rusty iron caparisons, thirty 
rusty iron caps, twenty five rusty helmets.’ While the castle was well supplied with crossbows there 
were however ‘twenty nine pieces, both bows and tillers, for crossbows, which had rusted, with six 
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rusty and also inoperable (immunitis) winches’. The castle’s mangonel was in pieces, with five of 
the slings described as ‘rusty and immunitas’. The last supply of equipment to the castle for which 
we have a record was in 1252, when thirty-six crossbows were provided to the garrison.36 In total 
the castle had armour for about sixty men, eighty bows, primarily crossbows and 26,000 bolts of 
varying sizes.37  
The process of repairing the royal castles seems to have been an on-going project. On 23 
February 1261, the sheriff of Wiltshire was ordered to repair the draw bridge of Salisbury castle as 
well as the well and to roof the [main] tower and the tower above the gate with lead where 
necessary.38 On 23 December 1261, the sheriff of Gloucestershire was ordered to let the keeper of 
the king’s works have 20 marks from the issues of the county to make two breast works 
(bretachias) and repair the king’s buildings in Gloucester Castle.39  At the Tower of London 
building work was increased a pace, with stern demands issued on 23 February to the sheriffs of 
Surrey and Kent to respectively send 1000 quarts of lime and twenty boat loads of ‘good free 
stone’ and another twenty of ‘stone and chalk’, both without delay to make a turret at the Tower. 
The aim of this work may have been to complete a section of the western curtain wall that had 
collapsed shortly after construction back in 1240 and which was still incomplete in 1253.40 
Payments for repairs recorded in the Liberate rolls fall off markedly after the resumption of Henry 
III’s personal rule in the middle of 1261. Whether this suggests complacency and overconfidence 
by the royalists, or that the necessary castles were now deemed to be in a fit state is unclear.  
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The Arteries of the Kingdom: Towns and Castles 
The involvement of towns in the Barons’ War was, to a significant degree, dictated by their 
strategic importance. Each significant town was of interest to each side for reasons of geography, 
resources (including man power), exploitable wealth, and their value as defensive or offensive 
bases. Gloucester, for example, commanded one of the best places to cross the river Severn and 
thence into Wales from the south-west and it served as an important port in the river trade of the 
Severn, and, via Bristol, onto Ireland.41 Dover and the other Cinque Ports were important harbours 
for trade with the continent. Towns were also usually foci for industry, frequently based on the 
resources of the local area. The iron industry in the Forest of Dean, for example, made Gloucester a 
centre for the manufacture of arms.42 Oxford was not only a major crossing point of the Thames, 
but also several major routes, such as from the Midlands to Southampton and from London via 
Gloucester into Wales, passed through it.43 Its location allowed it to act as a major trading point for 
the wool produced in the Cotswolds and the corn grown in the fertile lands around it. The town 
itself was an important centre of cordwainers and tanners, and maintained a strong cloth and wine 
trade with France and Flanders.44 If William of Newburgh could dub castles as the ‘the bones of the 
kingdom’ we should perhaps consider the towns as ‘the arteries of the kingdom’ through which its 
economic life blood flowed. Philippe Contamine summarizes the general importance of towns in 
medieval warfare most succinctly when he comments that they; 
…offered space, material and moral resources favourable for prolonged resistance and,… while 
a conqueror might easily ignore an inaccessible castle, it was absolutely vital to control such 
centres of economic, administrative and human resources as were represented by towns.45 
Fortified towns in particular played an important role as military bases during the war. Their size, 
geographical location and the protection offered by their walls made them an ideal centre of 
operations for each side. In particular, town defences significantly reduced the chance of a 
successful surprise attack on the forces sheltering within. The Lord Edward’s success at Kenilworth 
in 1265 was made possible by the decision of Simon the Younger to stay in the undefended town. 
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Likewise at Chesterfield, similarly unfortified, Henry of Almain’s men were able to sweep into the 
town unopposed by defences to capture Robert de Ferrers.46  
Towns and castles, particularly royal ones, were inextricably linked. Major royal castles were 
often sited in major county towns, and served as the administrative centre for a county’s sheriff, 
such as at Northampton, York, Gloucester and Hereford. Royal castles were more than a military 
base; they were often the centre of royal government with both administrative and symbolic value. 
The castle was also frequently an integral part of a town’s economy, as at Warwick (a seigneurial 
castle).47 Given their strategic importance, the presence of castles within most major towns is 
unsurprising. These castles often sat within the circuit of a town’s defences, if it possessed any, 
such as at Northampton, Gloucester, Lincoln and London.48 As a town’s castle was designed to 
guard and overawe the town, the citizens were naturally at a disadvantage if they came into conflict 
with its garrison. The control of the Tower of London was vital in determining London’s 
quiescence. Only with the arrival of de Clare’s army in April 1267 did those elements of the 
population in favour of the reformers gain ascendency.49 The loyalty of any castle garrison in a 
town would also likely determine any resistance by the town’s people. It is, for example, very hard 
to gauge the popular support by the citizens of Northampton for the defence against the king in 
1264 when the presence of a large baronial force in the castle and town rendered any objections by 
the citizens futile.  
The royal castles of the Tower of London, Dover, Gloucester and St. Briavells retained especial 
importance as the principal manufacturing points for crossbows, quarrels and other engines, which 
were then distributed throughout the other royal castles as needed. The location of, and industry in, 
Gloucester made the royal castle a strategically vital arsenal. Gloucester, indeed, previously had 
acted as a staging post for campaigns into Wales in 1228 and 1246-47.50 In one week of early 1264, 
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eight smiths were ordered to work on manufacturing crossbow bolts for the garrison.51 A handful of 
specialists in royal service were employed in this role in the 1260s: Thomas of  the Holy Sepulchre, 
maker of the king’s crossbows in Rochester castle before the war, and in 1265-66 at the Tower; 
Alan Smith (Faber), maker of the king’s quarrels at the Tower; a Henry, maker of the king’s 
crossbows in Windsor Castle; John de Malemort, maker of the king’s quarrels at St. Briavells, and 
Master Conrad, the artiller of the king’s horn crossbows and his three servants.52 These highly 
skilled men were responsible for the maintenance, manufacture and ammunition of the crossbows 
of royal forces, a time consuming job but well paid. John Malemort, for example, was paid 7 ½d a 
day for making a hundred quarrels and an additional 3d a day for the fletching.53   
Certain castles seem to have been used as depots or construction sites for the king’s siege 
engines, namely the Tower of London, Windsor and Gloucester.54 How many were kept stored 
there before the war’s outbreak is unknown. Most of our administrative records for siege engines 
come from the period of the siege of Kenilworth and thus may have been built specially for that 
siege. These include a berefridus or siege tower built at Gloucester castle for the siege of 
Kenilworth.55 Corfe contained one in 1261, while Carlisle had possessed two in the 1250s.56 The 
number of engines kept in storage in different castles is unknown. Castles and towns were an 
intrinsic part of the government and control of the realm and it is therefore unsurprising that the 
control of them would become so important to both sides, both before and during the war.  
 
The Struggle for Control of Castles, 1258-1263 
Either you return the castles which you have from the king or lose your head!57 
Simon de Montfort’s blunt declaration to William de Valence at the Oxford parliament in 1258 is 
both excellent testimony to the St. Albans chronicler’s view of Montfort’s forceful approach to 
dealing with obstacles, as well as to the beginnings of the struggle between Henry III and the 
baronial opposition for control over the royal castles in England. From 1258 until the beginning of 
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the war in March 1264, strenuous efforts were made by both sides to control royal castles. This 
section examines the course of events during this period, particularly the efforts put into acquiring 
the control of the castles at a time of nominal peace.  
In 1258, the changes of constables were done with the aim ‘to preclude any likelihood of a 
Henrician recovery’.58 The fear was presumably that Henry would garrison and stock his fortresses, 
holding out until he could summon foreign mercenaries and overawe any baronial opposition. 
Although the atmosphere was fraught it seems unlikely, given the Savoyard participation on the 
opposing side, that Henry contemplated using force at this early stage of events, even if Edward, 
Henry of Almain and the Lusignans were perhaps inclined to aggression. The barons decided to 
give him no choice, however, and in the twenty-fourth and final clause of the Provisions of Oxford 
appointed new constables to twenty one of the most important royal castles.59  
Constable 1258 Castle 
Robert de Neville Bamburgh, Newcastle upon Tyne 
Gilbert de Gant Scarborough 
William Bardolf Nottingham 
Ralph Basset of Sapecote Northampton 
Hugh Bigod The Tower of London 
Richard de Grey Dover 
Nicholas de Moules Rochester, Canterbury 
(absent from document) Winchester 
Roger de Samford Porchester 
Stephen de Longspée Corfe 
Mathias de Bezill  Gloucester 
Henry de Tracy Exeter  
Richard Rochele Hadleigh 
John de Grey  Hereford 
Robert de Walerand Salisbury 
Hugh Despenser  Harestone 
Peter Montfort Bridgnorth 
The earl of Warwick Devizes 
John fitz Bernard Oxford 
Table  2:1 The Constables Appointed in June-July 125860 
The act of resumption, which took back all alienated royal castles and lands, was aimed 
directly at the king’s half-brothers, William de Valence, Aymer, bishop of Winchester and Guy, 
who stubbornly refused to agree to the terms. It was this refusal which prompted Montfort’s 
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outburst.61 Following Montfort’s threat, the Lusignans escaped from Oxford with John de Warenne, 
earl of Surrey, and took refuge in Aymer’s episcopal castle of Wolvesey, outside Winchester. 
There they were swiftly besieged by the barons. The possibility of the use of force against the 
Lusignans had existed ever since the arrival of the armed reformers at parliament. At Wolvesey the 
gloves now came off to reveal the mailed fists beneath. The subsequent exile of the Lusignans 
marked the end of any potential armed resistance. The new constables were themselves a mixture 
of known royalists such as Robert Walerand, the steward of the royal household, and Mathias 
Bezill, a Burgundian Savoyard, and reformers such as Hugh Despenser and Peter de Montfort. 
Though humiliating for Henry, the change in constables was thus not an overtly aggressive act by 
the reformers. This stands in stark contrast to the changes in 1260 when Henry first began to regain 
control.  
Henry’s victory in the parliament crisis of 1260 allowed him to remove a number of the pro-
reform constables from eight royal castles. Most of these were firm supporters of Montfort (the 
exceptions were Robert de Walerand and William Bardolf) and this was a clear attempt by Henry 
to take back a firm grip on the royal castles.62  
Constable Appointed May 1260 Castle Replaced Constable 
Hugh Bigod Scarborough Gilbert de Gant 
Matthew de Columbariis Salisbury Robert de Walerand 
John Balliol Nottingham William Bardolf 
Thomas Gredle Northampton Ralph Basset of Sapecote 
James de Audely Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury Peter Montfort 
Roger Mortimer Hereford John de Grey 
William de Say Rochester John de Cobham 
Table  2:2 The Constables Appointed 19 May 126063 
Curiously there is no sign that the revival of Montfort’s fortunes around Michaelmas 1260 led to 
another change in constables, despite the appointment of Montfort and Edward’s supporters as the 
Justiciar, Chancellor and Treasurer.64 Perhaps, reliant as Montfort was on the support of the 
moderate Richard de Clare, earl of Gloucester and Edward, this act would have been perceived as 
too aggressive by his allies. Henry, however, apparently had no such scruples and he began to 
ready and repair the royal castles in the months following Montfort and Edward’s departure for the 
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continent in late 1260. On 28 January 1261, he ordered Robert de Walerand to deliver 15,000 
quarrels from St. Briavells to Richard of Cornwall for his castles, including 8,000 for two foot 
crossbows and 7000 for one foot.65   
On 9 February 1261, Henry retreated to the Tower of London. On 11th he temporarily 
appointed Matthew de Mara as keeper of Sherborne and Corfe castles, presumably with the 
intention to secure the south-west following the death of Stephen Longspée the previous constable. 
Geoffrey Gascelin, another royalist, was made constable of Hereford on the 27th, and on 4 March 
Robert de Walerand was appointed constable of Marlborough and Ludgershall.66 On 14 April 
Eustace de Balliol, brother of John, was made constable of Carlisle.67  
Henry’s efforts seem to have focussed upon securing those castles guarding the south coast, 
probably with the intention of permitting the ready arrival of foreign mercenaries. On 3 May, 
Henry arrived at Dover and removed Hugh Bigod as its constable and replaced him with the 
ubiquitous Robert Walerand and at Corfe replaced Matthew de Mara, a loyal if minor noble, with 
the influential Philip Basset.68 On 12 May, he ordered the sheriffs of Sussex and Hampshire to take 
oaths of loyalty from ‘knights, freemen and others’.69 The sequence of actions was completed with 
the arrival of the papal bulls that annulled the Provisions of Oxford. On 25 May, now nearly ready, 
Henry replaced Hugh Despenser as constable of the Tower of London with his chancellor, John 
Mansel, thus securing the royal hold on the capital. He then released the papal bulls at Winchester 
on Whitsuntide.70 Henry, now happy to act openly, began to reappoint the sheriffs as well as the 
constableships of major royal castles. In all twenty six castles had new constables appointed, 
mainly ‘from the baronage and ministerial elite’.71 Henry’s actions during the course of 1261 
demonstrated both his understanding of the levers of military power in England as well as his 
methodical approach to grasp and use them.  
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Table  2:3 Constables Appointed 9 July 126172 
The installation of rival baronial keepers of the peace from late June onwards saw the prospect 
of the use of force dramatically increase. A number of the royal castles remained out of royalist 
hands, their constables refusing to hand them over to the king’s appointees. In Suffolk and Norfolk, 
for example, the royal sheriffs were blocked from holding the castles by the keepers and Roger 
Bigod, earl of Norfolk. Hugh Bigod, Roger’s younger brother, refused to surrender Scarborough 
and Pickering.73 Henry began to ready the castles under his control for potential siege as the 
opposition to his revocation of the Provisions intensified and he awaited the arrival of his foreign 
allies. On 20 October, a stream of writs were sent to the constables of Lancaster, Shrewsbury and 
Bridgnorth, Gloucester, Devizes, York, Rockingham and Northampton promising their 
reimbursement for any money spent on the victuals for their castles, as long as they remained to the 
king, ‘unless by reason of war they are consumed in its defence’.74 The constables of Nottingham, 
Norwich and Carlisle were likewise promised recompense for expenditure on the ‘king’s houses 
and other works’ in their castles.75 On 9 November, John Balliol was busy augmenting the defences 
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Castellan Appointed July 9th 1261 Castle Replaced Castellan
Reynold son of Peter Winchester William de Wintreshill
John de Muscegros Exeter Henry de Tracy
John de Grey Hereford Roger Mortimer
Alan la Zuche Northampton Simon de Patteshull
William de Grey Lincoln Hamo Hauteyn
Ralph Russel Salisbury Matthew de Columbariis 
Philip Basset Sherbourne and Corfe Philip de Cerne
Philip Basset Hadley Richard de la Rokele
William de la Zuche Guildford John de Wauton
James de Audely Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury William de Kaveriswell
Philip Marmion Norwich, Orford Hervery de Stanhou, Roger Bigod
John Balliol Nottingham William son of Herbert, Simon de Aslakiston
John de Plessetis Sauvey William Bagod
Peter de Percy York John de Oketon
Adam de Jesmond Newcastle Thomas son of Michael
Eustace de Balliol Carlisle sheriff of Cumberland?
Robert de Walerand Canterbury, Rochester John de Cobbeham
Matthew de Mara Colchester Roger Bigod
Philip Basset Oxford Walter de Ripariis
Aymo Turemberd Windsor ?
John Lovel Cambridge, Huntingdon? John de Scalariis
Adam de Montalt Lancaster Geoffrey de Chetham
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of Nottingham with wooden hoardings.76 Peter de Percy, sheriff of Yorkshire expended £32 9s 6d 
of his own money on the wages of knights, crossbowmen both mounted and un-mounted, and 
archers in chasing the baronial partisans John de Eyvill, Adam de Newmarket and Richard Foliot as 
well as garrisoning York castle for 5 days from the 24 to 28 November.77 By December, Henry’s 
twofold tactic of negotiations and the threat of force had paid off and he was finally returned to full 
control of England without needing recourse to open warfare. Throughout this crisis, castles had 
played a key role, and were to continue to do so.  
 
The Barons’ War may not have officially started until 1264 but in reality the first major fighting 
broke out in June 1263 in the March of Wales. Remarkably, despite the growing crisis in England, 
Henry made no recorded effort to prepare the royal castles in the first half of the year and it was 
only following the Marchers’ rebellion in June that Henry began to ready his defences. Henry’s 
priority, as in 1261, was to secure the castles on the southern coast. His first act was to appoint on 9 
June, Nicholas de Crioll as warden of the Cinque Ports, with orders to the constable of Dover, 
Robert de Glastonia, to counsel and aid him. Henry also instructed the people of Dover on 10 June 
to provide ‘two or three of the most approved men for the security and defence of the said port by 
land or sea’.78 Two days later Henry began to arrange the defence of the rest of the kingdom, 
appointing Stephen of Penchester as captain for the defence of Kent and Sussex and Robert de 
Neville as captain for the lands north of the Trent. The constables of Rochester and Corfe were 
replaced and other royal castles were ordered to be provisioned, including Shrewsbury and 
Bridgnorth, both of which had already defected to the rebels.79   
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Constables ordered to Provision 
castles Castle Date 
James Audley Shrewsbury?, Bridgnorth June 16th 
Philip Basset Oxford, Devizes June 16th 
Adam de Jesmond Newcastle  June 16th  
Hamo le Strange Shrewsbury?, Bridgnorth June 16th 
Robert de Walerand Dover, Marlborough, Ludgershall June 17th 
Ralph Russel  Old Sarum June 17th 
Table  2:4 Constables Ordered to Provision Castles, June 126380 
A curious omission from this list was Nottingham castle. It is possible that the castle may have 
been seized already, but there is no evidence to confirm or deny this. In the North, de Neville had 
been ordered to defend against those who ‘devastate the lands of the king's faithful men by fire, 
plunder and other means’.81 De Neville’s position was tenuous; the lands north of the Trent were a 
vast area with significant tracts of it dominated or contested by the rebels. He was faced with a 
nearly impossible task, as he politely pointed out to the chancellor, Walter de Merton, a few days 
later.  
I have recently received the letters of the king, containing that he has appointed me his Captain 
of his counties beyond the Trent, (…) and the custody of the shire and castle of York. Truly, 
because to assume such is not possible without great expense, I have been led to beg (…),your 
counsel and help (…) in order to signify to me where and from whence, (…) I shall be able to 
acquire the money for the custody of the before said county and castle.82 
 
The situation was, however, deteriorating faster than Henry could react. In the March, the 
Marchers’ rising had sealed off the river Severn. They first stormed Hereford then seized 
Bridgnorth, Shrewsbury, Worcester and later Bristol, as well as Robert de Walerand’s castle of 
Kilpeck.83 Gloucester was besieged and taken.84 In the wake of the successful coup, Montfort, now 
in control, followed the pattern set by Henry and appointed new baronial keepers for eight royal 
castles. Five castles he put under the control of his supporters, including Peter de Montfort, John de 
la Haye and Ralph Basset of Sapecote.85 This was a surprisingly limited change in some ways, with 
castles like Bamburgh, Scarborough and Newcastle receiving no new appointments. Gloucester 
castle was held by the Marcher Roger Clifford, while Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth were in the the 
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hands of Hamo le Strange.86 Montfort either trusted his Marcher allies or he had only limited 
control over them as they remained in control of the castles they seized. Once more the need to 
prevent or obtain outside aid saw the south coast castles become the first objectives.87  
Baronial Keeper  Castle Previous Constable 
William Bardolf Nottingham John Balliol 
Henry de Tracy Exeter John de Muscegros 
Peter de Montfort Corfe, Sherborne Nicholas de Molis, Philip Basset 
John de Eyvill York Robert de Nevill 
John de la Haye Winchester Reynold Son of Peter 
Richard de Grey Dover H. bishop of London 
Ralph Basset of Sapecote  Northampton Alan la Zuche 
Table  2:5 Montfort's Appointments, 18 and 26 July 126388 
The collapse of the new regime was marked by Edward’s bold seizure of Windsor castle on 16 
October, where he was joined shortly by his father. On 25 October, Pevensey castle was committed 
to Edward by Peter of Savoy, then abroad, presumably as part of an attempt to organize the royalist 
campaign in the south. The Montfortian constable, John la Warre was ordered firstly, not to molest 
the men within and secondly, to grant safe-conduct to Edward’s men coming and going from the 
castle and finally, to prevent any plots against it.89 Similarly in Yorkshire on 6 November, Savoy’s 
steward, Guiscard de Charron, was appointed to hold Savoy’s castles and lands including 
Richmond.90 In late October to early November, Henry left Windsor with ‘a great force of men’ 
and proceeded to regain control of the chancery at Oxford, though it is unclear if he also took the 
castle. Next he took Winchester castle, expelling the baronial appointee John de la Haye, before 
making his move on Dover.91  
The seizure of Windsor highlights not just the defensive value of the castle, which now put 
Henry and Edward beyond the reach of Montfort, but also provides a useful illustration of its 
function as a military centre. A letter patent on 29 October, a day after Henry had set out for 
Oxford,  instructed the constable to let Edward have from the castle, ‘4 great targes, 16 smaller 
ones, 6 one-foot crossbows and 3 haubergeons to the use of him and his household in going with 
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the king on his present expedition’.92 The targes in particular might have been for siege work, 
providing protection for crossbowmen. Control of Windsor meant control of the equipment stored 
there and a material advantage for royalist forces in their campaign. To help secure it he left 
reinforcements of 31 sergeants with the constable Drogo de Barentein from late November to early 
December.93 
On 3 December, the holders of Dover refused to surrender the castle to Henry without the 
permission of the absent warden, Richard de Grey.94 Unready to conduct a siege, the royalists 
retreated, and, after just missing Montfort at Southwark on the 11th, Henry began work on regaining 
command of other castles. From 12 December onwards a small flurry of writs were dispatched to 
constables such as Eustace Balliol in Carlisle and Roger Clifford in Gloucester, aimed at either 
gaining or confirming control of castles. Hamo le Strange, for example, was rewarded with the 
control of the manor and castle of Ellesmere and renewed efforts were made for Guiscard de 
Charron, to gain Savoy’s castles, Richmond and Bowes, both of which had been placed under the 
control of Robert de Vipont by the barons.95  
Conclusion 
The castle was a crucial implement of war and was treated as such by both sides in the run up to the 
conflict. The efforts expended to control, repair and garrison these dominated key periods of 
tensions from 1258 onwards. In particular it was the major royal castles which attracted the greatest 
attention, those that Henry III had concentrated his resources upon during his reign and which sat at 
strategically vital locations in England. The appointment of rival constables and sheriffs by the 
opposing sides was likewise part of the wider struggle for the control of England. As the centres of 
local administration and as major symbols of local power, control of the castles, particularly the 
royal ones, were crucial means of establishing the effective and symbolic authority of each side.  It 
was these considerations that helped dictate the strategies adopted by both sides before and during 
the war.
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3 The Castle at War 
Pounds contends that ‘castles played no significant role’ in the civil war with the exceptions of the 
capture of Northampton Castle at its commencement and the siege of Kenilworth.1 This chapter 
will challenge Pound’s view and, building upon the themes discussed in chapters 1 and 2, it will 
study the composition of garrisons during the civil war; the nature and problems of sieges in the 
conflict and the techniques commonly used; how the ‘customs of war’ were applied in this time of 
civil war and rebellion and how this compares to the period prior to the 1260s. The chapter will 
also examine the previously unstudied resistance of royalist castle garrisons and its impact between 
the battles of Lewes and Evesham and finally the logistics behind the biggest siege of the war, that 
of Kenilworth in 1266. The Barons’ War will be contextualised in terms of broader debates about 
the changing role of castles in war. Eales, in examining the role of castles in the civil war of 1215-
17, argues that most castles remained essentially unutilised in the conflict and that minor castles 
(by which he implies primarily seigneurial and lesser royal castles) were of low military 
importance.2 Prestwich’s study of the role of castles in Edward II’s reign concludes that, in contrast 
to the thirteenth century, castles played only a very minor role in in the struggles of the reign, in 
which there were only very brief sieges.3 This chapter will examine the extent to which the role of 
castles in the Barons’ War conformed to that of earlier and later periods. This chapter also provides 
the opportunity to examine the dispute over the primary function of the castle in the context of a 
single war rather than in the customary study of an individual castle or pan-century survey.4 
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Garrisons 
The garrison was the crucial constituent part to the function of the castle in wartime. As Coulson 
puts it, ‘the human element always came first’ in defence.5 This section will therefore further the 
discussion from Chapter 1 and examine the formation of castle garrisons during the war.  
Castles should not be viewed as simply defensive strong points, but also as vital bases for 
offensive operations. A castle might provide protection for those inside, but to control a region it 
required the presence of a garrison capable of reacting and covering ground swiftly.6 As a result, at 
least part of any garrison was usually mounted. In peace time the majority of royal castles were 
usually only staffed by a few porters and wardens. Garrisons of royal sergeants and crossbowmen 
both mounted and on foot, were usually retained only in major royal fortresses, such as the Tower 
of London, and the castles in the March.7 With the lack of comparable records for seigneurial 
castles it is hard to make an accurate assessment as to numbers and types of troops garrisoned 
within, but during peace time these were probably small. In wartime, garrison sizes were liable to 
fluctuate depending on the strategic importance of the castle and whether it was serving as the 
centre of operations for the fighting in its locality. Small groups of stipendiary troops, such as 
archers, could be assigned to bolster the defenders as and when needed, such as at Bamburgh in 
mid-1265.8 The surviving expenses account of Rochester castle in 1267, during de Clare’s renewed 
rebellion, demonstrates the fluctuating size of a wartime garrison. The garrison size is not listed but 
the number of horses for which oats are being provided regularly varies between ten and ninety six 
as men come and go from garrison.9 
In tempus guerrae, the king retained the right to demand the temporary render of a seigneurial 
castle into his hands and to garrison it with a royally appointed constable and troops.10 While this 
right became an issue in the 1215-17 civil war, particularly in sparking the siege of Rochester 
castle, the issue of render is less visible in the 1260s.11 The only two clear instances both involve 
                                         
5
 Coulson, Castles in Medieval Society, p.149. 
6
 Cornell, ‘English Castle Garrisons’, pp.240-262. 
7
 Walker, ‘Welsh Wars’, pp.92-3; J.S. Moore, ‘Anglo-Norman Castle Garrisons’, Anglo-Norman Studies 
XXII (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000), pp205-59; Prestwich, ‘The Victualling of Castles,’ pp.169-82. 
8
 C47/2/1/13; Pounds, The Medieval Castle, p.122. See also Chapter 3, pp.128-29.  
9
 E101/3/5. 
10
 C.L.H. Coulson, ‘Rendability and Castellation’, Chateau Galliard : Etudes de Castelllologie médiévale, 6, 
(Caen: Université de Caen, 1973)  pp.59-67. 
11
 I.W. Williams, ‘King John, Stephen Langton and Rochester Castle, 1213-15’, Studies in Medieval History 
presented to R. Allen Brown, eds., C. Harper-Bill, C. J. Holdsworth, J. L.Nelson (Woodbridge: Boydell 
 83 
 
Pontefract castle which was in the hands of Alice de Lacy, the widow of Earl Edmund of Lincoln. 
In 1264, Robert de Neville informed Henry III that he had garrisoned the fortress strongly. Just 
three days after the escape of Edward in 1265, a letter patent was dispatched to Pontefract castle 
instructing Alice that it was ‘unexpectedly’ required, and ordering her to surrender it to a Peter de 
Castre.12 While other renders may have occurred, they seem to have played only a very small role 
in the war. 
There are several pitfalls in attempting to make an accurate assessment of the numbers in 
garrison during the Barons’ War. Surviving records of royal castles often mention the number of 
men, knights, sergeants, crossbowmen and archers etc. that were serving in a garrison in receipt of 
royal wages. As Prestwich notes, however, a wartime garrison’s numbers were probably slightly 
higher than that indicated by the number of men receiving wages. Yet this data has sometimes been 
taken as a definitive, or nearly such, number of men in a garrison. In particular, care is needed to 
differentiate between a permanent garrison on foreign campaigns and those operating during 
periods of civil war, as in the latter situation those men receiving royal wages were liable to be only 
part of the garrison.13 An additional problem in the current historiography has been the consistent 
failure by historians to adequately differentiate between seigneurial and royal castles. This has 
resulted in an unhelpful blurring of the lines between the two.14 For the Barons’ War we have no 
information for the former but some for the latter, making it problematic to treat both the same. 
Men could join garrisons for a variety of reasons. The custom of castle guard, whereby men in 
the vicinity of the castle were required to perform military service in its garrison for forty days, 
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could be used to augment garrisons during wartime. The evidence for castle guard is, however, 
limited and in many cases ambiguous. Prestwich in particular casts doubt on its application into the 
thirteenth century, while Painter argues that castle guard was increasingly being commuted in 
return for payments.15 At Clun, in one known thirteenth-century instance of castle guard, the 
tenants of the seigneurial castellany are referred to as owing forty days castle guard during wartime 
in both 1254 and 1272. Suppe reckons that there were only nine knights or sergeants owing service 
on this basis.16 It is less clear how this system affected those men from the 100s in land value and 
40 marks in chattels or lower brackets. Clun, a castle based in the volatile March, is also by no 
means necessarily representative of seigneurial castles in the quieter regions of England at this 
period. Furthermore, the castle guard system’s ability to function in a time of civil war is open to 
question. Some men could also be compelled to join a garrison and thus would not necessarily 
appear on any wage roll.17 A civil war furthermore created circumstances of political polarization 
which meant that men might also volunteer for service in garrisons for reasons of personal 
adherence to one faction, and operating alongside impressed men and those serving in retinues.  
The garrison of Scarborough provides an excellent example of the likely composition of a 
wartime garrison. When it surrendered to John de Eyville in 1264 the garrison consisted of fifty 
individuals, of whom fifteen have surnames based on place-names within approximately 10-12 
miles of Scarborough. Another eleven have names that can be partially traced to lands further away 
but still within North and East Yorkshire. A further seven have names based on an occupation 
probably related to permanent service in the castle, e.g. Porter, Baker, Usher and Hunter, while 
there are also a Cobbler and Taylor, though these latter two may have come from elsewhere. One 
individual, Richard Marshal, was a king’s sergeant and two others carried the surname or title of 
Arbalester (crossbowman) suggesting they were also known by their profession and were 
stipendiary soldiers of the garrison. A number of men are difficult or impossible to place and could 
either have been other stipendiary troops or part of the retinue of Sir John de Oketon, the 
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constable.18 Scarborough suggests that during the war a garrison was usually a composite body of 
royal stipendiaries, retinue members, castle guard levies and volunteers.  
 
Siege 
This section of the chapter focuses upon the actual siege of castles during the civil war and 
particularly the key themes in their treatment and strategic importance. We will examine the 
‘customs of war’ in this period regarding castles and their application during the civil war; the 
effectiveness of castle defences in the face of attack and what this may reveal about the role of 
castles in warfare in light of the comments by Eales and Prestwich. Several important sieges afford 
more detailed case studies, including those of Gloucester Castle. 
Customs of War 
The established ‘customs of war’ regarding castle sieges seem to have been followed during the 
course of the Barons’ War. These unwritten norms of behaviour governed the treatment of 
garrisons whether a castle fell by storm or surrendered on terms. The ‘right of storm’, which could 
trace precedent back to biblical times, placed the lives and goods of the besieged in the hands of the 
besiegers. This custom gained particular prominence in previous rebellions against the crown in 
England, most notably King Stephen’s refusal to accept terms at Shrewsbury in 1138 resulting in 
the storm of the castle and the subsequent execution of ninety-three men. At the siege of Bedford in 
1224, the defenders were all hanged regardless of rank after the successful mining of the keep 
compelled them to surrender unconditionally.19 Remarkably perhaps, given the increasing 
bitterness of the conflict, there is no evidence of a mass execution of a castle garrison during the 
Barons’ War. The principal reason for this is that most castles surrendered, it seems, on terms. 
There are a number of castles that did fall to storm, principally Gloucester in 1263, Warwick, in 
1264, Alnwick in 1267, and a number of Marcher castles like ‘Hulkes’ (possibly Castle Coch) in 
1265, but if these garrisons were systematically put to the sword then the chroniclers do not say 
so.20 It is possible in the case of the capture of some small, lightly defended castles that the death of 
the entire garrison might have escaped attention during the confusion of the war but it is noticeable 
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that there was no execution on the scale of those carried out after the siege of Bedford. Following 
the capture of Gloucester in 1263, for example, although one man was executed, the constable 
Matthias Bezill and the other survivors were spared. William Mauduit, earl of Warwick and his 
family were taken prisoner when Warwick fell. At Alnwick, the Lord Edward’s assault took the 
castle but according to Wykes, Edward displayed notable leniency to the defeated garrison.21  
A demonstration of mercy by a besieger towards those captured in a siege was often motivated 
as much by practical concerns as moral. In 1216, after King John threatened to hang the rebel 
garrison of Rochester, he was warned that to do so risked reciprocal treatment of royalist supporters 
in the future.22 A similar disincentive was provided by the complex web of familial relationships 
that linked the opposing sides together in the 1260s. There are no recorded cases of tit-for-tat 
killings of castle garrisons, although after the defeat at Evesham the garrison of Kenilworth 
threatened to execute Richard of Cornwall and later severed the hand of the king’s messenger.23  
The surrender of castles on terms was the most common and least costly method of taking 
them. The custom of respite meant that a besieger could grant a garrison a stated period to seek aid 
from their lord. If the defenders’ lord failed to deliver aid, or granted permission to the garrison to 
surrender, the garrison would leave under terms.24 The most lenient conditions could permit men to 
depart with their horses and arms. Confiscation of these or agreements to refrain from bearing arms 
were also used. At Kenilworth, the final surrender occurred after the expiration of the requested 
customary forty day period for the garrison to seek aid from Simon the Younger.25  In June 1265, in 
return for yielding Gloucester castle and bearing arms against Edward in ‘no place’ for forty days, 
the garrison was allowed to depart not only with life and limb, but their arms, horses and ‘all other 
things’.26 One member of the Gloucester garrison, Grimbauld Pauncefoot, reportedly swapped 
sides following the castle’s surrender and was knighted by Edward as a reward.27 Two other 
members of the garrison, Robert de Ros and Robert de Lisle, likewise seem to have enjoyed a 
relatively swift return to favour. In 1266, de Ros, for his good behaviour following the surrender, 
was officially forgiven his trespasses, while de Lisle was granted the wardship and lands of 
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William de Aubeny’s heirs on 21 November 1265.28 Arranged surrenders remained preferred by 
both factions as the least costly method of resolving the fate of a castle, and this could often result 
in quite favourable terms for garrisons. The particular motivations of Montfort’s treatment of 
castles will be explored later in the chapter. 
The castle’s lord played an important role in any surrender. If the lord, whether seigneurial or 
royal, was not present, the lord’s appointed constable was not meant to surrender the castle without 
permission. If a constable failed to make at least the appearance of a sufficient effort to defend the 
castle they invited accusations of betrayal by their lord.29 In the complex political circumstances of 
the Barons’ War this issue could be particularly troublesome. On 8 and 15 February 1264, for 
example, Henry sent messengers to Dover castle demanding admittance. The garrison refused, 
claiming they could not hand over the castle without the permission of its absent constable, Richard 
de Grey, even though Dover was a royal castle and technically de Grey was an appointment of the 
king.30 Lordship, as in early wars, played an important role in the issues of surrender and resistance 
by castle garrisons. 
Siege warfare was not, however, free from acts of brutality, which was principally against non-
nobles. When the Montfortian attack on Rochester in 1264 was abandoned, for example, Montfort 
left behind a small holding force. The surviving garrison, upon realising Montfort’s army had 
departed, sallied out and defeated the holding force. In an act of revenge for the siege, the royalists 
severed the hands and feet of the captured, presumably non-noble, rebels.31 There are, however, 
very few recorded incidents of this nature.  
Siege Technology 
Siege technology played a significant if perhaps under reported role in the Barons’ War. It is hard 
to fully assess the impact of siege technology in the war as narrative accounts only provide details 
of sieges when it was of major castles, most notably against Kenilworth, as opposed to minor 
castles. The danger then is that we judge the effectiveness of mid-thirteenth century siege 
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technology on the basis of its success against the most powerful and modern fortresses, and as a 
result underplay its performance against weaker fortifications. Developments in siege technology 
had a material impact on the development of castle designs. Hubert de Burgh’s major augmentation 
of the defences of Dover castle, an already powerful fortress, in direct response to the damage 
inflicted by Prince Louis’ mining provides the most direct testimony to this effect.32 For the smaller 
royal and seigneurial castles the construction of such expensive improvements was unlikely and 
this contributed to the widening gap between the strength of the major and minor castles. 
In addition to starving a garrison out, there were several major tools at the besieger’s disposal 
in England by the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. For more sustained sieges the mine and the 
siege tower could be utilised. While the first use of the mine in England is unclear, the Gesta 
Stephani records that King Stephen used it at least once in his 1136 siege of Exeter.33 The mine was 
utilised to great affect against both Rochester and Dover in the 1215-17 war, and it once again 
proved decisive at the siege of Bedford.34 There is little indication, however, that the mine played a 
major role in 1264-67. The only two recorded attempts at mining were Montfort’s at Rochester in 
1264, and Henry III’s at Kenilworth in 1266. Both of these attempts failed; the former due to lack 
of time and the latter due to the moat around Kenilworth.35  
The erection of siege towers is recorded only at the siege of Kenilworth in 1266. These were 
used primarily to provide a platform to sweep wall tops clear of defenders and had been used at the 
siege of Bedford in 1224.36 Henry III and the Lord Edmund had each erected very large towers at 
Kenilworth. Edmund’s could reportedly host more than 200 crossbowmen while Henry III’s was so 
large it was named ‘The Bear’.37 Some of the materials for these seem to have come from 
Gloucester castle.38 Unfortunately, both these machines were destroyed after hits from the 
defenders’ own engines.39 
The main innovation by the Barons’ War was the introduction of the counterweight trebuchet 
into England. Siege engines, the traction petraria and the torsion mangonellus had been in use for 
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centuries. These were used to bombard castles with stones and fire, both to demoralise the enemy 
garrison and to affect a breach in the defences.40 The trebuchet was first recorded as being 
introduced by Prince Louis against Dover castle in 1217. By 1225, Henry III’s government had 
hired a Master Jordan as the king’s trubechetarius who, over a five year period was involved in 
constructing trebucheta (lighter counterweight lever engines) at Dover, Windsor and Winchester. 
That Master Jordan’s position was unique is indicated by the fact he is the only individual ever to 
be accorded this title by the royal government.41 While older siege engine designs, the petraria and 
the mangonellus were still in use at the siege of Bedford, Bachrach has demonstrated how by the 
1240s both had been or were in the process of being phased out of the royal arsenal by the new 
ingenia, which were specifically described as trebucheta or the larger blida. Royal records cease to 
refer to trebucheta after 1244, and thereafter it seems ingenia had become the accepted term.42 
These engines could inflict significant damage and enjoyed an impressive range, between 170 and 
420 yards depending upon the design of the machine.43 By the siege of Kenilworth, Henry III had 
deployed 11 engines to hammer the castle defences; some of these stones have subsequently been 
excavated.44 One of the clearest signs of the impact of the new engines on castle design is provided 
by an account for the construction of the new D-shaped towers on the western wall of Windsor the 
works of which were done ‘by view of the master trebucheter’.45 By the 1260s, these engines were 
not confined to royal hands. Montfort possessed engines at the siege of Pevensey and in 
Kenilworth. Gilbert de Clare deployed engines against the Tower of London in 1267; while the 
Marchers and Edward were able to use them against Gloucester castle in both 1263 and 1265.46 On 
11 May 1265, Montfort ordered the sheriff of Hereford to erect a building in Hereford castle for 
housing the engines he was bringing with him. He may have used these engines subsequently 
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against Monmouth castle.47 It seems highly probable that Montfort was able to deploy engines 
against the Marchers’ castles on his campaigns in the March in 1264-65 and this may have 
contributed to the swift fall of the Marcher castles.48  
Surprise  
A consistent theme in the accounts of assaults on castles in the Barons’ War is both the use of 
surprise attacks and the vulnerability of castles to this tactic. The logic behind launching a surprise 
attack was that it could capture a castle swiftly and with minimal bloodshed, while, in the recorded 
instances of failure, it did not seem to result in any heavier casualties on the attackers than a 
‘conventional’ assault. As a tactic it had no real downsides. The use of surprise attacks against 
Warwick and Alnwick were notably successful. Surprise meant a garrison might not be able to man 
the defences swiftly enough to repulse an attack, a particular problem if the garrison was small and 
could place only a handful of men on watch at any one time. An attack at night time or the early 
morning made early detection even harder and thus increased the chance of success.  If such 
techniques worked on strongly built and sited castles like Warwick, the likelihood of success 
against smaller, less impressively fortified seigneurial castles was even greater and it is probable 
that this technique was tried more often in local warfare than just those incidents recorded in the 
narrative accounts might suggest. An alert garrison might fend off the attack, but accounts of failed 
attacks highlight that it was those castles with concentric layers of defence (sometimes including 
town walls) which had the greatest chance of successfully responding to and fending off the attack. 
When, for example, Sir John Giffard and Sir John Balun attacked Gloucester in 1264, they used 
subterfuge to achieve surprise, reportedly fooling the gate guards of the town into thinking they 
were Welsh merchants. They failed, however, to take the castle. Again, in 1265, surprise helped 
breach the town walls of Gloucester, but once more the castle was able to hold out. In both cases 
the attackers would have been slowed overcoming the town’s defences, giving additional time for 
the castle garrison to become alerted.49 
The royalist attempt to free Edward from Wallingford in the autumn of 1264 provides the most 
interesting illustration of this type of attack. Determining that the garrison of Wallingford was 
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weak (according to Robert of Gloucester through the advice of the queen), Warin de 
Bassingbourne, the royalist commander of Bristol and member of the familia regis, led three 
hundred horsemen from Bristol in a surprise raid.50 Wallingford was a royal castle which Henry 
had granted to Richard of Cornwall in 1231.51 Over the 1240s, Richard substantially improved the 
castle with the construction of three concentric walls and moats on the northern side of the castle, 
making it one of the few concentric castles in England. Creighton has contended that these changes 
were done with the principle purpose of the conspicuous display of Richard’s wealth and power 
and dubs it a ‘concentric show-fortress’. In particular, Creighton notes that the course of the road 
into the borough of Wallingford was altered to bring it round the foot of the castle where Richard’s 
works, including the concentric walls, could be viewed to greatest effect.52 While part of Richard’s 
intentions behind the construction of this triple ditch and curtain wall may have been display, the 
improved defences also had a very practical defensive purpose. The northern approach to the castle 
was the only direction from which the castle itself could be directly attacked without first entering 
through the town. Although the town defences were in an unknown state by 1264, the significant 
bank and ditch and the provision of night watchmen dictated by Henry III’s 1242 de forma pacis 
meant that if the objective was to seize the castle by surprise, there was little practical incentive for 
an attacker to approach from that direction due to the increased risk of detection.53 
When Bassingbourne’s men arrived from Bristol at sunrise on a Friday morning they assaulted 
and breached the outer wall from the direction of the church of All Hallows, which lay directly on 
the road leading to the town from north. The attack seized the outer-ward, but the garrison were 
alert enough to contain them there and ‘with arbalests and with other engines, fast against them 
cast’. The attack was finally halted when the garrison threatened to hurl Edward from one of the 
castle’s mangonels, a threat Edward was forced to personally affirm, urging his would be rescuers 
to depart ‘otherwise he was dead in truth’.54 The new concentric defences of the castle were crucial 
in delaying and assisting in the detection of the royalist attack. Wallingford may perhaps have been 
a showy castle following its rebuild by Richard of Cornwall, but it was not a show castle. It would 
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have also provided a useful illustration to Edward of the benefits of concentric defence, a feature 
which he incorporated into both his later work on the Tower of London and into a number of his 
Welsh castles, such as Beaumaris.55  
Treachery 
The betrayal by some defenders of a castle is a recurrent theme in accounts of sieges in the war. 
The motives of these individuals likely varied but the narrative or legal records never elucidate the 
reasoning of those involved. Personal considerations rather than political ideology do seem the 
most likely cause. Simon the Younger’s recapture of Tonbridge castle after the battle of Lewes was 
reportedly assisted by a Roger de Fonte who had betrayed the castle’s state to Simon.56 Roger’s 
motivation is never made clear. Politics may have been involved but so too might the desire to 
avoid being trapped defending an isolated castle for an apparently losing side with little or no 
prospect of relief. At the siege of Kenilworth, as the circumstances of the garrison became more 
desperate, the resolve of a number of the defenders’ broke and they attempted to haul up the royal 
banner in surrender. They were overwhelmed by the other rebels and executed.57 Again, the 
motivation for betrayal was probably personal; perhaps the individuals were seeking to avoid 
harsher royalist reprisals by facilitating the castle’s fall. In 1263 at Gloucester, the desperate 
constable, Matthias Bezill, unwisely released the prisoners held in the castle to assist in the 
defence. These prisoners, deciding that their prospects were improved by assisting the attackers, 
opened the postern to let in the rebels.58 One by-product of the use of conscripted locals in 
garrisons was that such men were liable to be unwilling participants and might desert when the 
opportunity arose. One Richard Walecon, for example, is recorded in the Berkshire Eyre as having 
been conscripted into Odiham Castle by the rebel constable, Richard de Havering. The jury 
accepted Richard Walecon’s assertion that he had escaped from the castle when he could, clearing 
him of wrongdoing.59  
The most significant and intriguing case of treachery, however, involved the fall of Dover in 
October 1265. With Montfort’s death his wife Eleanor, now based in Dover castle, became a centre 
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for Montfortian resistance in the south east.60 Henry III wanted his sister and the remaining 
Montforts brought to heel and on 28 September he ordered the barons and bailiffs of Dover to 
prevent her departure without his permission. On the 2 October, messengers were sent to Louis IX 
to discuss the fate of Eleanor and her children while on 10 October Henry complained to Louis that 
Eleanor had dispatched her younger sons Richard and Aumary by ship to Gravelines with 11,000 
marks.61 Just as in 1264, however, no moves were made to besiege the castle.  
Henry III had invested heavily in the defences of Dover ever since the unsuccessful siege by 
Prince Louis, making good the vulnerabilities revealed in that siege. By the 1260s, Dover was one 
of England’s most formidable fortresses and there can have been little relish for a siege amongst 
the royalists.62 Over the summer of 1265, Dover’s garrison readied the castle for a potential siege, 
with references appearing in Eleanor’s household roll for the period of 23-26 August of oxen taken 
de praeda (from plunder) rather than de stauro (from stock).63 Eleanor also paid the wages for 
twenty-nine archers residing in the garrison, probably the same twenty-nine men who were listed as 
serving at the siege of Pevensey.64   
All, however, was not well in the fortress. Since the battle of Lewes, Dover had been used as a 
prison for a considerable number of captured royalists, including the major Anglo-Scottish lord 
Robert de Brus.65 According to Wykes, sometime before 26 October two of the three custodians 
(custodes) of Dover castle conspired with the royalist prisoners to seize control of the keep while 
the third was in the town. Barricading the keep’s doors the royalists held it against the garrison’s 
determined attempts to retake it. On receipt of this news, Edward set out at once with a large force 
of knights, travelling without sleep until they arrived at the castle and assailed it. Caught between 
the keep, which was well provisioned with food and crossbow bolts, and Edward’s army, the rebels 
surrendered in return for the terms of departing with life, limb, horses and arms.66 Edward 
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prioritised obtaining possession of the castle over punitive action against the garrison.67 On 26 
October, Eleanor negotiated for the return to favour of several of her household before departing 
the castle on terms on the 28th with her two young children.68 Treachery was crucial to ending the 
resistance of one of England’s most powerful castles. Dover was a serious potential problem for the 
royalist cause in the early autumn of 1265. The strength of the castle, the possibility of foreign 
support for the rebels and the assistance of the rebellious Cinque Ports which could have supported 
it, rendered the castle a serious longterm threat to the newly revived royal government. Had the two 
constables not betrayed the garrison, the royalists may have been faced with the necessity of 
besieging both Dover and Kenilworth, a monumental undertaking given the ramifications of the 
royal siege of Kenilworth in 1266.69  
Gloucester and Control of the Severn 
In the course of the war several castles became crucial focal points for the conflict. With the 
exception of the siege of Kenilworth in 1266, these sieges have received very little attention in 
current historiography.70 This section will examine those for which we have good surviving 
narrative accounts and will discuss the context and importance of the sieges as well as building up 
a picture of the problems and methods of siege warfare during the Barons’ War.   
 
Gloucester castle came under siege on three occasions between the summer of 1263 and June 1265. 
In 1263, the royalist constable, Mathias Bezill, rejected demands from the allied Marchers and 
reformers that he surrender the castle, declaring as the king’s appointed constable that ‘he would be 
no traitor, nor ever yield up the castle’.71 Bezill’s garrison were only ‘a few’ according to the local 
chronicler Robert of Gloucester, who seems to have been an eye witness or at the very least 
interviewed those who had been for his account. Robert’s view is supported by that of the Flores 
based at nearby Pershore abbey.72 It was the inadequate garrison that was to prove the greatest 
contributing factor to Gloucester castle’s fall. The rebels were well equipped and over four days 
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assaulted the castle with ‘crossbows and engines’, destroying the brutaske and the bridge that were 
‘all of wood’.73 The Flores reports that the gate to the city was also burned in the fighting, although 
it is possible that this refers to the same brutaske and bridge as Robert. It was Bezill’s desperation 
for men, according to the Flores, that persuaded him to release some of the prisoners held in the 
castle to help defend it. Their treachery forced Bezill back to the ‘most strong keep’ which was 
fortified with three doors and bars of iron. The defenders held out for a while longer but apparently 
took heavy casualties, as Robert lamented ‘but for want of help many were destroyed’. The siege 
ended when the attackers broke through the doors with iron mallets and axes and seized Bezill.74  
The most interesting point in this account is the use of siege engines (ginnes) by the rebels. 
What Robert means by this is left vague but his phrasing suggests some kind of throwing machine, 
possibly trebuchets given that Robert also uses the term magonel.75 Where the rebels got these is 
unknown. It is possible some might have been seized from the other castles captured that summer, 
or perhaps some had been built during the recent wars in Wales to reclaim the castles lost to the 
Welsh.76 Perhaps Montfort had provided some from Kenilworth. If Robert’s account is accurate 
then it suggests the rebel forces were very well equipped. While nothing in either account 
contradicts the other, it is curious that the usually very well informed Robert omits the story of the 
prisoners’ treachery and this does raise questions about the Flores’ version. Yet both accounts 
agree on certain key features. The outer defences, possibly including the gate towards the city, were 
burned. The garrison was inadequate, and with the fall of the outer bailey Bezill retreated to the 
keep. While Gloucester was a powerful fortress, the root of its fall though seems to have rested on 
its inadequate garrison, a fact supported by the service of a carpenter in the defence.  
The siege of 1263 displays both the crucial importance of the castle on the river Severn but also 
the difficulties of conducting the siege of a major fortress. It also highlights the necessity of a 
sufficient garrison size for a prolonged defence. In addition, as the first major siege of the civil war 
it would have helped inform the attitudes and approaches of the participants to siege warfare in the 
rest of the conflict.  
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In February 1264, a second attack on Gloucester became highly probable following the arrival of 
Montfort’s sons, Henry and Simon, in the March. The royalists senses an opportunity to trap the 
Montforts while they were busy capturing of the royalist seigneurial castles of Wigmore, belonging 
to Roger Mortimer and Thomas Corbet’s Radnor as well as ravaging royalist lands.77 On 4 
February 1264, following the swift return of Edward from the continent, a letter close was 
dispatched to Roger Clifford, sheriff of Worcestershire and constable of Gloucester. Clifford was 
ordered to ‘destroy and throw down’ all the bridges in his bailiwick on the River Severn, except at 
Gloucester, and to ‘sink and break’ the boats, barges and ships on the river to block the eastward 
passage.78 The intention was to cut off the sons of Montfort and their allies from the Montfortian 
strongholds of the Midlands, including the great Montfortian fortress at Kenilworth. The motive for 
making Gloucester rather than one of the other towns on the Severn the only crossing point 
probably had much to do with its location. The bridge at Gloucester permitted supplies from St. 
Briavell’s Castle and the Forest of Dean to take the most direct route to Oxford, the muster point of 
the royal army.79 Likewise this route allowed Edward’s forces to move directly to Oxford on their 
return while conversely forcing the Montforts to march further south in an effort to reach their 
Midland bases, rather than being able to cross the Severn at Bridgnorth or Worcester. Gloucester 
also boasted a major castle and town fortifications that could be used to help defend the crossing. 
Gloucester and its castle therefore became the logical hinge upon which the campaign in the March 
would turn.80  
Gloucester castle’s role as the seat for the sheriff of Gloucester and Worcester further increased 
the importance of its position in early 1264. Since the switch in loyalties of the Marchers to the 
royalist faction in late 1263 the region around Gloucester had been contested between the two 
factions. In particular, there was skirmishing as the Montfortian John Giffard from his castle of 
Brimpsfield vied with the royalist sheriff, Roger Clifford, to dominate the region. Clifford, who 
had held Gloucester since the ejection of Bezill, had learned from the fate of his predecessor and 
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ensured ‘he stored the castle with power enough’.81 The garrison was reinforced with an unknown 
number of men receiving royal wages, their pay listed in the Pipe Rolls as starting from 21 
December 1263. Clifford would later claim £100 was spent on repairs to the walls and battlements, 
brattices and engines in the castle, deepening the ditches and replacing portcullises. Much of this 
was probably a legacy of the damage inflicted in the previous summer’s fighting.82 John Giffard 
similarly prepared his castle of Brimpsfield, sited 12 miles from Gloucester, storing it ‘well 
enough’ by gathering and driving the property of his neighbours to the castle and increasing his 
forces with ‘the most stalwart men he found’.83 In one incident of the escalating conflict in either 
the second half of 1263 or early 1264, Clifford attempted to hold the hundred court in Quedgley, 
two miles from Gloucester. Giffard, departing Brimpsfield castle with an armed force, fell upon the 
court, killing men and forcing Clifford to flee and others to hide in a church.84  
The date of the commencement of the second siege of Gloucester is uncertain, but it may have 
been underway for around a week before Edward’s arrival on 5 March. Despite Clifford’s 
precautions in setting a good watch, the town was taken by surprise, though the castle remained in 
royalist hands. Unable to take the castle by assult, the resultant standoff developed into a full siege 
when the Montfort’s and their army arrived from the March and added their efforts to securing 
control of the vital fortress.85 On Ash Wednesday, 5 March, Edward’s army, fresh from taking the 
castles of Huntington and Hay from Humphrey de Bohun, crossed the bridge over the Severn from 
the west and assaulted the town. Despite the Montfortians being caught between Edward’s attack 
and a simultaneous sally conducted by the garrison, the royalist assault was repulsed.86 The royalist 
failure to lift the siege meant that providing direct aid to the garrison was the next priority. Edward 
therefore commandeered a ship belonging to the Abbot of Tewkesbury and entered the castle from 
the river.87 Edward then raised his standard above the castle. These acts had both symbolic and 
practical significance; for as well as bringing needed reinforcements, by raising his standard, the 
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king’s son was making a statement that the garrison had received its royal lord’s aid. To facilitate 
resupply, Edward next reportedly had the bridge to the castle across the Severn to the castle Mead 
repaired.88 Despite Edward’s reinforcement of the garrison, the siege continued, with the rebels 
besieging the castle whilst ensconced within the protection of the town walls.89 
 
Figure  3:1 Gloucester Castle and the River Severn c.150090 
The Montfortian siege seems to have made little progress. In contrast to 1263, the Montfortians 
apparently lacked throwing engines; the garrison did, however, and from ‘within cast out, with 
their engines fast’. The Montfortians were apparently unable or unwilling to starve the garrison out, 
perhaps due to Clifford’s preparations and Edward’s supply efforts. A protracted siege was not in 
the Montfortians’ interests since there was the possibility that further royalist reinforcements might 
arrive. Likewise Edward was keen to break the siege; first to avoid being trapped in Gloucester for 
a prolonged period, particularly if more rebels might be on their way, and second, because the date 
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for the muster at Oxford was fast approaching. According to Robert, each side conducted a series 
of indecisive assaults and sallies between the castle and town and sniped at range with bows, 
crossbows and the castle’s engines. The ‘bicker lasted long’, Robert noted. John Giffard, who had 
reportedly returned to Brimpsfield at some point, re-joined the siege, burning the bridge to the 
Mead once more and cutting the castle’s supply route.91  
Efforts to achieve a negotiated peace were, however, still underway. The bishop of Worcester, 
Walter de Cantilupe, and Abbot Reinaud of Gloucester frequently mediated between the two sides 
and prevented battle, as Edward and his men ‘often were within, upon the point to strike out’.92 It is 
possible that the two ecclesiastics tried to arrange day-by-day truces, in lieu of a more significant 
compromise. The fighting underway in the country at this stage remained in a strange semi-legal 
limbo of rebellion yet not quite rebellion, as Henry III himself had not yet personally entered the 
fray nor had the barons formally defied him. Despite the efforts of the two men, there was no 
appreciable lull in the fighting as ‘bicker, slaughter and shooting, between them often was’. The 
siege ended on 13 March when, according to Robert of Gloucester, royalist watchers spotted the 
approach of Robert de Ferrers’ army from the direction of Tewkesbury.93 Edward struck a peace 
deal with Henry de Montfort via the mediation of Cantilupe, which permitted the abandonment of 
the siege on the provision that the citizens of Gloucester would not suffer retribution for their 
involvement. With the agreement, the rebels withdrew to Kenilworth, leaving the newly arrived 
Ferrers enraged.94   
Existing interpretations of the Montfortian failure to take Gloucester have been inspired 
primarily by the Annals of Dunstable’s claim that Montfort was angry at Henry de Montfort for his 
failure to capture Edward. This has led to a general perception that Henry was somehow naive in 
agreeing to a peace and needlessly squandered a chance to capture Edward.95 The charge of naivety 
may be true, particularly as regards the assurances extracted for the protection of the citizens of 
Gloucester, yet this would be misreading the situation in March 1264. First, the Dunstable account 
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of events at Gloucester bears little resemblance to the local accounts of Robert or the Flores. It 
omits any details of the fighting, except that the barons feared their army was too small and called 
for Ferrers’ aid. It then refers to a mass knighting in preparation for conflict. The latter point is not 
mentioned by the other sources and smacks as deliberate foreshadowing of the battle of Lewes by 
the annalist. Robert of Gloucester’s far more detailed information, replete with precise local details, 
instead shows the siege instead being a close fought encounter.96 Second, the assumption is that the 
arrival of Ferrers’ force changed the underlying dynamic of the siege. With no knowledge of the 
state of supplies in the castle we cannot predict how long the castle could continue holding out. 
Even if Ferrers’ force had brought siege engines with them the likelihood is that it would have still 
taken days to affect a breach. The reinforcements might discourage Edward from sallying out, but 
they did little to alter the fact that the castle remained a formidable barrier to assault.  Perhaps the 
castle could have been taken by storm with fresh troops, but Henry may have decided such a course 
risked a pyrrhic victory. Third, we assume Henry’s position was strong enough to maintain the 
siege for much longer. Despite Montfort having lands and allies in the March, the Marchers were 
primarily royalist, and as such further supplies or relief forces for Gloucester were possible from 
the West. Henry’s ability to provide his army with food and ammunition is unclear as the supplies 
the host were carrying with it when they arrived at Gloucester were unlikely to have been large. By 
the time of Edward’s arrival, the siege had already been going on for a week or more and supplies 
may have been an increasing source of concern for the Montfortians. Coupled to this may have 
been the issue of the service of any levies brought with them, who may have been reaching the 
forty day limit. Fourth and perhaps most importantly, was the timing, as Henry III arrived at 
Oxford on 8 March for the muster of the main royalist host. This worrying news may well have 
reached Henry de Montfort on or before 13 March and the potential of being caught by the main 
royal host, which was only around fifty miles away, may have motivated the decision to withdraw 
to the safety of Kenilworth.  
The second siege of Gloucester provided a salutary reminder to the combatants that when 
adequately garrisoned and supplied, major stone fortresses could only be taken with the necessary 
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equipment and preparation. By contrast, seven seigneurial castles are recorded as falling to both 
parties in the space of a month, through either short sieges or direct assault whether due to inferior 
defences or inadequate garrisons. Failure at Gloucester had a price as well. As the Dunstable 
annalist’s account shows, Henry de Montfort’s reputation suffered slightly for his perceived 
outwitting by Edward, however unfair such a view may have been.   
 
The third siege of Gloucester again grew out of an attempt to seal the River Severn. In the summer 
of 1264, the damage Montfort’s army was able to inflict unchecked against the lands and castles of 
the Marchers in the March prompted a change in strategy by the latter when they renewed their 
rebellion that autumn. Montfort was too strong in the field and the Marchers’ castles had proved 
vulnerable. While the royalists attacked Gilbert de Clare’s castle of Hanley, south of Worcester, in 
early October and the Montfortian stronghold of Hereford on 10 and 11 November, they also 
sought to prevent Montfort from entering the March by blocking his passage over the Severn.97 
These efforts were assisted by their continuing control of the royal castles, with the Flores 
commenting that the royalists were established in castles from Bristol to Chester.98  The plan 
worked in that Montfort was blocked from crossing at Worcester, but it failed when the Marchers 
were outflanked by a combined attack from the west by Montfort’s ally Llewelyn and from the 
north into Cheshire by Robert de Ferrers.99 
The strategy of sealing the Severn was, however, once more applied by the royalists in the 
summer of 1265. The town and castle had been surrendered to the Montfortians in December 1264 
and Montfort had since reinforced the garrison.100 In the week before midsummer, the royalist 
assault seized the town by surprise and the Montfortian defenders retreated to the castle.101 In 
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contrast to the second siege, the besiegers this time had stronge ginnes to bombard the castle.102 It 
seems inadequate supplies rather than an inadequate garrison was the prime reason for the castle’s 
fall this time, as Robert of Gloucester comments that they waited for ‘succour’ from Simon ‘for 
else they must need, the castle yield and tower’.103 On 29 June, with no relief from Montfort 
evident, the garrison yielded to Edward on terms.104 It is unclear if the date of surrender was agreed 
beforehand or whether the garrison simply gave up. Robert’s account provides no indication of any 
respite granted in the siege while relief was sought. The garrison were granted terms by Edward 
who, much like Montfort since the battle of Lewes, was keen to gain control of the castle without 
further time and effort.105  
Why Montfort remained static in Hereford until 23 June is unknown. He made no recorded 
effort to relieve Gloucester or attempt to march north to make the crossing at Shrewsbury, where 
the castle at least seems to have been in his hands until late June.106 Lack of information and 
perhaps the strength of the royalist host at Gloucester may have played a role in this hesitancy. 
Castles may also partially explain his failure to move north. The early capture of Ludlow suggests 
the crossings of the River Terne, which barred any march north, were also guarded. With 
Gloucester’s fall, however, Montfort’s army was cut off from aid. While Montfort’s southwards 
march took Monmouth castle and Castle Coch, neither materially assisted his efforts to escape and 
he was forced to retreat once more to Hereford.107 Gloucester and the other castles and towns along 
the River Severn were crucial in dictating the shape of the war in 1265. 
The sieges of Gloucester castle demonstrate the strategic importance of this major royal 
fortress and how its possession helped shape the conduct of the war in the region. More generally, 
the sieges highlight the critical role that supplies and garrison strength could play in the success of 
the defence of even powerfully built castles. While negotiations were apparently the preferred 
method of resolving a sustained siege by both parties, it is noticeable that the deployment of siege 
engines occurred in both the successful sieges. Engines, as well as inflicting physical damage on 
the fabric of defences, also applied additional psychological pressure on the defenders. By the late 
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summer of 1265, the physical toll inflicted by the three sieges was severe, damage that would not 
be repaired in some cases for decades. One of the sieges had resulted in the burning of the top two 
floors of the keep, damage that had still not been repaired by 1303.108 In 1270, an inspection 
ordered by the king and conducted by the abbot of Gloucester and prior of Llanthony, reported that 
in the assessment of the carpenters, masons and ‘divers trustworthy persons’, it would cost 60 
marks to repair the bridge across the river (burned by Giffard) which was now ‘nearly pulled down’ 
and to repair the walls and other less badly damaged buildings. This sum, however, excluded ‘the 
repair of the tower and the buildings that are altogether ruined and pulled down’.109 The garrison’s 
efforts to improve the defences also resulted in substantial damage to the neighbourhood of the 
castle. In 1267, an inquisition noted that the damage caused to the priory of Llanthony by the 
digging of a ditch and the burning of a number of its buildings close to the castle was 31s, 10d 
yearly. By 1268, a review of Gloucester’s defences seems to have concluded that the priory’s 
buildings had compromised the defences and therefore the king granted the meadows of 
Southmede and Waleham to the priory in exchange for the one below the castle.110  
 
The Siege of Rochester and the South Coast 
The decision to besiege Rochester castle, like that of Gloucester, was determined by its 
strategically vital location defending a river crossing. Unlike the sieges of Gloucester, however, 
that of Rochester differs in the very tight time scale in which it was conducted, which resulted in 
the application by Montfort of quick, but costly tactics to ensure its reduction. The siege also 
marked Montfort’s personal entry into the civil war as well as the largest and fiercest siege 
conducted under his command.  
Montfort’s decision to attack Rochester in April 1264 addressed two objectives; to remove 
a royalist garrison that guarded a major crossing on the River Medway thus severing land contact 
with Montfort’s allies in the Cinque Ports; also to distract Henry III from his successful campaign 
in the Midlands, which threatened the lands of both Montfort and many of his allies. The attack on 
Rochester also provided an opportunity to combine his forces with those of Gilbert de Clare, who 
                                         
108
 HKW, ii, p.654. 
109
 CLR 1267-72, no.1125 . 
110
 CIM, i, nos.338,351; CLR 1267-72, no.1010; HKW, ii, p.654. 
 104 
 
had recently joined the rebel cause. De Clare had based himself at his castle of Tonbridge, south of 
the Medway, a situation that permitted Montfort to launch a two pronged attack on the town from 
both north and south of the river. Had de Clare not joined Montfort’s side in the assault, Montfort’s 
forces would have been compelled to battle the undivided royalist garrison when trying to cross the 
river. De Clare and his army arrived at Rochester on Thursday 17 April, laying siege to the town 
and castle. The next day Montfort’s army, including the London militia, arrived on the north bank 
of the Medway at the suburb of Strood.111 
 
Figure  3:2 Castle and Town defences of Rochester112 
De Clare’s initial assault on the walls was repulsed and Montfort twice failed to take the 
fortified bridge before the pair co-ordinated a joint attack around the time of Vespers. As de Clare 
assaulted the walls, Montfort used boats to cross the river and resorted to ‘a most subtle trick’ to 
defeat the bridge’s defences. Using a little boat he ‘set a great fire with pitch, charcoal, sulphur and 
with pig (fat)’ before using this fire ship to burn down the timber ramparts built on the bridge (and 
probably part of the still mainly timber bridge itself).113 The defenders were driven back to the 
castle. Two days later Montfort launched a determined attack on the castle which succeeded in 
taking the outer bailey and forcing the garrison back to the great keep, which, as in 1215, continued 
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to hold out.114 Crucially, according to the Dover Chronicle, following their success the rebels then 
rested on Easter Sunday before resuming their attacks on the Monday. The Dover Chronicle 
remarks that is was only the rebels’ decision to rest on two feast days that prevented the castle’s 
fall. Given both the attackers efforts of the previous two days and Montfort’s own strong religious 
sensibilities, the decision not to press the attack is not perhaps surprising.115 
Henry’s alarm upon learning of the attack on Rochester was reflected in the haste with which 
he marched the royal army south. According to Wykes, Henry drove the royal army’s march from 
Nottingham so hard that they marched nearly without sleep and as a result they made it to 
Rochester well within five days.116 The news of the king’s approach and Edward’s simultaneous 
threat to Tonbridge castle caused the rebels to retreat to London in the night, leaving only the small 
holding force that Wykes dubbed victimas.117  
 
 
 
 
(Image has been removed due to Copyright restrictions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3:3 Besieger with a pick, Joshua Conquering the City of Ai, Macieowski Bible, 
c.1250, Pierpont Morgan Library, New York, Ms M 638 f.10v 
 
Rishanger, writing in 1290s and early fourteenth century, proclaimed that Simon ‘gave an 
example to the English of how assaults ought to be made on castles, of which in those days they 
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were wholly ignorant’.118 Considering the success others had enjoyed against castles so far in the 
war, this claim should be taken with a large pinch of salt. Yet Montfort’s assault against 
Rochester’s strong defences does indeed demonstrate elements of good planning, cunning and a 
high degree of determination. The prosecution of the siege needed to be swift in order to take the 
castle before a relief force could arrive and Montfort pressed it with considerable vigour, with the 
exception of the breaks on the feast days. He had come well equipped for a siege. As well as the 
materials he used for the fire ship he brought engines with which he bombarded the keep after the 
capture of the bailey and attempted to mine it as well, perhaps recalling accounts of King John’s 
successful siege fifty years before. Some of those involved in the mining appear in the Inquisitiones 
de Rebellibus for Kent. A Richard Lambard of Borstal was accused specifically of digging or 
sapping the wall of Rochester castle while a William Lodman and John Phelipe of Strood ‘came to 
the siege of Rochester crossing the river Medway in a boat with arms and pickaxes to attack the 
city and castle’.119 The keep, described by Coulson as ‘meant to be imposing, not defended’ once 
more proved resilient to siege.120 Although details of the garrison are largely unknown, we do know 
that it was led by the constable, Roger de Leybourne, John de Warenne, earl of Surrey, John fitz 
Alan, earl of Arundel and William de Breuse.121 Given the crucial location of the castle and the 
significance of the men holding it, a large garrison formed from a combination of royal troops, 
stipendiaries and retinues was likely. Townsmen, whether willingly or not, were also involved in 
the defence. The death toll of the fighting is hinted at by the Dover continuation of Gervase of 
Canterbury, which comments that ‘many’ were ‘captured, wounded and killed’ as well as the 
Flores’ statement that Simon’s final assault on the city on the 18 April only succeeded ‘after many 
wounds and slaughter of his [men]’.122 The casualties inflicted on the besiegers were likely high, 
following at least one attack on the town walls, the three assaults on the bridge, the storming of the 
outer bailey, as well as the subsequent week of siege.123 There is no indication, in contrast to the 
sieges of Gloucester, of any attempted negotiation between the two parties, as both presumably 
anticipated that Henry must come to the castle’s relief.  
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Montfort and de Clare demonstrated that even a well garrisoned major stone castle could be 
nearly taken by force if the attacker was willing to pay the high price in casualties. Montfort’s need 
for haste meant that direct assault was the only real option open to him and his tactics at Rochester 
were not perhaps those that he or many other commanders would be inclined to follow given the 
choice. We should note though Montfort’s later reluctance to engage in major siege warfare in 
Rochester’s aftermath.124 The fabric of Rochester castle, like that of Gloucester, suffered heavily in 
the siege and took decades to repair. In a writ of 1273, the main gate into the bailey was noted to 
have been destroyed during the war.125 The keep had been subject to battery by Montfort’s engines 
and, whether by design or accident, Roger Leybourne had also burned down the king’s hall in the 
castle prior to the siege. The castle subsequently remained in poor shape and it was only in 1281 
that the hall and chambers, ‘long since burned’, were licenced for demolition, while much of the 
damage was not made good until the mid-fourteenth century.126 
 
The Tower of London 1267 
The siege of the Tower of London was the last siege of the war. There has been no full account of 
the siege, despite the significance of the event and the implications de Clare’s failure to take the 
castle had for his rebellion.127 De Clare had become increasingly alienated by the royal policy of 
disinheritance and by the perceived failure of Edward to honour the promises made to him 
regarding reform. De Clare began to collude with the Disinherited at somepoint perhaps in 
February 1267. The plan, it appears, was to seize the capital and combine forces with the 
Disinherited in order to pressurize the king to ameliorate his terms for the restoration of the 
Disinherited’s lands.128 On 8 April 1267, de Clare arrived outside London with his army and was 
let into the city the next day by the papal legate, Ottobuorno, who was unaware of de Clare’s 
intentions. The arrival of some of the Disinherited at Southwark on 11 April and de Clare’s refusal 
to confront them was the first sign to the legate that something was amiss. Events moved slowly, 
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however, suggesting some caution by de Clare, as his men only moved to seize control of the city 
gates after 17 April. This event and the resulting revolution in London caused Ottobuorno and his 
household to retreat to the security of the Tower. De Clare seems to have sought not to alienate the 
legate and even permitted Ottobuorno’s free movement from the Tower and into the city to preach 
the crusade at St. Paul’s. On 27 April, Ottobuorno moved from issuing stern remonstrations against 
the situation in London to the declaration of an interdict on the city. 129 De Clare’s patience now 
gave out and he demanded the Tower’s surrender, laying siege to it when the garrison refused to 
comply.130   
De Clare’s failure to secure the Tower had serious consequences, for without it his control of 
London remained incomplete. From 1263, the Montfortian domination of London had been 
reinforced by control of the Tower under its constable, Hugh Despenser, and was garrisoned with 
men drawn from as far away as Cambridgeshire.131 Henry III was well aware of the castle’s 
importance, and he made efforts to ensure that it remained well garrisoned following the castle’s 
surrender by Hugh Despenser’s widow after the battle of Evesham.132 By mid-March, the garrison 
of the king’s sergeants was at least thirty five strong with wages being paid to fifteen mounted and 
twenty infantry sergeants.133 That de Clare failed to achieve it peacefully is in part due to his 
slightly misjudged handling of Ottobuorno as well as the determination of the royal garrison. 
Control of the Tower mattered to de Clare’s plans. That he had siege engines with him does suggest 
he had come prepared for the possibility of a siege but the immediate seizure of both London and 
the Tower, as in 1263, had almost certainly been his intention. The Tower’s defiance was a litmus 
test as to both de Clare’s resolve in the face of the unfolding crisis and the importance he placed on 
possession of the castle. The fierceness with which de Clare conducted the siege is informative on 
both points. 
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Figure  3:4 Plan of The Tower of London, c.1270134 
The importance of the Tower was such to de Clare that a simple blockade was not sufficient. 
Instead, he set up engines in the parts of the city adjacent to the Tower, probably close to the 
location of the main gate, and continuously bombarded the castle.135 The defenders raised their own 
engines but these were too small to respond properly. While fitz Thedmar curiously avoids 
describing the siege he does mention that following de Clare’s subsequent reconciliation on 23 
June ‘the whole of the covered way’ (claustura) ‘which the earl had made between the city and the 
Tower, was entirely broken up and the timber carried away’.136 The next day twenty work men 
from each ward were sent to demolish a ditch that the earl had built.137 Presumably these works had 
been used to shelter the besiegers from the castle defenders and its construction is indicative of the 
large effort to which de Clare went. Knowles’ discussion of de Clare’s rebellion mentions that the 
siege was conducted with vigour by de Clare, but does not consider the nature and significance of 
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de Clare’s acts.138 The decision to actively bombard a royal castle while a papal legate was inside 
marked a dangerous escalation in the confrontation and is indicative perhaps of a degree of 
desperation on de Clare’s part in contrast to his rather cautious moves during April.   
Supplies became a problem for the garrison, but following the arrival of Henry III and his army 
from Cambridge after 7 May, reinforcements were brought into the castle via the southern gate by 
the river and the legate was escorted to safety. By 30 May, at least forty two royal sergeants are 
recorded as being in the garrison. Given the castle’s importance the likely number of 
reinforcements was probably higher.139 The relief accomplished, the royal army moved off to 
Stratford, only four miles from the Tower.140 Despite Henry’s failure to enter the city, he made 
Stratford his base, within easy distance to reinforce the Tower in the case of assault. In the 
meantime, Henry once again prioritized securing his ability to bring in foreign reinforcements from 
the continent. He ordered Roger Leybourne to reinforce both Rochester castle and Dover with 
additional supplies and then dispatched Leybourne to the continent to bring the reinforcements.141 
A combination of factors eventually led to a peaceful resolution to the London crisis, but 
throughout De Clare’s position in the capital remained insecure, weakening his negotiating 
position. More generally, the royalist domination of the key castles thwarted any wider ambitions 
de Clare may have harboured in his actions.142  
De Clare’s position in London was never fully secure throughout his rebellion in 1267. This 
factor added to the pressures building upon him over the course of May as further royalist 
reinforcements arrived. The siege of the Tower possibly left several longer term legacies. One of 
these may have been to further focus Edward’s mind upon the importance of the Tower for the 
control of London. The massive building works that transformed the already powerful fortress into 
a ‘major concentric castle’ were begun shortly after his return from crusade in 1275 and continued 
until 1285.143 De Clare too may have found any lessons he had learned from the siege of 
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Kenilworth reinforced at London, for in 1268 he commenced building the powerful concentric 
castle of Caerphilly in Glamorgan.144 
King’s Men without the King 
Of the many problems facing the new Montfortian regime in the wake of Lewes, the control of 
castles would prove to be one of the most difficult to resolve. Montfort’s approach combined both 
political and military pressure but displayed a consistent reluctance to engage in protracted siege 
warfare and actively favoured acquiring the surrender of castles through diplomatic means. This 
section will examine the resistance of the royalist garrisons, particularly the final three holding out 
in 1265, Bamburgh, Pevensey and Richmond, and the pressures on both Montfort and the royalists 
at this period. This section will also examine how the on-going siege of Pevensey may have 
affected Montfort’s response to the remaining royalist garrisons. 
 
On 15 May, less than a day after the Battle of Lewes, the first writs of the new Montfortian 
controlled royal administration were sent out. It is notable that the very first of these was an 
instruction to the ‘knights and others’ in Windsor castle ‘not to go out of the said castle to do any 
ill in those parts, or permit any to be done, upon peril of all the lands they hold in the realm’.145 The 
same writ was then sent to another fourteen castles demanding the same.  
 
Table  3:1 List of Royalist Castle Garrisons Mentioned on 15 May 1264146 
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Active Royalist Garrisons, pre-May 14th 1264 Possession, May 1264
Windsor Royal
Pevensey Peter of Savoy/Lord Edward
Tonbridge Captured from Gilbert de Clare
Rochester Royal
Reigate John de Warenne
Northampton Royal
Nottingham Royal
Oxford Royal
Stamford John de Warenne
Benefield presumed captured after Northampton from Humphrey de Bassingbourne 
Salisbury Royal
Winchester Royal
Fotheringhay John Balliol
Lincoln Royal
Hertford William de Valence or Royal
 112 
 
The majority of these are royal castles although five are seigneurial, of which one, Tonbridge, had 
been recently captured from Gilbert de Clare. This is not a comprehensive list of royal castles, nor 
even of the most powerful, as it does not include castles such as Bamburgh or Gloucester. Nor does 
it include all the castles belonging to those royalists caught at Lewes. Instead, strategic value and 
contemporary knowledge seem to have been at play in the composition of the list.  
 
Figure  3:5 Geographical Distribution of Royalist Castles Mentioned on 15 May 1264 
An examination of the geographical distribution of the listed castles suggests that the strategic 
intelligence available to Montfort was one of the probable factors underpinning the selection. Four 
of the castles lay in Kent, Surrey and Sussex; namely Tonbridge, Rochester, Pevensey and Reigate. 
The presence of active royalist garrisons in these castles was probably obvious to the Montfortians 
during the campaign in the run up to Lewes. Likewise, the close proximity of Hertford and 
Windsor to London meant that Montfort was probably relatively well informed as to the activities 
of their garrisons. Winchester, Oxford and possibly Salisbury had been taken from the 
Montfortians by Henry in late 1263 and so also featured on the list, as had Northampton and 
Nottingham in April 1264.147 Further north, the rebel dominance in the midlands meant that 
Montfort would have had a good idea of what garrisons were against him. Fotheringhay held by 
John Balliol, Stamford, possibly belonging to Warenne, and Benefield, probably captured from 
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Humphrey de Bassingbourne, formed a trio of closely situated royalist strongholds.148 Their close 
proximity to Northampton and the Midlands heartlands of the Montfortian faction suggests the 
receipt of active intelligence from his supporters that these garrisons were causing problems. 
Lincoln appears to be something of an outlier in this list but two of Montfort’s main supporters, 
Nicholas Seagrave and Henry de Hastings, both had lands in Lincolnshire and presumably 
informed him about the garrison’s activities. By 15 May, it would have been several days since 
Montfort likely had last received intelligence on these garrisons.  
This list provides an insight into Montfort knowledge of the strategic situation in England the 
day after Lewes. Totally absent from this list are any castles north of the Humber or in western 
England. Perhaps Montfort assumed that the garrisons in these regions were less of a threat to the 
peace in the short term or maybe it demonstrates his ignorance of the situation outside the south 
and east. De Neville’s control of Pontefract may have limited the intelligence reaching Montfort 
concerning events in the North and likewise the royalist control of the River Severn may explain 
the absence of castles from the west and Welsh March. The royalist captures of Northampton and 
Nottingham in April probably also disrupted his communications with the region of the Midlands, 
effecting his strategic knowledge.  
 
Between 15 May 1264 and August 1265, Montfort’s objective was to end the resistance of royalist 
castle garrisons. To achieve this he relied on a strategy which involved a combination of political 
pressure and the limited use of force. Montfort’s first recourse in the wake of his victory at Lewes 
was to use the authority of the captive king to appoint new constables and sheriffs. On 4 June, 
Montfort appointed the custodes pacis, men responsible for restoring law and order to their 
counties whose powers focussed upon ‘matters of a military and policing nature’, with orders to 
arrest ‘without delay’ those ‘malefactors and disturbers of the peace…bearing arms’.149 In addition 
to these appointments, Montfort also began to replace the royalist sheriffs and constables. Between 
28 May and 23 July, Montfortian constables were appointed to a total of twenty castles.150 
Resistance by the affected royalist constables and garrisons now entailed a direct defiance of royal 
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commands. This pressure, however, seems to have had limited effect upon most royal castle 
garrisons and seems not to have been applied to the vast majority of baronial fortresses. 
 
Table  3:2 Montfortian Appointed Constables 28 May - 23 July 1264151 
Early Montfortian successes were focussed in the South-East as Montfort sought to eliminate 
the royalist garrisons near London. He had two principle advantages in this region in both the 
proximity of the garrisons to the captive king and the potential assistance of the London militia in 
conducting a siege. On 2 June, the Windsor garrison were persuaded to leave with safe conducts, 
and the constable, Drew de Barentein was replaced by Sir John fitz John.152 The surrender of the 
castle provided an additional coup as it was the residence of Edward’s wife, Eleanor of Castile and 
her household, as well as William de Valence’s pregnant wife Joan.153 Tonbridge was retaken by 
Simon the Younger, aided in part by treachery.154 Pevensey castle, however, to which a number of 
notable royalists had fled following the battle of Lewes, held out. 
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Rebel Constable Castle Appointment Date
Henry de Montfort Dover 28th May
John fitz John Windsor c.2nd June
Humphrey de Bohun (the younger?) Goodrich 5th June
G. de Clare Pembroke 6th June
John fitz John castles of R. de Vipoint 7th June
John de Abernun; John de Wauton Lewes 8th June
John de Burgo the elder Norwich 11th June
Nicholas de Seagrave Rockingham 17th June
Roger Bigod Orford 8th July 
Nicholas Espirgonel Colchester 10th July 
Gilbert de Clare Richmond 10th July 
Hervey de Borham Hadley 10th July
Henry de Hastings Scarborough 10th July
Hugh Dispenser Devizes 12th July 
Hugh Dispenser Oxford 12th July  
William son of Herbert Nottingham 13th July 
Henry de Montfort Corfe 15th July 
Henry de Hastings Kertling 17th July
Simon the Younger Nottingham 18th July 
William son of Herbert Hareston 18th July 
Hugh Despenser Orford 18th July
Humphrey de Bohun the Younger Winchester 23rd July 
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Beyond the South-East, the same tactics seemed to have gained little traction with royalist 
garrisons, particularly with the northern lords and Marchers, as both groups retained control of their 
royal castles. Montfort’s first attempts to bring them before the court failed as they refused the 
summons to aid in the defence against the queen’s expected invasion that summer. The Northerners 
claimed that they were being harassed by the Montfortians John de Eyville, John de Vescy, 
Thomas de Moulton, William Marmion and Gilbert de Umfraville.155 The northern Montfortians 
destroyed the royalist Thomas de Furnivall’s castle of Sheffield and captured of Skipton, held in 
wardship by Edward, both seigneurial castles. They did not, however, take any of the royal castles 
or other major stone fortresses.156 On 15 August, the Yorkshire knight William Bossall was 
appointed to hold York castle, with Robert de Neville instructed to surrender it to him.157 De 
Neville refused. Montfort’s efforts to bring the northern royalists to the court did not succeed until 
early 1265. The northern castles remained in royalist hands until late 1264 and early 1265.158  
Following the failure of political pressure, the Montfortians turned to the use of force in their 
dealings with the recalcitrant Marchers. The Marchers, in addition to retaining control of several 
royal castles, including Gloucester, Shrewsbury and Bridgnorth, were alleged to have committed 
‘many depredations’.159 They furthermore continued to hold many of the prisoners captured at 
Northampton against the form of the peace and were demanding ransoms for their release.160 
Montfort and de Clare raised an army, including the posses of Gloucestershire, Shropshire and 
Herefordshire, and with the assistance of Llewelyn, assaulted the Marchers’ lands during the 
summer of 1264. They retook Hay and Hereford, forced the surrender of Richard’s Castle by Hugh 
de Mortimer and took Roger Mortimer’s castle of Ludlow.161 The speed of this campaign and lack 
of sustained sieges suggests that the garrisons surrendered due to lack of men or supplies or fell to 
storm. Sadly, little information on the campaign exists to confirm or deny these possibilities. The 
ready fall of seigneurial castles is yet again noticeable. No details are provided of the fall of the 
royal castle of Hereford except the Flores’ statement that Montfort intravit Herefordiae, suggesting 
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the entry was not violent.162 The most notable point, however, is that Montfort did not attempt to 
besiege the royal castles. He seems to have struck the smaller, more vulnerable targets, which 
allowed him to still hurt his adversaries and force them to terms. 
Although the Marchers were forced to terms in July at Montgomery, the possibility of 
achieving a decisive victory was undermined by the necessity of returning to the south coast to 
prepare to repel the queen’s invasion force. The Marchers were forced to promise to surrender the 
royal castles and their Montfortian prisoners, while both James Audely and Mortimer each 
surrendered a son as hostages to Peter de Montfort and John fitz John. The Marchers, however, 
rapidly reneged on the deal.163 A number of other garrisons remained a thorn in the Montfortian’s 
side. Bristol was held by a number of Lewes survivors, including Warin de Bassingbourne and 
John de Muscegros, both members of Henry III’s familia regis. They were among seven knights 
banneret that had retreated to the fortress in the wake of the battle. These remained active in the 
royalist cause, not least in undertaking the audacious but failed rescue attempt of Edward at 
Wallingford castle at some point in the summer or autumn of 1264.164 
The collapse of the Marchers’ military resistance after Montfort’s second campaign in 
November to December sparked a wider one amongst the royalist garrisons in general. Montfort’s 
successful reduction of the Marchers, again without resorting to besieging the royal castles, meant 
that he could now turn his attention to the remaining royalist garrisons in England, a fact probably 
apparent to the garrisons themselves. The Montfortian campaign and the subsequent submission of 
the Marchers at Worcester on 12 December seems to have led to the near total capitulation of the 
remaining royalist garrisons in the rest of the country. Newcastle-upon-Tyne was apparently ready 
to surrender on 2 December. The fifty strong garrison of Scarborough marched out under safe 
conduct on 3 December and John de Grey’s forty strong garrison in Nottingham did the same on 18 
December.165 Safe conducts appear to have been granted for all of those departing. That of 
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Gloucester Castle was around 24 December and the Bristol garrison departed around the 19th and 
20th.166  
The surrender of Bristol castle demonstrates the extent to which Montfort was willing to 
compromise when seeking the surrender of the royal castles in the second half of 1264. The 
garrison of Bristol had already proved itself to be an active threat to the Montfortian regime. 
Strategically they were also occupying a major port that allowed them contact with the royalists on 
the continent. The royalist control of the castle was significant as it meant they dominated the 
principal landward assault route on the city, wedged as it was between the natural barriers of the 
rivers Avon and Frome.167 On top of these motivations, the castle was also a long festering source 
of contention between the Clares, Montfort’s allies, and the king, who had given it to Edward in 
1254 as part of his appanage.168 Montfort, according to Robert of Gloucester, had Henry make 
frequent but unsuccessful demands for the garrison to surrender.169 Montfort’s final solution to 
gaining the castle’s surrender prioritised control of  the castle over the neutralisation of its garrison, 
by granting safe conduct to the royalists to go to the royalist held Salisbury castle and stay there 
until ‘the king made ordinance touching their state’.170 Montfort’s strongest card in forcing this 
departure may have been the support of the town against the garrison.171 The seeming generosity of 
these terms suggests both Montfort’s eagerness to secure the castle and the stark military reality 
that he could not force the garrison’s total capitulation at that point in time. The royalist position 
was apparently equally weak, perhaps because they were harassed by Montfort’s campaign in the 
March or threatened by a revolt in the town that endangered their supplies.172 Whatever the cause, 
they decided to agree to the transfer sometime around 19 December.173 While not an unadulterated 
victory for Montfort, this was nonetheless a significant achievement, removing the royalists from 
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control of a valuable port.174 The departure was an effective admission of defeat by the royalists as 
now they were left isolated in a castle whose state of repair was unclear and that, according to a 
poem by Henry d’Avranches, was, 
…exposed only to the winds, which were strong enough to shake its summit. Little water was to 
be found: …The chalk soil was bad enough, but the shortage of water worse. The former 
dazzled the eyes, the latter provoked thirst. The silence of birds was a loss still worse than the 
violence of the wind. The one deprived us of pleasure, and the other destroyed our very 
dwellings.175     
 
Once the garrison had been cut-off from further reinforcement additional efforts could then be 
applied to obtain their final surrender. On 12 March 1265, Montfort’s approach appeared to pay off 
as the key commanders were given simple protection provided they did not attempt to come before 
either Henry III or Edward without permission from the council.176 This presumably was to prevent 
another attempted raid to free the king or his son under the guise of coming before them. Robert of 
Gloucester does not mention the transfer to Salisbury, but instead remarks that the garrison agreed 
to go into exile along with the Marchers, and that their removal was the result of letters sent by 
Edward.177  
On the 14 March, the same men, including Maurice de Berkley, and other knights in the 
garrison of Bristol castle were instructed to come before the king, wherever he was, around the 
octaves of Easter.178 On 17 March, Bassingbourne was dispatched with two others into south Wales 
‘on the affairs of Edward the King’s son’. What these affairs may have been is suggested by the 
same safe conduct, which included ‘Richard de Tunderle, Roger de Mortimer, yeoman, Nicholas 
son of Martin and other sergeants in the munition of the castles of Carmathen, Cardigan and 
Cilgerran, coming to the king wherever he may be in England’.179 Perhaps Bassingbourne was 
himself to be the bearer of the safe conducts to these garrisons. That he had now, for the time 
being, been brought to heel by Montfort is clear and the earl seemingly utilised him as a further 
tool in his quest to bring the royalist garrisons in Wales into line.    
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By March 1265, the majority of the northern royalists had run out of options for further 
resistance and had finally travelled south. When they appeared at court, Montfort ordered John 
Balliol and Peter de Brus, who held the strong stone fortresses of Barnard Castle and Skelton 
respectively, to surrender their castles and stand trial, if requested, in return for safe-conducts.180 
With this success, one indeed that had been achieved without resorting to repeated expensive and 
time consuming sieges, Montfort could now concentrate upon bringing the final recalcitrant 
garrisons to heel.  
The facilitation of the surrender of the castles rather than the capture of the garrisons was 
apparently the priority for Montfort during this period. The garrisons were presumably allowed to 
disperse. As Saladin’s conquest of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 illustrated, however, this 
method of gaining the castles but not necessarily neutralising the men who held them was not 
without potential drawbacks. The generous terms Saladin offered to the garrisons of the Frankish 
castles in some cases assisted his swift reduction of the key fortresses without the necessity of 
resorting to long sieges, but it also meant that the freed garrisons were able to concentrate their 
resources in remaining centres of resistance. The influx of men into Tyre was important for its 
success in resisting Saladin’s subsequent sieges.181 As we possess only two garrison lists, we 
unfortunately cannot trace the movements of most of the men subsequent to their departure. One 
possible instance of an individual migrating from royalist garrison to royalist garrison can be found 
in the Scarborough garrison. A Richard son of John de Dunwich is listed elsewhere as a member of 
the household and fellowship of John de Warenne, earl of Surrey.182 Where Richard was during the 
Lewes campaign and how he ended up in the garrison of Scarborough is open to speculation. He 
may have been a member of de Warenne’s garrison at his castle of Sandal or elsewhere, or he even 
may have been an escapee from the battle of Lewes. Whatever his origin point, with his lord in 
exile in France, he may have made his way north to join royalist forces there. While lack of 
surviving evidence prevents a deeper assessment of how Montfortian policy impacted on the 
concentration of royalist resources, the pattern is detectable during the subsequent rebellion of the 
Disinherited from late 1265 to the summer of 1267. Then rebel groups sometimes cohered into 
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larger forces when forced to vacate one base, most notably when some of the rebels dispersed from 
Chesterfield to Kenilworth after their defeat in May 1266.183  
Montfort’s use of both political pressure and targeted military force proved to be a great 
success. The royalists were kept under steady pressure to comply with Montfort’s demands through 
his use of negotiation. This was underpinned by Montfort’s retention of key hostages in the form of 
the king (effectively), Edward, Richard of Cornwall and Henry of Almain. Coupled with the sticks 
of military force and royal command was the carrot of a peace settlement that could potentially 
secure Edward’s release. On 14 December 1264, for example, he granted Roger Leybourne, Roger 
Mortimer and Roger Clifford permission to go to Kenilworth and meet Edward, so that the prince 
could urge them to accept the covenants of the peace deal.184 Montfort used the peace arrangements 
of March 1265 to try and gain control of a host of key castles, stipulating that Edward’s castles of 
Bristol, Chester, Newcastle-under-Lyme and the Peak would be surrendered to him. To these 
would be added the royal castles of Dover, Bamburgh, Scarborough, Nottingham and Corfe which 
would be transferred from royal control to that nominally of Edward. This complex transaction, 
removing key royal fortresses from royal control, much as Montfort had acquired Kenilworth, 
would then be completed by Edward’s surrender of the castles into Montfort’s custody.185 At a 
stroke of a pen rather than a sword, Montfort alienated some of the key castles of the realm into his 
personal control.  
There were several reasons for Montfort’s failure to engage in large scale sieges of major 
castles during this period. First was the necessity of prioritising targets. From July to September 
1264, the threatened invasion required Montfort to concentrate the bulk of his forces in the south, 
therefore a long siege, like that which developed at Gloucester earlier in the year, was not an 
option. The second attack on the March in November again did not witness any attempt to launch 
major sieges. Now, however, the limiting factor was probably the onset of winter and the sparcity 
of necessary supplies caused by months of warfare ravaging and burning the lands in the March. 
From the early New Year until March 1265, the negotiations next demanded that some semblance 
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of peace should be maintained, a fact aided by the surrender of the majority of the royalist castles 
in December.  
By the end of March 1265, only three castles were definitely still in royalist hands, two in the 
north, Bamburgh and Richmond, and one on the south coast, Pevensey. Of the three castles, only 
two were besieged, and of these the siege of Pevensey further explains Montfort’s reluctance to 
engage in a sustained siege.  
  
Pevensey, Bamburgh and Richmond 
Three principal questions arise from the continued resistance of these castles: why did these 
fortresses in particular continue to resist while the others surrendered? Who were those resisting 
and what affect did this have upon Montfort’s regime? Both Pevensey and Richmond castles had 
been in the possession of the queen’s uncle, Peter of Savoy and this fact may partially explain their 
continued defiance. Peter was on the continent from 1263 and through most of the war. In 
November 1263, Peter’s lands in Yorkshire including Richmond castle were committed during 
pleasure by the king to Guiscard de Charron. Guiscard was closely linked to Peter. A foreigner by 
birth, Guiscard held lands in both the north and south of England, at least some of which were from 
Peter.186 He was clearly highly trusted by Peter, for as well as being descibed as Peter’s steward, in 
1262, when Peter was abroad, he was one of only two named individuals who could appoint 
attorneys to act in Peter’s stead ‘in all pleas moved for or against him before justices in eyre or 
others’. The other was Queen Eleanor.187 The importance of acquiring the lord’s consent to 
surrender their castle, discussed above, may well have had a role to play in Guiscard’s refusal to 
bow to Montfortian demands to come before the court and surrender Richmond.188 The same 
scenario may have been played out at Pevensey as well. We have the names of only three men in 
the castle from a writ demanding their surrender; John de la Rede, Hanekin de Wissant and Imbert 
de Montreal. De la Rede, Peter of Savoy’s steward in Sussex, had all of his lord’s lands in the 
county committed to him by the king on 13 December 1263.189 He also had connections to the Lord 
Edward, to whom the castle was committed on 25 October 1263. De la Rede acted in Edward’s 
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name as Steward of Hastings from 1254-9, following his lease of the Rape at farm to Peter in 
1254.190 In 1262, following Edward’s quitclaim of Hastings and the castle to Peter, the custody 
probably went once more to Rede.191 De Wissant was listed as the constable of Pevensey on 7 
August 1263 when the council demanded that he surrender the castle ‘as he loves his body’, to John 
de Warenne.192 De Wissant was presumably Peter’s appointee and he remained in office under 
Edward as of 8 July 1264.193 Little is known of de Montreal prior to the war, though he seems to 
have been of some importance in the region of Sussex and Kent in c.1261.194 De Montreal and de 
Wissant, given their surnames, may have been foreign members of Peter’s familia. In addition to 
the original royalist garrison, the situation in the castle was complicated by the arrival of William 
de Valence, John de Warenne and Hugh Bigod following their flight from the battle of Lewes. 
These men reportedly arrived with 700 men and upon their departure probably left a number of 
these to bolster the defence of this strategically situated castle.195 The likely result was a garrison 
that was a hotchpotch of different allegiances. By the summer of 1264, the power structure in the 
garrison had cohered around three men, of whom two at least were closely associated with Peter. 
By 17 March 1265, though, the Montfortians remained uncertain as to who commanded the castle 
for, in another effort to make them surrender a vaguely worded safe conduct was issued ‘for two or 
three of those who are in the castle of Pevensey’ to go to speak with Edward.196  
That two of the three remaining royalist castles should both be Peter of Savoy’s is striking, 
especially when the possibility of deliberate co-ordinated resistance between the two castles must 
have been very low. Peter himself maintained an active role during this period supporting Queen 
Eleanor on the continent, including paying men for military service, presumably for the intended 
invasion of England.197 Pevensey was also receiving assistance from the continent, suggesting that 
it remained in contact with Peter.198 Like de Charron at Richmond, Hanekin and Rede could 
legitimately refuse to surrender the castle unless permitted to by Peter. The likely Montfortian 
counter argument was that the castle was committed by Peter to Edward in 1263. That commitment 
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was presumably intended to be temporary by Peter, but the safe conducts for the garrison’s leaders 
to go to Edward in March 1265 probably mark Montfort’s efforts to exploit this legal weakness. 
Unlike with Warin de Bassingbourne, however, there is no sign that representatives of the 
Pevensey garrison went to meet Edward and instead they remained defiant. 
Bamburgh was a different case. Robert de Neville, the constable, had made his career in royal 
service from the late 1250s, becoming sheriff of Northumberland in 1258 and constable of 
Bamburgh in 1259.199 He also served as a messenger to the Scots court during these years.200 His 
loyalty was with the king during the turbulence of 1258 onwards, and in 1261 he was appointed to 
keep the forests beyond the Trent. On 6 May 1263, he was made constable of Devizes castle, but 
his command was changed and enlarged to that of the unusual title of capitanus for the defence of 
the lands north of the Trent. This included the holding of York and Bamburgh castles and required 
the royalists in the region to be answer to him.201 As constable of a royal castle, Robert’s defiance 
was a more serious issue than that of Guiscard and the leaders at Pevensey. He refused either to 
appear before the court or to surrender the castle when ordered.202 Again as with Richmond and 
Pevensey, we do not have a record of any justifications he may have used for his refusal to 
surrender, which may simply have been the illegitimacy of writs issued by a king in captivity. If so, 
de Neville’s arguments were unlikely to have been unique amongst the royalist garrisons prior to 
December 1264. The survival of these three garrisons of Richmond, Pevensey and Bamburgh, 
while partially based on stubbornness and probable issues of lordship, rested also upon additional, 
more practical factors.  
 
While the longest recorded siege in English history is commonly thought to be that of Kenilworth 
in 1266, this is not strictly true, for in duration, although not in scale, the siege conducted by the 
Montfortians of Pevensey castle surpassed it.203 This occasionally has been misconceived as three 
separate sieges; instead it was simply one long one that saw peaks and troughs of activity.204 With 
the growing threat of the queen’s invasion during the summer, the control of Pevensey, probably 
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the last royalist garrison in the south-east, became increasingly important. The garrison had been 
aggressively raiding the lands surrounding the castle since the battle of Lewes and perhaps prior to 
this. By 8 July, the attention of the Montfortian regime had been drawn to the castle through a 
combination of the garrison’s ravaging, which probably prompted a growing storm of complaints to 
the new government, and the need to secure the coast from invasion. As with the other castles, 
Montfort first tried the diplomatic approach. On 8 July, safe conducts were issued for the three 
leaders to come to the king ‘as the king understands that many enormities have been committed by 
them and others in the munition of that castle’.205 This was apparently rejected by the leaders but 
the offer was renewed by Montfort on the 18 July, but this time with safe conduct for them to go 
‘beyond seas’. In line with his general strategy, Montfort also appointed Ralph de Camois as the 
new constable. These actions yet again had no appreciable effect on the garrison.206 
The castle and village of Pevensey were sited on a bluff by the sea on the south coast. It was 
built within the remains of the old Roman fort, part of which still made up the castle’s fabric in the 
1260s. Significant improvements were made to the defences during Peter’s tenure. The wooden 
palisade that provided the curtain wall of the inner bailey was removed, probably around 1254, and 
was replaced by a new stone curtain wall, reinforced with three towers each of three stages. These 
linked with the stone gatehouse that had been built in the 1220s and were surrounded in turn by a 
ditch (it is unclear if a moat existed at this stage or not). The walls and towers themselves 
possessed tall battering plinths around the new circuit. These defences were thus very new by the 
time of the war and likely state of the art.207   
Pevensey provided a direct link to the royalists on the continent, which probably dictated why, 
in stark contrast to Montfort’s usual strategy, it received the attention of a full siege. Efforts in this 
direction began at some point in the summer of 1264 under the command of Simon the Younger. 
Perhaps limited at first to trying to contain the garrison, it apparently became clear that the castle 
would not fall easily. On 18 September, John fitz Alan, Eobert de Saint John, Franco de Bohun, 
Robert Aguilun and ‘the knights, free tenants and all others’ were ordered to muster at Pevensey 
with ‘horses and arms and their whole service, and with the whole posse of their friends’ to ‘give 
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their counsel and aid’ to Simon ‘in besieging the castle, and in repressing and taking the king's 
enemies within that castle, who are perpetrating homicides, burnings and plunderings.’208 Despite 
these reinforcements the siege showed no signs of ending by the beginning of November. In fact 
the expense of maintaining of the siege forced Montfort to promise £800 to his son in ‘part 
satisfaction of his expenses in the siege of the castle of Pevensey.’ The chronic expense of the siege 
necessitated the assignment to the younger Simon of the bishop of Winchester’s fine for the king’s 
corn and stock, with the first 500 mark instalment being transferred to him with orders for the 
bishop to pay the other 700 marks owed directly to him.209 By 27 November, however, it was 
obvious the siege would continue for several months yet. The county posses of Surrey and Sussex 
were disbanded with firm orders issued to the sheriff not to distrain or harass the men of the county 
due to their many ‘expenses and labour’ in the siege, as well as in guarding against the coming of 
aliens in the summer. Instead, money was allocated for ‘maintaining certain men for making the 
said siege’ in ‘the instant of winter’.210  
In addition to the strong defences, the garrison’s resilience is explained by Montfort’s orders on 
3 December to the barons of Hastings, Winchelsea and Rye to watch and capture ‘certain 
individuals’ who were ‘endeavouring by ships to munition the castle of Pevensey with men and 
victuals to the king’s damage’.211 Able, due to its port, to achieve resupply from their continental 
allies, the garrison could not be starved out without naval support. During the winter months Simon 
the Younger’s siege drew down into a blockade, his father providing £100 in part payment of 
another 250 marks granted to him to maintain the siege and also to dig a ditch in front of the castle 
‘so the king’s enemies may not get out.’212 Simon the Younger received another 100 marks on 15 
February after having spent a presumably chilly few months before the castle buffeted by the sea 
winds. The castle still showed no signs of surrender, even as Montfort was gaining the upper hand 
elsewhere in England. 
The final failed efforts at negotiation in mid-March 1265 marks the last recorded word of the 
siege in the record material until the Waverley Annals recount that Simon the Younger raised it on 
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16 July to come to his father’s assistance.213 Robert of Gloucester remarks that word from his father 
reached Simon while he was besieging the castle, as he longe adde ido.214 As no narrative account 
of the siege itself survives we are left with only our inferences from administrative records. In 
addition to the use of the ditch and attempts at a sea blockade, the only other record is an 
Exchequer account from 1288 mentioning that an unspecified wall was thrown down at the time of 
the war.215 It is impossible to say if the discovery of an ‘extraordinary number of stone balls’ used 
for siege engines in the bailey and many others in the ditch are connected to the war or may be 
explained by the possible role of the castle as a centre for their manufacture.216 The presence of 
engines is confirmed, however, by a record in the Countess Eleanor’s household accounts referring 
to efforts to retrieve an engine from outside the castle following the siege’s abandonment.217   
The unsuccessful siege of Pevensey explains much about both Montfort’s failure to besiege 
other castles in this period, including Bamburgh and Richmond. The heavy expense and scant 
success of the siege probably deterred him from risking the commencement of a fresh one until 
either the successful reduction of Pevensey or at least a significant improvement in his strategic 
position. Like Pevensey, both Bamburgh and Richmond were formidable stone fortresses, and 
again like Pevensey, Bamburgh could be easily resupplied from the sea. At the same time as 
Montfort was being forced to deal with the Marchers, the threat of invasion and other potential 
enemies, he was simultaneously committing valuable resources to a siege, one vital to prevent the 
landing of royalist reinforcements. The siege of Pevensey was therefore an expensive necessity for 
Montfort at a time when royal revenues were already affected by the war, and as such it provided a 
strong disincentive against the launch of any further sieges.218 The scant comment the siege 
provoked from chroniclers may have been down to the combined factors of the unfavourable light 
it shone on the Montfortians to the mainly pro-reform chroniclers and its apparently dull and long 
winded nature. Montfort too may have tried to keep news of events limited, a job made easier by 
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the relatively isolated nature of the location of Pevensey itself. The pro-royalist Wykes, one of the 
few chroniclers to mention the siege, summed it, and Simon the Younger’s efforts, up with the 
single damning phrase, frivolam et inutilem.219 Montfort, as with the second siege of Gloucester, 
escaped the tarnish of failure that had now touched two of his sons. While leaving the thankless 
task of the conduct of the siege of Pevensey to Simon the Younger on a practical basis allowed him 
to concentrate on greater issues, it also had the effect of isolating himself from the popular 
perception of failure at a time when maintaining the image of strength that followed his vitory at 
Lewes was of critical importance to Simon’s rule. 
  
The peace agreement of March 1265 marked the high point of Montfort’s regime and left him free 
to take more direct action against the castles of Richmond and Bamburgh. On 23 April 1265, 
Montfort instructed the sheriff of Yorkshire, William Bossall, and the Keeper of the Peace, John de 
Eyville, to raise the posse of Yorkshire and to commence a siege of Richmond.220 We know even 
less about the events at Richmond than we do Pevensey. An attempt on 16 January to persuade 
Guiscard to appear before the court was a failure, despite Montfort’s issued stipulations to the 
northern Montfortians not to molest Guiscard.221 By 5 March 1265, an increasingly confident 
Montfort issued a fresh safe conduct to Guiscard in a letter patent. However, in a letter close dated 
the same day, Montfort threated that Guiscard’s failure to comply would result in the seizure of his 
lands and the raising of the whole county posse of Yorkshire to storm the castle.222 Guiscard’s 
response was clearly a refusal for on 23 April Montfort fulfilled his threat by ordering John de 
Eyville and William Bossall ‘so manfully and so powerfully to besiege’ Richmond.223 Virtually no 
details survive of the siege outside a few, very brief, references in the Inquisitiones de Rebellibus 
that recount accusations against seven individuals who were alleged to have been with de Eyville at 
Richmond.224 How far the siege advanced is unknown, though clearly some effort was made. On 30 
May, Montfort dispatched a letter close to de Eyville demanding that he hurry day and night with 
the whole of his posse to Worcester. De Eyville never arrived in the March and it probably took 
                                         
219
 Wykes, p.169. 
220
 CR 1264-68, pp.112-113. 
221
 CPR 1258-66, p.400. 
222
 CR 1264-68, pp.101-2. 
223
  tam viriliter tamque potenter obsideri, CR 1264-8, p.113. 
224
 CIM, i, no.939; Rotuli Selecti, pp.160-1. 
 128 
 
several days for the letter to reach him, so the siege of Richmond probably ended in early June.225 
Whenever the siege was abandoned, John de Eyville seems to have retreated south to Scarborough 
with a number of his followers to garrison the castle there.226  
Bamburgh, despite the ravaging reportedly committed by its garrison, was not besieged. The 
choice to besiege Richmond over Bamburgh was a practical one again. Richmond was not isolated 
in the far north and taking Richmond continued the Montfortian tactic of pushing the royalists to 
the fringes of the kingdom. Yet of the two, Bamburgh seems to have been considered the more 
important by Montfort.as it was one of the castles included in the peace agreement in March 1265. 
Attention turned to it on 17 March when it was officially handed over to the Lord Edward. On the 
19 March, Robert de Neville was ordered to surrender the castle with Gilbert de Clare promising to 
bring de Neville before the court. By 6 April, Montfort complained this had still not been done with 
de Neville refusing to comply, even under the pretext of rendering his account of the castle at the 
Exchequer. 227 Instead the garrison commenced or continued ravaging lands in Northumberland, 
most probably those of Montfortians such as John de Vescy of Alnwick. On the same day that the 
siege of Richmond was ordered, the sheriff of Northumberland was instructed to prevent the exit of 
the garrison from the castle and to seize the lands of those within.228 Montfort had more cause to 
besiege Bamburgh, but he did not.  
The decision not to launch a full siege of the castle is very telling. Already committed to two 
sieges Montfort probably could not afford to commit the time and resources to a third without 
leaving himself overstretched. The garrison itself seems to have been fairly large. While there are 
no surviving narrative accounts, the partially surviving record of the expenses of the waged section 
of the garrison running until 10 August 1265 is for ten knights and squires, eight mounted 
crossbowmen and sixteen archers and watchmen. As has been shown for Scarborough, this would 
have been only part of the garrison present.229 Sadly the poor state of the document prevents 
discovery as to whether the garrison number fluctuated during 1264-5. The garrison however was 
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large enough to cause a growing problem and one that probably needed more resources to deal with 
properly than Montfort could spare.  
A siege of Bamburgh risked something else as well. The Flores remarks that in the Christmas 
of 1264, in the furthest north, John Balliol and Alexander III, son-in-law to Henry III, were 
conspiring against Montfort.230 Indeed, the Scottish source, the Gesta Annalia II, reports that 
Alexander had sent troops to help Henry at Lewes, confirmed by the Flores and Furness accounts, 
and in 1265 was raising an army to come to Henry III’s aid. Its march was only prevented by the 
royalist victory at Evesham.231 Scottish support for Neville, a man who was known at the Scottish 
court for his services to Queen Margaret in the 1250s, was not improbable. Although invasion 
remained unlikely until the escape of the Lord Edward, Montfort may have judged that besieging a 
castle so close to the Scottish border might risk provoking Alexander’s direct intervention before 
Montfort was ready to respond. Instead in March, Montfort dispatched letters to both Alexander 
and Margaret urging them to accept the peace terms and ‘not to delay’ them ‘through any 
defects’.232 The decision of Gilbert de Clare to promise to obtain Bamburgh’s surrender in March 
1265 is also potentially significant. By February 1265, de Clare seems to have been already 
plotting against Montfort. Given the timing of events it seems possible that de Clare was 
deliberately using the negotiations as a cover for contacting de Neville to co-ordinate resistance. De 
Neville furthermore provided a likely link to Alexander and any potential Scottish support.  
The fate of the royalist garrisons between the battles of Lewes and Evesham reflects Montfort’s 
apparent aversion to committing himself to sieges of major fortresses and instead his preference to 
reduce the royalist garrisons through an approach that combined the astute application of force with 
political pressure. This policy was only reinforced by the fruitless siege of Pevensey that dragged 
on, draining both men and money. The three castles that resisted Montfort in England were able to 
do so on the basis of their formidable defences, the stubbornness of their commanders, Neville and 
de Charron, and their ability to resupply from the sea, in the cases of Bamburgh and Pevensey. The 
most remarkable of these stories arguably is the one we know least about. Of the two, Richmond 
would seem to have been in the weakest position, yet it too held out. This is in stark contrast to 
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events in the March of Wales, where by May 1265 the Marchers had apparently given up trying to 
hold castles, as Edward’s escape found Roger Mortimer camping out in the woods rather than in 
Wigmore castle.233  
These castles played an idirect role in the eventual fall of the Montfortian regime. Had Simon 
the Younger not been engaged in the siege of Pevensey he might perhaps have reacted sooner to 
events in the March after Edward’s escape; it took him, however, six weeks to raise the siege. It is 
also likely that the siege of Richmond also distracted further reinforcements from coming to 
Montfort’s aid. Few men from Yorkshire or Northumberland were with Montfort at Evesham, and 
few seem to have been in the relief army that Simon the Younger took to Kenilworth.234 Royalist 
castle garrison resistance was a distraction, but it may have proved a costly one for the Montfortian 
regime in 1265.  
The Logistics of a Siege, Kenilworth 1266 
This final section of this chapter examines in more detail the logistics necessary for conducting 
large scale sieges during the war. The siege of Kenilworth provides the best case study for a study 
of logistics, for while the scale of the siege was unusual it is also the one for which there is the 
greatest abundance of both surviving administrative and chronicle material. We will also examine 
the siege in the light of the previously discussed themes and examine its importance to the 
Disinherited.   
Kenilworth rapidly became the focal point for Montfortian resistance following the battle of 
Evesham, with the garrison being joined, according to the Evesham Chronicle, by ‘a great 
multitude of the retainers of those killed and of those who had escaped from the battle [of 
Evesham] and of those who were having bitterness of spirit for the fathers and brothers and friends 
slain’.235 Efforts to gain the castle’s surrender began soon after Evesham. On 24 August, Edward 
ordered that the garrison should be instructed to surrender, and this was performed by the 26th.236 
Simon withdrew from Kenilworth sometime between 11 and 23 November, leaving it under the 
command of a Sir William de la Cowe and John de Warre. Simon joined up with John de Eyville 
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and other rebels at the Isle of Axholme.237 His motive for leaving the castle was probably similar to 
that of Roger Mortimer’s for not remaining in Wigmore castle; a desire not to be trapped in a siege 
and preference for freedom of movement that permitted him to rally his supporters and harass his 
foes. Perhaps, as Knowles suggests, this move was also designed to distract attention from any 
possible attack on Kenilworth.238  
On 14 November, eleven men ‘lately in the munition’ of Kenilworth were granted safe conduct 
and licence to go beyond seas. Otherwise unknown, these individuals’ surnames suggest that they 
were French and Flemish in origin and they were possibly some of the roughly 140 stipendiary 
knights recorded as having spent Christmas with Simon at Kenilworth in 1264.239 Their departure 
may denote that Simon the Younger’s funds had run out or at least were too strained to continue to 
maintain the knights. Alternatively, with Simon’s departure, the mercenaries decided to withdraw 
from the apparently hopeless situation of the Disinherited’s cause.  
The decision to besiege Kenilworth was presumably reached in October or November with a 
muster at Northampton arranged for 13 December. Amongst those issued summonses on 20 
November were masons and other workers from Warwickshire instructed to come with spades, 
picks and other tools to the muster.240 This force, however, was diverted to help Edward besiege the 
Isle of Axholme.241 Although Simon submitted and subsequently agreed to the surrender of 
Kenilworth, the garrison did not comply. Henry de Hastings, having abandoned Axholme, arrived 
at the castle with reinforcements and assumed command, before continuing to stock the castle by 
raiding the surrounding region.242 He refused Simon’s instructions to surrender, declaring that they 
would yield Kenilworth neither to the king, Edward nor Simon, but only if Eleanor de Montfort, 
who they now treated as the castle’s lord, personally instructed them to do so. As at Dover and 
possibly Pevensey and Richmond, the absence of the authorisation of the castle’s lord was used as 
a method of resisting even royal authority.243 Following the failure of diplomatic pressure, on 20 
December preparations began for deploying the entire resources of the crown against the castle, 
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with orders for a muster at Northampton arranged for 27 January, although this was subsequently 
delayed, possibly due to the winter.244  
Curtailing the plundering by the garrison of Kenilworth became the next priority for the 
royalists. This would be a crucial first step to begin to limit the supplies reaching the garrison, for, 
as Robert of Gloucester commented, Henry de Hastings ‘had well stored the castle on each side, of 
corn and flesh he gathered in the country wide’.245 As well as providing a statement of the re-
imposition of royal authority on the war torn region, critically, it also began to fulfil Henry III’s 
imperative as king to defend his subjects. A parallel can be seen in the orders issued by Montfort in 
March 1265 for the containment of the garrisons of Pevensey and Bamburgh.246 By 26 December, 
the situation around Kenilworth had deteriorated to such an extent that Osbert Giffard and Reynold 
son of Peter were ordered, alongside the posse of both Oxfordshire and Warwickshire, to ‘subdue 
those who hold out in the castle of Kenilworth’.247 Edmund and a strong force reoccupied the 
damaged Warwick castle as a base for these efforts.248 Henry’s delays in commencing the siege 
were probably primarily down to practical reasons. The start of spring would hopefully bring more 
clement weather for the besiegers; it would allow more preparation time and would furthermore 
provide space for the royalist commanders to defeat the bands of the Disinherited roaming the 
countryside who might threaten the realm while siege efforts were underway. On 15 March, a new 
summons was issued for 28 March, Easter Day, at Oxford.249 To raise the needed manpower Henry 
issued an order for four or five men from each vill in Oxfordshire and Berkshire to come to Oxford 
alongside those owing service. This requirement was extended to at least Northamptonshire as 
well.250 
On 20 April, Henry’s army arrived at Oxford before departing for Northampton on the 27th and 
then moving to the forward base at Warwick by 18 June. The siege commenced on 25 June.251 
According to the Dunstable Annalist the garrison of the castle now contained 1,070 men and 160 
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women as well as an unknown number of servants.252 There must be some scepticism about this 
figure for the simple reason of logistics. The amount of food needed to supply this number of men 
and women for the duration of the siege from June to December would have been staggering. The 
possibility cannot of course be ruled out, particularly given the unusual specificity of the figure, but 
the length of time the garrison lasted under siege makes the figure seem unlikely, even reckoning 
upon attrition.  
The siege of Kenilworth was to be the royalists’ equivalent to the Montfortians’ siege of 
Pevensey, slow burning but hugely expensive, yet on a far greater scale. Kenilworth was a state-of-
the-art castle, heavily garrisoned by a determined opposition. Henry III, unlike Montfort at 
Pevensey now committed himself to the fall of the castle, and proceeded to throw the resources of 
the kingdom behind the endeavour. This required a huge outlay in resources. The Pipe and Liberate 
Rolls reveal a sophisticated royal war effort which involved several royal castles acting as hubs for 
the supply of major materials.253 The Pipe Roll accounts for Gloucester show the industry involved 
in the logistics of the siege. A siege tower was transported, presumably in pieces, from the castle to 
Kenilworth along with materials for the repair of the king’s siege engines including seven virga 
machinaria or beams for siege engines, along with nails.254 In addition 4000 quarrels from St. 
Briavells were made and transported to Kenilworth alongside three hammers and timber for the 
king’s works.255 Iron from the Forest of Dean was another important resource, with the sheriff of 
Gloucester ordered on 4 September to provide 10 marks worth ‘seeing that the king is in no small 
need of iron at the present siege’.256 In London, Hugh of Windsor was paid £8, 4s for large siege 
pavises (targiis). Raw materials for the crossbow industry at the Tower of London were provided 
by two citizens of London, Markemano de Cologne (presumably a German merchant) and 
Bartholomew Le Estreys, who were recompensed 47s for providing wattle, cloth (cortice), bow 
strings, and fletching for the king’s crossbows. Thomas of the Holy Sepulchre was hard at work 
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making quarrels with the sheriff of Kent ordered to provide his 9d a day salary. 15s were paid for 
the carriage of the king’s equipment for engines and crossbows. Finally twenty-four carpenters 
were paid 100s for coming to the king from London to Kenilworth.257 Windsor’s contribution was 
smaller with only six belts used for spanning crossbows recorded as being dispatched to 
Kenilworth.258 Other materials were transported from across the country, some from the counties 
surrounding Warwickshire. Horsehair from Oxfordshire and Berkshire was carted to Kenilworth 
for the engines.259 Hemp and cables were purchased by the bailiffs of Bridport for £11 8s.260 Boats 
were taken from Chester and the Abbot of Gloucester over land to the mere surrounding the castle 
to try another attack.261 The demand for arrows apparently outstripped the supply provided by the 
local vills and on 8 September the sheriff of Sussex and Surrey was required to provide 300 
sheaves of ‘well prepared arrows out of the issue of his bailiwick’ for the siege.262 In total nearly 
80,000 quarrels were sent to the siege, 30,000 of them from Lincolnshire (10,200 recorded paid for 
in the Pipe Rolls). Of these 20,000 were for crossbows for one foot and 10,000 for two feet from 
the Tower alongside the 4000 from St. Briavells.263 The order for the Tower’s supply was given on 
9 August at Kenilworth and comments that the king ‘is in extreme need thereof for the present 
siege’.264 Whatever supplies of quarrels Henry had collected before the siege’s commencement 
were already running alarmingly low after approximately 6 weeks of siege, an indication of the 
formidable rate of their consumption in the fighting. Another 13,500 were delivered to Kenilworth 
from Lincoln soon after 1 November.265 
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Figure  3:6 Origins of Supplies to Siege of Kenilworth 
Material for the defensive siege lines were provided by the surrounding counties, with quotas 
assigned to individual forests, presumably based on some pre-existing assessment of the available 
resources and industry. In Northamptonshire 220 hurdles, 10 foot long and 8 foot wide were 
constructed in Whittlewood Forest and transported to Kenilworth for £11. The Liberate Roll shows 
Henry ordered in total 500 from Northamptonshire, the others possibly constructed in other forests, 
with instructions that they be ‘thick and close-wattled’ (densas et spissas).266 On 28 July, the sheriff 
of Oxfordshire was ordered to have 500 8 foot long and 7 foot wide hurdles made in Bernwood and 
another 1000 in Wychwood with firm instructions to deliver them to the king by 15 days after 29 
July. The sheriff of Worcestershire was similarly ordered to produce 500 hurdles from Feckenham 
Forest.267 In addition to those known, it was ordered that unspecified numbers of ready hurdles 
from Buckingham and Bedfordshire, Gloucester and Warwickshire should be transported to the 
siege. These hurdles were presumably to act as cover for the attackers against missiles fired from 
the castle. The Northamptonshire hurdles were possibly designed to be placed closer to the 
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defender’s engines and crossbows.268 Kenilworth had been equipped with its own throwing 
machines by Simon shortly after his return in 1263, which were described by the impressed author 
of the Flores as ‘Unheard amongst us and unseen’. They may have been built by Master William 
the Engineer who was in de Montfort’s employ.269 Robert of Gloucester’s account notes the regular 
exchange of fire between the engines of the two sides and the Flores remarks that the engines of 
the royalists were being shattered by those of the besieged.270 Another potential use for the hurdles 
was as a defensive barrier against sallies by the defenders which are reported in Robert of 
Gloucester, the Annals of Dunstable and the Flores. In a show of defiance the defenders kept the 
castle gates open and made regular attacks on the besieging army.271  
Feeding the besieging army was also an issue, particularly as the garrison had been stripping 
the countryside for months beforehand. Gloucester dispatched grain to Kenilworth and bucks were 
ordered taken from the forests of Gillingham and Clarendon. On 10 October, thirty five oxen and 
fifty wethers were delivered to Kenilworth. One Master Thomas de Wymundham had one hundred 
and ninety three and a half quarters of wheat taken for the king’s use during the siege, for which he 
was eventually paid £43 10s 9d.272 
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Figure  3:7 Artist's Impression of Kenilworth Castle viewed from the east after building work 
under King John273 
The methods employed against Kenilworth closely resemble those used against Bedford in 
1224. In the case of Kenilworth, however, with its large artificial mere, the royalists did not have 
the option of bombarding the castle from multiple directions and the moat defeated attempts at 
mining.274 It was only hunger that finally brought the garrison to its knees.275 With desperation 
mounting in the garrison, as the siege entered November they finally agreed to surrender if Simon 
the Younger did not relieve them. On 14 December, the garrison finally surrendered and were 
allowed to depart safely. How many were left is unknown but the conditions inside were so bad by 
the conclusion that upon entering the royalists were said to have been nearly overcome by the 
stench.276 Closing the siege operations, Henry departed Kenilworth for Oxford leaving two knights, 
Roger de Wauton and Ralph de Hotot, to dismantle the siege works including the engines.277  
The sheer scale and expense of the siege of Kenilworth provides the starkest illustration of the 
disincentives for Montfort to embark on sieges of this scale. The six month siege of Kenilworth 
became a national effort, in some ways akin to Montfort’s massive muster on the south-coast, albeit 
without the same popular appeal. Yet, Montfort had only really obtained access to the resources 
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commanded by Henry after December 1264 with the surrenders of Nottingham and Gloucester, 
while Henry was able to pit the resources of the crown against Kenilworth. At Pevensey and then 
later at Richmond, Montfort and his allies could neither command the same resources, nor did they 
focus their efforts on the reduction of those castles with the same degree of determination. Instead 
both sieges were relatively local affairs involving the local county levies and regional Montfortian 
adherents. Henry III, in contrast, used the realm to break the last castle of the rebels. 
While the financial cost of the siege was high with £2,948 0s 4d for the wages of soldiers and 
craftsmen alone, this figure also covered Henry’s subsequent campaigns up to the confrontation at 
Stratford in 1267 (including the fortification of Cambridge), which were also on a large scale.278 
This sum for a six month siege and Henry’s subsequent campaigns is actually surprisingly 
favourable when compared to his expenses at the siege of Bedford in 1225 which had been £1,311 
18s 2d. for the wages of the soldiers and craftsmen for eight weeks.279 Simon the Younger’s siege 
of Pevensey had cost over £1,700 for 11 months (although this sum may not have been confined to 
wages).280 This does raise the question as to why Henry may have spent less on wages at 
Kenilworth than he did at Bedford forty years earlier. Perhaps he made greater use of the free 
military service owed to him and maintained a smaller stipendiary field force. There are no records, 
such as that of the fifty three Breton crossbowmen and their associates employed by the king for 
the siege of Bytham in 1221, indicating the number of any stipendiaries employed.281 To 
contextualise the scale of the expenditure on these major sieges, in comparison Henry had spent 
over £6,000 over a thirty-five year period upgrading Dover castle into the greatest fortress in the 
land; while York from 1245-62 had £2,450 spent upon it.282 It was comparatively more expensive 
to take a castle than to maintain and improve it. 
After all this expense and time, however, in the Dictum of Kenilworth agreed on 31 October 
Henry had agreed to let the garrison go free and furthermore had been required to moderate his 
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policy of disinheritance.283 To temper this disappointment, though, were the strategic gains. 
Kenilworth, one of England’s strongest castles and held by a powerful garrison, had been taken. 
Victory was perhaps inevitable due to the disparity in power between the two sides but the expense 
and resources required at a time of turmoil in the state made the commencement of the siege by no 
means an easy choice. Despite these obstacles Henry’s forces had outlasted the defenders, and he 
had fulfilled the oath which he had taken at the start of the siege that he would either have the 
castle surrender or he would capture it.284 His enemies would laud the rebels’ courage and fortitude 
but Henry had used the siege as a venue to demonstrate his restored power and that his captivity 
had not ‘irrevocably impaired’ it.285 The siege certainly made an impression amongst some 
chroniclers, as well as demonstrating the garrison’s bravery (or perhaps desperation), the power of 
Henry’s resources and determination to take Kenilworth were clearly displayed. The siege of 
Kenilworth further illustrates why so few sieges of major castles were prosecuted during the war. 
Grossly expensive and time consuming only someone with the power of the state behind them 
could co-ordinate the resources to reduce them. 286  
The sieges of Kenilworth and Alnwick as well as that of Dover, mark the rebels’ handful of 
attempts to hold castles against the royalists after the battle of Evesham. In 1215, the successful 
siege of Rochester castle by King John had the effect that, as the Barnwell annalist commented, 
‘few cared to put their trust in castles’.287 The Disinherited, as with the royalists prior to Evesham, 
seem to have followed the same doctrine, except at Kenilworth.288 The siege of Kenilworth 
demonstrated the effectiveness of modern fortifications, but it also reinforced the message of the 
siege of Rochester fifty years before. Without support, the castle on its own could not win the war 
and even the mightiest could be reduced with the application of the necessary resources and 
determination. In 1266, Henry III displayed he had both of these requirements. 
Conclusion 
Several themes emerge from a study of the role of castles during the Barons’ War. Castles were 
fundamental to both shaping the course of the war and, just as importantly, to the minds of those 
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fighting it. The low military importance of minor castles that Eales observed concerning the civil 
war of 1215-17 can, however, also be seen in 1264-7. When unsupported minor baronial castles 
were attacked, such as Skipton and Sheffield, they nearly always fell, though our sources never 
elucidate the causes of the fall. Certainly the defences of these were no longer on a par with those 
of many of the major royal castles or those possessed by the great magnates. Coulson argues that, 
‘lords and their vassals, particularly if of lower rank, tended to more interested in the symbols of 
strength’ and any more ‘would take them out of their class and usually beyond their means’.289 If 
we judge on the basis of the Barons’ War, there would seem grounds to support this conclusion. 
The defences of most seigneurial castles seem to have been inadequate in the face of major attack, 
whether due to their lack of sophistication or the weakness of their garrisons. The improvements in 
siege technology over the thirteenth century may provide an additional explanation for this 
situation. We should, however, perhaps not be too dismissive as to their defensive value. That they 
were not proof against large armies equipped with siege engines does not mean that they did not 
provide protection against smaller raiding parties. The absence of appropriate records, particularly 
more detailed accounts of local warfare in some regions, prevents a proper assessment of the 
effectiveness of seigneurial castle defences in this regard. The deterrent effect upon raiding parties 
of attacking even modest castles protected by banks, ditches and timber palisades, would have been 
no less than that on their forebears. Lack of evidence does not in this instance equate to lack of 
effect. Castles, particularly the major royal fortresses, however, were fundamental in helping to 
shape the development of the war. One of the major incentives for Henry III’s decision to march 
his army to Lewes was that the town was controlled by the castle of the royalist John de Warenne, 
earl of Surrey. This seigneurial castle, reinforced by Edward, held out against assault.290 It was the 
Montfortian attack on Rochester that pulled Henry III from the Midlands and it was the 
Montfortian presence at Kenilworth as well as the royalist control of castles such as Gloucester that 
were a major influence on the movements of Montfort in the final days of the Evesham 
campaign.291 
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Castles were indeed built as status symbols, but display and defence were not mutually 
exclusive concepts for those building them at the time of Barons’ War. Status could be accrued by 
the display of practical modern fortifications. Rochester’s great keep, dismissed by Coulson, 
proved its strength against major siege operations twice in a century. The improvements to 
Pevensey under Peter of Savoy no doubt displayed Peter’s wealth to the locality in peace time, but 
in war the improvements had very practical benefits. The triple wall built by Richard of Cornwall 
on the northside of Wallingford looked impressive and displayed the earl’s great wealth, but it also 
served an entirely practical military purpose. While most of Kenilworth’s defences were probably 
already in existence by the end of John’s reign, Montfort still apparently added to the castle, for as 
the Flores remarked he ‘strengthened [the castle] with remarkable buildings’.292 Kenilworth was a 
powerful status symbol for the earl, the king’s brother-in-law, particularly as he sought to increase 
his influence in Warwickshire.293 While much of Henry III’s reign had indeed been peaceful, 
conflict in England was never beyond the realm of possibility, particularly amongst an aristocracy 
for whom the conduct of warfare remained an integral part of their identity. Henry spent much on 
improving the comforts in his castles, but he never seems to have lost sight of the importance of 
major royal fortresses, such as the Tower of London and Windsor, as defensive bastions. Defences 
might be neglected in peace time, but in war time they became a priority for government 
expenditure. The Barons’ War demonstrates that while the castle could fulfil many roles in the 
thirteenth century, it remained also a military tool for a military elite. 
Strong defences might assist in a garrison’s ability to resist but the success of this resistance 
was determined by more human factors, for example, sparse supplies doomed the defence of 
Gloucester castle in both the first and third sieges. The size of the garrison might also play a role. 
Too few made it difficult to adequately defend the castle; too many made it more vulnerable to 
swift starvation. Fear of the consequences of capture if the castle was stormed would doubtless 
have preyed on the minds of the defenders, particularly if their participation was less than 
voluntary. Although there was only one reported execution of a prisoner post-capture of a castle, 
that of the carpenter at Gloucester in 1263, lethal reprisal for resistance remained a real possibility, 
particularly when fighting the crown. Whether Henry’s execution of the eighty men at Bedford 
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castle in 1225 was still in popular memory is unknown but it is possible, and was probably known 
amongst those of knightly rank. 
While modern castle defences gave defenders an edge, they remained largely vulnerable to the 
same pressures as any other castle. Surprise was favoured in attacks over expensive full sieges. 
John Giffard and Edward’s successful surprise assaults on the castles of Warwick and Alnwick 
demonstrate that advanced design was for nought if the garrison was unready. This technique was 
tried less successfully at Wallingford by Warin de Bassingbourne and at Gloucester by Giffard and 
Edward in 1264 and 1265 respectively. In both cases multiple lines of defences, whether from a 
concentric castle design or the inclusion of town defences, seem to have provided advance warning 
and delayed these attacks enough to allow the garrison to repel the assault. If surprise could not be 
achieved, however, the only methods of taking these castles were by political and diplomatic 
pressure, the method apparently favoured by both sides, or by siege. The major sieges required to 
take these castles were vastly expensive, time consuming and fraught with difficulty, especially as 
specialists were required for the construction of siege engines. Sieges were therefore avoided 
except when absolutely necessary, as at Pevensey, Kenilworth and Gloucester. The reduction of 
one of these castles without the element of surprise or the garrison’s capitulation required a truly 
national effort with command of resources that only the king was capable of drawing upon during 
the war. When considered in this light, Prestwich’s observations concerning the small number and 
brevity of the sieges in Edward II’s reign, alongside Eales’s work, starts to seem less like a change 
but rather a continuation of a pre-exiting trend dating back to the beginning of the thirteenth 
century at least. 
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4 Towns and Warfare in the Barons’ War 
Towns have been a largely neglected topic in the historiography of the Barons’ War and warrant 
particular attention, not only because of their crucial importance to the economy of the country but 
also because of their distinctive role in warfare which sets them apart from castles.1 This chapter’s 
aim is not to address in detail the complex issue of their mixed loyalties during the war’s course, a 
large topic in its own right, though some discussion of this is necessary. This chapter will instead 
examine towns’ strategic value, their actual involvement in warfare, how the application of the 
‘customs of war’ operated in regard to them in a time of rebellion, and finally the possible impact 
of the war on the development of town defences after the war.  
Loyalty and Resistance 
In Chapter 2 we established the strategic importance of towns for each side. This section will 
examine the factors that determined why certain towns became actively caught up in the war, 
whether through political allegiance, the presence of a castle garrison or attempts at self-defence.2 
The political loyalties of some towns helped shape their subsequent military interactions during 
the war. There was urban involvement in the reform movement from early on, with town concerns 
about abuses of royal authority addressed in the original petitio baronum in 1258. Article 22 
complained about the excessive prises taken in the king’s name by his appointees in ‘fairs, markets 
and cities’, and the corruption of the officials involved.3 In article 23 the king was accused of 
‘scarcely ever’ paying for his prises and thus impoverishing English merchants and discouraging 
foreign ones.4 Other issues included unfair fines by justices or sheriffs (20 and 21) and the power of 
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Cahorsin money lenders in London (26).5 In the actual Provisions though, these were watered down 
to simply the demand to remedy: 
the city of London and all the other cities of the king that have gone to shame and destruction 
through tallages and other oppressions.6 
 
Writing about events in 1263 after the overthrow of the Aldermanic regime in London, Wykes 
commented that through the whole kingdom of England in the major cities and boroughs there 
were ‘low people… proclaiming themselves bachelors (bachilarios) publicly and with daring 
violence they were oppressing the greater [citizens] in the towns and boroughs’.7 ‘Bachelor’ 
usually implies a retainer but could also mean a junior craftsman.8 The Annals of Burton claims 
that in 1259 the Provisions of Westminster were instigated by a deputation self-styled the 
communitas bacheleriae Angliae, who demanded reform of the abuses of the great magnates. Tout 
judged this group to be no more ‘than a chance number of rash young gentlemen’.9 The styling of 
‘bachelors’ may either indicate some town involvement in the crafting of the Westminster 
Provisions or perhaps marks a later conscious assumption of the term by sections of town 
communities in order to identify themselves with the reform of and resistance to the abuses of those 
in power, whether the king, magnates or town elites.10   
Previous political involvement and interest in the reform process did not necessarily translate 
into support for Montfort in 1264. Despite his statement, Wykes only specifically mentions 
London, leaving the suspicion that he could be guilty of a degree of hyperbole.11 We know most 
about events in London thanks to the London alderman Arnald fitz Thedmar’s contemporaneous 
chronicle. The commune’s radical overthrow of the aldermanic government and the policies of the 
populist mayor, Thomas fitz Thomas, pushed it firmly into the Montfortian camp in a way that is 
more exceptional rather than illustrative of a wider pattern of urban support in England. A royalist 
victory would mean an end to the city’s new government at the very least and entail serious 
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repercussions for those involved. The Londoners could especially expect retribution for the insults 
offered to the queen in 1263 and the burning of Richard of Cornwall’s manor of Isleworth in early 
1264.12 The Cinque Ports, Bristol and to a slightly lesser degree Bury St. Edmunds, also decisively 
backed the Montfortians but the towns of England and the March largely seem to have remained 
wary of involvement. 13  
Urban support was not confined to the Montfortians.14 On 16 July 1265, the citizens of 
Winchester, in one of only two firmly identified instances (outside of London) of a town 
deliberately slamming the gates on an army for political motivations, opted to resist the army of 
Simon the Younger when he approached the city on his way to Kenilworth. This loyalty may have 
had several root causes. Winchester was Henry III’s birthplace, and the king consciously referred to 
himself as Henry of Winchester even on the battlefield of Evesham when he reportedly cried ‘Do 
not kill me, for I am Henry of Winchester your king!’15 Winchester was one of Henry’s favoured 
residences as well as being an established royal centre and he spent £10,000 over the course of his 
reign on repairing and improving the castle, both its defensive features and its living quarters.16 
Henry visited the city at least once a year in forty six out of the fifty-six years of his reign, usually 
at least twice a year. Five of the years when he was unable to visit were due to the Barons’ War. He 
celebrated Christmas eighteen times in the city, and his affection for the town was perhaps 
reinforced by the war as he spent increasingly long periods there, including three months in 1268-9, 
as well as the last five Christmases of his life.17 The citizens’ hostile relations with St. Swithun’s 
may have also played a role in their loyalty, for the English church’s generally favourable stance 
towards the Montfortian party (the bishop of Winchester, John of Exeter, was on the baronial side 
as was the prior of St. Swithun’s Ralph Russel), may have pushed the townsmen in the opposite 
direction.18 On 4 May, the citizens’ dispute with the priory boiled over, resulting in the burning of 
                                         
12
 Wykes, pp.136,140; G. Williams, Medieval London: From Commune to Medieval Capital (London: 
Athlone Press, 1963), p.224; See below for more discussion of London; Stone, ‘The Rebel Barons of 
1264’, p.5. 
13
 For details on Bury’s behaviour see Bury, p.34. See below for the Cinque Ports;  S. K. Cohn, Popular 
Protest in Late Medieval English Towns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.84-5;  
14
 For some examples see Knowles, ‘The Disinherited’, Part ii, pp.100-102. 
15
 Guisborough, p.201. 
16
 HKW, ii, pp.858-62. 
17
 D. Keene, Survey of Medieval Winchester, 2 vols (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1985) part i, i, pp.100-3. 
18
 C.L. Kingsford, rev. N. Vincent, ‘John Gervase’, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14854?docPos=1, [accessed, 27.03.14]; Knowles, ‘The 
Disinherited’, Part ii, pp.101-2.  
 146 
 
St. Swithun’s houses outside the priory walls and in the killing of seven of its men.19  Noticeably 
there were no attacks on the Jews in the town, the king’s personal property, until Simon the 
Younger’s sack in 1265.20 Winchester’s loyalty was rewarded by a six year exemption from 
rendering their farm at the Exchequer ‘in consideration of their losses sustained for the king’ from 
Simon’s sack.21  
 
The military involvement of towns in the Barons’ War was very frequently reactive rather than 
proactive, with self-defence a key motivator. The wealth of towns was extremely tempting to both 
sides, particularly when they were low on funds, and the most direct method of accessing this 
wealth was to plunder the town. Fears concerning the intentions of an approaching army therefore 
greatly increased the attraction of manning the defences for those towns that possessed them. In 
March 1264, at Chester, the justiciary William de la Zouche and the citizens took defensive action, 
‘fearing that the city was about to be besieged’.22 Such fears were well founded. Ironically de la 
Zouche and other royalists earlier that month had attacked Stafford … and returning ‘they burned 
the town of Stone and forcibly entered the Church and plundered all that they found there’. A few 
days later they again went to Stafford, but were repulsed and on their way back burnt the town of 
Eccleshall, broke into churches and took many captives and spoil.23 Stories such as these, even if 
exaggerated, would have provided ample motivation for a fortified town’s decision to resist an 
army.  
Castles and their garrisons could lead to a town’s involuntary military involvement in the war. 
As castles were designed to guard and overawe their town, the loyalty of the castle garrison would 
also likely determine any resistance by the town’s people.24 The 1264 occupation of the town and 
castle of Northampton by a large baronial force, for example, makes it very hard to accurately 
gauge the degree to which the participation of the citizens was voluntary. The control of the Tower 
of London was vital in determining the capital’s quiescence. Only with the arrival of de Clare’s 
powerful army in April 1267 did those elements of the population in favour of the reformers gain 
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ascendency. There are, however, examples of towns which successfully defied a castle garrison of 
a different loyalty, such as at Bristol in 1263 and December 1264.25 In the summer of 1265, 
Shrewsbury’s citizens harassed the Montfortian garrison, preventing their effective supply of the 
castle.26 However, successful resistance by towns to a castle does not appear to have been common 
and outside intervention tended to be necessary when withstanding the will of its castle.  
  
The ‘Customs of War’ and Towns 
The ‘customs of war’ described for castles in Chapter 3 were generally the same as those applied to 
towns, though with several differences.27 Firstly, there would have always been a great temptation 
or even the explicit pressure for an attacking army to sack towns. With regular streams of income 
disrupted by the war, both sides were reliant upon raising funds by less savoury methods. For 
example, protection payments from both religious houses and towns were relatively common.28 
After 1265, towns such as London, Northampton and Hereford among others were fined by the 
royalists. London’s massive 20,000 mark fine was used to pay off a loan from Louis IX of 
France.29 Conducting a sack, in contrast, could be a direct and swift way of both paying an army 
and raising its morale. At Northampton in 1264, the Dunstable annalist noted that the victorious 
royalists ‘plundered the burgesses and all other inhabitants to the last half-penny’.30 In fact sacks 
appear to have been fairly common place during the war. Winchester, Northampton, Worcester, 
Gloucester, Lincoln, Cambridge and Norwich, to name probably only the best known, were all 
subjected to sack during the war and its aftermath, the latter two helping fund the activities of the 
Disinherited post-Evesham.31  
A secondary use of the sack was as an exemplary punishment. Edward’s sack of Gloucester in 
1264 was revenge upon the townsmen who had supported the rebels. He hanged the porters of the 
town’s gate whose negligence had originally allowed the Montfortians inside. The burgesses were 
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then arrested with a ‘great ransom’ extorted from them, and finally he destroyed ‘all the town.’32 
Such actions were both a punishment of the town and a warning to others that might follow suit. 
How far this actually discouraged the resistance of other towns is unclear, given, as discussed 
previously, that some towns had little choice in resisting and might perhaps fear the sack regardless 
of any resistance offered.33 The surrender of London in 1265 may, however, be indicative of this 
deterrent effect. Following the Battle of Evesham the spectre of eventual defeat and all the horrors 
of the sack probably influenced the citizens’ decision to surrender. The Disinherited’s sack of 
Norwich on 16 December 1266 carried off an ‘abundance of booty’, in one account as much as 140 
wagon loads.34 On 31 May 1267, fearing a further attack the ‘constable for keeping the peace’, 
Thomas de Carlton, killed a city sergeant, Walter de Starston, who, when requested by de Carlton 
to call the citizens to assist the defence of the city against the Disinherited, refused, using ‘base 
language’ at Thomas.35   
It is noticeable that while chroniclers describe sacks they never actually condemn them. In fact 
the only real condemnations come from Robert of Gloucester’s account of Edward’s treatment of 
Gloucester in 1264 and Wykes’ of the royalist sack of Northampton. Though Robert clearly 
sympathizes with the citizens, his condemnation is not that the sack occurred; rather it is because 
Edward broke his word to Henry de Montfort not to punish the townspeople after the Montfortian 
withdrawal.36 For Wykes it was the ‘sacrilege’ of sacking the churches, rather than the sack itself 
that provoked his outrage.37 The indication therefore is that, though considered awful, the sack was 
still recognized as being within the accepted rules of war. One factor influencing this perception 
may be that sacks during the war did not in the main involve killing. Few narrative accounts 
mention the murder of citizenry, and those that do, such as Wykes’s account of the taking of 
Winchester, indicate that the casualties were low.38 Plunder was the primary objective.  
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The Cinque Ports provide an interesting coda to this discussion in that, though some such as at 
Winchelsea were subjected to the sack, they are noteworthy in the comparatively favourable terms 
subsequently shown to them. Edward’s treatment of the Cinque Ports in 1266 varied. The Flores, 
for example, comments that ‘for their demerits’ some of the ports were punished, some terrified 
and others ‘he [Edward] accepted to the peace generously’.39 At Winchelsea, a comparatively 
remarkable degree of leniency, including the restoration of their liberties, was exercised to 
encourage the town’s future good behaviour following its assault and capture. The Waverley 
Annals claims that Gilbert de Clare recommended the sparing of one of the principal men of the 
town, whom Edward was about to hang, because sparing him would encourage the rest of the 
townspeople to submit peacefully.40 The Dover/Canterbury chronicles comments that, following 
the ports’ surrender, ‘the lord King conceded all those liberties, on land and on sea, which they had 
before’.41 The leniency of their treatment by the royalists caused note. Fitz Thedmar, presumably 
bitter that the Ports had escaped so lightly compared to London, remarked that ‘for what reason or 
through what necessity all the concessions aforesaid were made unto them, I know not’.42 Such 
treatment is further indicative of the strategic importance placed in the compliance of the Ports. 
 
Town Fortifications and the Barons’ War  
English town defences by the 1260s were neither ubiquitous nor sophisticated. For those towns that 
possessed them, the defences were often based on pre-existing Roman fortifications or those of the 
Anglo-Saxon burghs. From the late twelfth to the mid-thirteenth century there was a period of rapid 
urban growth with larger towns demonstrating ‘clear signs of a growing independence in terms of 
self-government, the development of laws and craft regulation’. This growth also prompted the 
display of this increasing autonomy through the construction of urban defences, bars and gates.43 
Some new circuits were constructed during the thirteenth century but documentary sources such as 
murage grants (the right for towns to charge a toll towards the construction or maintenance of town 
defences) used by Turner, do not necessarily indicate the absence of defences around a town prior 
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to the first grant.44 Towns with defences were actually a minority in England; out of 640 boroughs 
in medieval England and ‘more than a thousand other places with markets’, only a maximum of 
211 are believed to have possessed defences.45 Such defences were not confined though to the 
largest towns, but were rather spread throughout the ‘urban hierarchy’.46 The greater part of the 
largest and wealthiest English towns, the majority of which were royal boroughs, possessed 
defences (places like Norwich being notable exceptions). Seigneurial boroughs, by contrast, were 
less likely to possess defences, perhaps as a reflection of some lords’, particularly ecclesiastical 
ones, concerns against promoting aspirations for communal self-control amongst the inhabitants of 
their settlements. In addition, Creighton and Higham postulate that the acquisition of urban 
defences by seigneurial boroughs was further curtailed by possible lordly concerns that murage 
grants might result in an increased royal influence over their borough.47  
By the time of the Barons’ War, defences could vary from simple ditches and banks topped by 
a timber palisade to a full stone enceinte with ramparts surmounting an earthen bank, further 
reinforced by a ditch on the outside. In some cases only a ditch and bank were present, as at 
Norwich, though when constructed with enough steepness and depth this remained a significant 
obstacle.48 Timber town defences were gradually replaced by stone over the course of the thirteenth 
century, mirroring the contemporary evolution in castle architecture. Both Shrewsbury and Oxford, 
for example, had respectively replaced their enceintes with stone by 1242 and 1244 at the latest.49 
As Creighton points out, however, there was no smooth transition; Stafford, for example, was 
granted murage in 1224, but in 1233 the king granted sixty oaks to plug three gaps in the walls. 
Even by 1600 two gaps remained covered by palisading rather than stone.50 Yet even wooden 
fortifications when well-constructed were, as Turner comments, ‘as strong as anything bound with 
mortar’, and quicker and cheaper to repair in times of emergency.51 Ditches, as well as providing a 
physical obstacle to assault, also prevented siege engines getting too close to the wall base, made it 
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difficult to erect scaling ladders and provided some protection against sapping.52 Nevertheless, the 
record of town defences in successfully repelling attacks during the war is not inspiring.53 
Contamine, speaking generally of town defences in Europe before the fourteenth century, has 
commented that town ‘fortifications were often very rudimentary and it was rare indeed when an 
enceinte did not have some weak points’.54 Similarly, while noting that ‘the degree to which 
defences were effective is not […] easy to assess’, Turner has questioned how far English town 
defences of the mid-thirteenth century ‘could ever act as a useful and effective barrier against 
attack’.55 This stands in contrast to continental developments. In comparison to the often very basic 
design and limited spread of English town defences those in France and Flanders were much more 
advanced and by 1300 ‘almost all’ towns and burgs ‘boasted crenelated stone and brick enceintes 
bristling with mighty towers and fortified gates’.56 This growth was stimulated by rising wealth, 
local insecurities and both royal and lordly interest in safeguarding ‘the towns upon which so much 
of their power rested’.57 In Flanders, for example, Namur had acquired a double-walled enceinte 
and four towers by the mid-thirteenth century.58 In the far south, towns such as Carcassonne and 
Toulouse played a major role in the Albigensian Crusade. The towns and cities enjoyed 
considerable independence and power in the political structures of the region prior to the crusade, 
while local instability and the topography encouraged the erection of stronger fortifications.59 The 
majority of older German towns were also fortified with stone walls by the end of the thirteenth 
century. The growing prosperity of these towns, such as Cologne, permitted the building and 
upkeep of new defences, the maintenance of urban troops under the command of the patricians, 
town arsenals, and access to both political alliances and mercenaries.60 No thirteenth century 
English town, except perhaps London, approached this sort of power.  
The prime difference underpinning the development of these continental examples and their 
English counterparts was the comparative security provided by the greater dominance of royal 
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authority in England.61 Unlike the fractured political structures of Flanders, Germany and many 
regions of France, English towns were located in a relatively stable political environment by the 
thirteenth century. Although disputes over rights existed, the armed seizure of towns was rarely a 
realistic threat, except in the event of civil war, and thus there was no pressing imperative to build 
and maintain sophisticated defences. The main exceptions to this were those towns located in the 
region of the Welsh March and the northern towns of Carlisle and Newcastle. 
Towns and cities such as London, Oxford, Gloucester, York, Northampton, Hereford, 
Rochester and Winchester all possessed communal fortifications by the mid-thirteenth century. 
Frequently, however, town walls were designed to enable civic authorities to monitor the entrance 
into and exit of individuals, a particular issue if communal liberties restricted the right of free trade 
for outsiders.62 A statement of civic wealth and prestige, walls also afforded a sense of security 
which encouraged trade and provided both a convenient barrier to prevent the entry of undesirables 
such as plague victims as well as a defence against brigands or, in the March, opportunistic Welsh 
raiders. Henry III, for example, permitted the bishop of Salisbury to fortify the new town with 
either ramparts or ditches, ‘for fear of robbers’.63 The security aspect of town defences is 
emphasised in Henry III’s de forma pacis which specified that at night every city gate was to be 
guarded by sixteen men, every borough gate by twelve and in rural townships by six or four men.64 
The military value of town walls was appreciated by both sides in the war. Concurrent to the 
efforts to repair castles in 1261, we also witness eight murage grants, four of which were at the 
instigation of Richard of Cornwall (Exeter, Chichester) and Edward (Stamford, Bristol).65 In fact, 
when compared to the period of 1247-58 when twenty six grants were made in eleven years, we see 
twenty seven grants made in the eight years from 1258-66, and twenty-four for the period of 1266-
72.66 Some key towns also received direct investment by the crown. In 1262, Rochester’s town 
defences were augmented in obvious anticipation of war. Alongside recorded repairs to the castle 
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on 10 May, payment was made on 11 July for £25, 5s. and 5d. for the timber used ‘for the works of 
Rochester bridge and the town gates, and to make breastworks (bretachias) round the town’.67   
Date Town Date Town 
27 Feb 1259 York 17 Sept 1264 Haverford  
2 March 1259 Abergavenny  29 Nov  1264 Winchester  
2 May  1260 Knighton 30 Jan  1265 Hereford 
26 July 1260 Ludlow 31 Jan 1265 Hereford 
11 Nov 1260 Southampton 21 March 1265 Newcastle 
15 Feb 1261  Exeter  22 May 1265 Gloucester 
17 March 1261 Grimsby 19 Oct 1265 Stamford 
26 May 1261  Stamford 20 Feb 1266 Shrewsbury 
28 Sept 1261 Great Yarmouth   6 May 1266 Lewes 
20 Oct 1261 Carlisle 14 May 1266 Lynn 
20 Oct 1261 Hereford 28 June 1266 Carmarthen 
22 Oct 1261 Bristol  2 Nov, 1266 Shrewsbury 
3 Nov 1261 Chichester  27 Nov 1266 Ludlow 
12 July 1262 Winchelsea 14 Dec 1266 Bristol 
26 Nov 1263 Oxford 4 May 1267 York 
10 Feb  1264 Worcester 10 May 1267 Bristol  
13 April 1264 Totton 
  Table  4:1 Murage Grants 1259-6768 
Despite the advantages of town walls and grants of murage, maintaining walls was a costly 
business and there is evidence from the early thirteenth century of attempts at deferring these costs 
by leasing out the mural towers to tenants in return for their agreement to maintain them. Chapels 
were often built in the gatehouses, holes could be made for aqueducts and drains, as at Carlisle in 
1238, and posterns cut into the walls, as at Shrewsbury and Worcester, where they provided 
entrances to friaries.69 In 1235, Alexander Swerford, Treasurer of St. Paul’s, was permitted the free 
use of a wall turret close to Ludgate in London with allowance to construct what buildings he 
pleased. London’s Newgate was turned into a gaol by 1219.70 The effects of these attempts to 
defray maintenance costs led to the domestication of sections of the defences, which in turn ‘must 
have made the nature of the wall less defensive’.71  
The towns of the Welsh March were more likely to possess viable fortifications in the 1260s 
than those in other parts of central and southern England, due to the increasing numbers of Welsh 
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incursions over the previous decades of Henry’s reign. Although tracing the existence of town 
fortifications prior to grants of murage is difficult, the March received a large proportion of the first 
murage grants between 1220 and 1250.72  
Town Defences in the War 
It is particularly worth noting that in the main towns had not experienced warfare since the 1215-17 
civil war and the more geographically limited Marshal rebellion of 1233-34.73 After forty years of 
relative peace the town defences that did exist were not necessarily in an optimal state. In a period 
of sustained calm, the constant expense entailed in the maintenance of town defences could render 
them, in the citizens’ eyes, an unnecessary burden. As a result walls could sometimes simply be left 
to decay. Northampton’s, for example, were in poor condition as late as June 1263 when the king 
granted borough taxes to the mayor and burgesses to fund repairs to the defences ‘for his security 
and theirs’.74 The sudden creation of a wide breach by the royalists in their assault was imputed by 
the Dunstable annalist to treachery, but it may have been merely down to their dilapidated state. 
This pattern was, as already discussed, often equally true for the castles, including Northampton 
castle.75  
The walls were not the only part of the defences that could have been compromised by the 
war’s outbreak. As space became a premium there was a growing temptation to either build upon 
or dump refuse within a town’s defensive ditch, increasingly compromising the defences. Urban 
sprawl beyond the town wall, when conducted without consideration for the military efficacy of the 
defences, could provide cover for the advance of any attackers. In some cases this could result even 
in buildings that overlooked the ramparts, providing attackers with ready firing platforms with 
which their archers could sweep clear wall tops. 
Following the royalist attack on Hereford on 10-11 November 1264, an inquiry was launched 
into ‘robberies and other trespasses’. It recorded the defenders’ efforts, upon receiving word of the 
royalist advance towards them, to put the defensive ditch that surrounded the walls back into good 
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order.76 The citizens seized land and threw down houses in order to ‘widen the ditch, which was to 
the great improvement of the city’. They even threw earth from the ditch, presumably in an effort 
to deepen it, onto the bishop of Hereford’s land, and ‘pulled down part of the mill-pond because it 
was on the town ditch’.77 The same behaviour is recorded in the Chronicle of St. Werburg’s abbey 
at Chester, where the chronicler expresses fury at the citizens’ decision to dig a ditch around the 
city.78  
 
Figure  4:1 Hereford c.126479 
At Hereford, the inquiry’s main focus was apparently upon ecclesiastical property damaged 
during the events, concentrating as much upon the citizens’ actions as upon that of the attackers. 
The inquiry explicitly accused the citizens and garrison of Hereford of burning ‘certain houses in 
the suburbs which hindered the defence’. From the gate of St. Nicholas to Thithene they threw 
down houses ‘to the damage of one tenant of the bishop and tenants of the king’. Between the gates 
of Thithene and Widemarsh ‘for the same cause’ they pulled down the ‘Prior of St. Guthlac’s mill 
and two houses of the bishop’s fee’ and the mill house of a clerk. On the night of the royalist 
army’s arrival the Montfortian castle garrison burnt down the prior of St. Guthlac’s mill and eight 
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houses on Bithebroke Street. The mill was explicitly said to have been burned ‘because by it the 
enemy could cause them much annoyance’, probably since by its height archers could threaten the 
walls, as were the houses because they were ‘an annoyance to the castle and city.’80 
 
Figure  4:2 Chester 126481 
In 1264, the citizens of Chester ‘at the suggestion of a certain cursed fellow named Robert 
Mercer, then sheriff of the city’…‘pulled down the houses of St. Werburg that were in Bog lane’ 
and destroyed the gardens before digging their ditch.82 The damage at Rochester in 1264 was even 
more severe. Roger Leybourne, the royalist castle commander, torched the suburbs facing 
Canterbury, including parts of the town and the priory before the Montfortian attack.83 We can see 
these actions repeated in other periods, particularly in French towns such as Rheims during the 
Hundred Years War.84 Such destructive efforts were usually compounded by the actions of the 
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enemy as well, for example, when at Hereford the royalists burnt the suburb of Bissopstrete.85 It is 
interesting to note that in the first two cases above, we only know about the defensive preparations 
through the complaints of the local religious community. It seems that even at a time of civil war it 
was only the threat of imminent attack that prompted some towns to emend their defences. At 
Hereford, Chester and Rochester it was the castle garrison that apparently took the lead in these 
efforts, further emphasising the important role of urban castle garrisons in determining the military 
resistance of towns. As commented in Chapter 3, such activities were in the garrison’s interest as 
the town defences were frequently important to the defence of the castle itself and often bore the 
brunt of the initial fighting.86  
Despite being relatively unsophisticated, town fortifications demonstrated the ability to repulse 
direct assault by major armies on several occasions during the war. At Worcester, Winchester and 
Rochester, the determined resistance of the defenders drove off direct attempts to storm the towns. 
During Robert de Ferrers’ attack on Worcester in 1264 the earl’s army was reportedly ‘vigorously 
resisted’ by the citizens on the walls, forcing him to adopt other methods for gaining entry.87 
Robert of Gloucester comments that at Winchester in 1265 þe biker longe ilaste when Simon the 
Younger attempted to take the town. Again direct assault apparently failed.88  Gilbert de Clare’s 
initial attacks on Rochester’s walls were also driven off.89 At Northampton, despite the wall 
reportedly having been breached, the defenders repulsed two royalist assaults before the third broke 
through. In this case the rubble and ditch probably remained a potent hindrance to the attackers. 
Simon the Younger was reportedly unhorsed and captured when holding the breach, as he 
impetuously charged into the midst of the attackers.90 Little need was ever shown for the 
deployment of siege engines against towns. Though Roger Leybourne came with siege engines for 
the reduction of Sandwich, he took it with the first storm. Indeed, it is striking that the only 
recorded sustained siege of a fortified town is that of Winchelsea in 1266 which only lasted a few 
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days. The stipendiary archers hired for the campaign only received two days’ wages at most before 
it too fell to storm.91  
The lack of major town sieges in the Barons’ War stands in stark contrast to the Albigensian 
crusade and the wars in Germany in the first half of the century. Toch ascribes the strength of 
German towns in terms of their ‘stone fortifications, the very size of cities, the sheer number of the 
population, ruling patricians aspiring to a knightly way of life, urban arsenals’… ‘and access to 
military alliances’ which together in the thirteenth century made them ‘into military powers in their 
own right.’92 The explanation for the disparity with English towns during the civil war lies not just 
in the smaller scale of English towns but also in an inherent problem with English town defences, 
namely their size and condition.  
While town defences demonstrated an ability to withstand direct assault when properly 
manned, the narrative accounts also reveal that they appear to have been very vulnerable to surprise 
attack against usually untended sections of wall. These most frequently, though not exclusively, 
were connected to the grounds of a religious house. This phenomenon highlights the general issue 
in English town fortifications that ‘frequently, town walls acted as arenas where power plays 
between different sectors of the urban community were acted out’.93 The petitioning by religious 
houses for the creation of postern gates in their wall sections was one demonstration of their 
privileged status which could undermine the integrity of the town’s defences, as could the 
expansion of their precinct.94 In 1278, the proposal by the Carmelites to enclose part of 
Northampton city walls and block the crenallations as part of the construction of a new precinct ran 
into resistance when the jury for the enquiry noted that this work would hinder the town’s watch 
who used the crenallations to ‘watch for malefactors approaching the town’. If closed up, they 
noted, ‘various misdeeds and stratagems might pass undetected’. The jury also argued that the 
enclosure would be a nuisance to the citizens as the burgesses and the sick often walked on the 
walls between gates to get the air, and during the winter they used it to avoid the muddy streets.95 
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The responsibility for the upkeep and access to wall sections could also be a source of dispute. In 
the fourteenth century, for example, Oxford’s New College, after some negotiation, agreed to take 
responsibility for the upkeep of the city wall section to which it adjoined.96  
Winchester provides the best documented example of the impact that multiple jurisdictions 
could have on the effectiveness of town defences during the war. According to Wykes, Simon the 
Younger breached the defences through the priory cathedral of St. Swithun’s ‘that adjoins to the 
city wall’ by breaking a window and opening the door.97 St. Swithun’s sat within the wall’s circuit 
in its own enclosure.  
 
Figure  4:3 Winchester 126598 
The citizens and priory had fallen out in part over the custody and maintenance of the walls and 
gates in that sector. Winchester’s defences were maintained via the city’s right to collect murage. 
This right, however, was divided. The citizens were responsible for the northern circuit. St. Mary’s 
abbey was responsible for the east gate. The South-East corner, containing Wolvesey Palace was 
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the bishop’s responsibility, and the walls near the cathedral close St. Swithun’s. The South-West 
corner was meant to be maintained by the city and castle in conjunction.  The maintenance of over 
a third of the wall was out of the jurisdiction of the citizens and only one of the five gates belonged 
to them.99 The explosion of violence between the two areas of the town probably did little to assist 
the citizens’ ability to police the region of the precinct adequately. The prior may have resisted the 
entrance of armed citizens into the grounds, even though access to the walls for assembly and 
maintenance during time of war was a requirement of royal permission for new intramural 
enclosures in the mid-thirteenth century.100 The sack of the city seems to have spurred a resolution 
to this dispute as in 1266 the Priory and citizens agreed that the Priory was responsible for 
maintaining King’s Gate, South Gate and its drawbridge, as well as the walls adjoining each 
gate.101  
 
Figure  4:4 Gloucester 1264-5102 
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This pattern is repeated at Gloucester in 1265. The initial royalist assault was against the north 
end of the town but the defenders managed to hold the attackers off ‘wel inou’.103 However, as 
Robert of Gloucester comments: 
Between St. Oswald’s gate and the north gate, indeed, is a long wall, where the abbot’s orchard 
is, and within the orchard were no people to defend the town. Therefore in the assault some 
went without, and broke a piece of the wall before they were aware within.104  
 
As the map indicates, the inclusion of the abbey in the wall’s circuit hugely increased the area 
requiring guarding and in this case no watch was placed on this sector either through oversight or 
the refusal of the monks to allow defenders into the precincts. The presence of the orchard would 
have provided additional cover to the attackers. The apparent ease of the destruction of a section of 
wall there is also suggestive of poor maintenance of the defences by the abbey. In 1263, the 
discovery by the new abbot, Reginald de Homme, that the abbey had debts totalling 1500 marks, 
lends credence to the possibility that the abbey was not in a position to be assiduous in the wall’s 
maintenance. In 1272, the abbot’s financial difficulties were so great that he appealed to the crown 
for assistance and the abbey was transferred temporarily into royal custody.105 
In 1264, the royalists breached Northampton’s city wall reportedly by mining it at the section 
enclosing the priory of St. Andrews at the same time the king was demanding entrance to the town; 
an event that led to suspicions that the prior had betrayed the defenders to the king by weakening 
the wall.106 Guisborough’s account goes as far to say that the wall was levelled so that it was 
possible for forty horsemen to enter abreast.107 Northampton’s defences were generally in a poor 
state and whether the priory was actually responsible for the maintenance of its section is unknown. 
In a visitation in 1262, however, the priory was noted to be 272½ marks in debt suggesting again 
that, like Gloucester, if it was responsible, the maintenance of the wall may not have been a 
priority. This could explain how the wall was mined so quickly before being detected.108 The 
capture of Worcester by Robert de Ferrers, although not achieved through the grounds of a 
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religious house, was obtained, according to the Flores, through the grounds of the ‘Old Castle’ that 
had by that period fallen into disrepair.109  
It is noticeable that London was never directly attacked during the war, despite its crucial 
strategic significance, and this begs the question as to why. The perceived formidableness of the 
defences may provide one explanation. More akin in scale to the larger continental towns, London 
boasted a large population and powerful militia, a strong position further augmented in 1264-5 by 
the Montfortian control of the arsenal in the Tower. The walls themselves were impressive. Much 
of their fabric dated to Roman times, with later modifications to its upper portions, and was 
reinforced at various points by at least twenty five towers of both Roman and medieval origin, 
some large enough to accommodate siege engines. The surviving fragments of the wall, indicate 
that some sections were at least 10.7 metres tall and this was fronted by a ditch that was, when in 
good repair presumably, 1.8 metres deep and 4.8 metres wide.110 These defences were very 
formidable and if replicated around the enceinte, would have rendered the city largely impervious 
to direct assault without the assistance of more specialised siege machines. 
 
Figure  4:5 : London Wall, Cooper's Row 
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It is impossible to make an accurate comparison of the strength of London’s defences to those 
of its contemporaries due both to the fragmentary remains and the result of subsequent 
modifications over the centuries. Repairs to the walls were underway on the king’s order in 1257 as 
they were ‘in a dilapidated condition, and without ramparts’, with murage granted for 10 years on 9 
April 1257.111 The Bury Chronicle and Annals of Winchester record the presence of ‘barriers and 
iron chains,’ which the Bury Chronicle remarks ‘were remarkably effective for the defence of 
every open space and narrow street of the city’.112 These inner defences were a practical second 
line of defence designed to rob cavalry of their advantage.113 As Turner points out, ‘the town wall 
was probably the only defence the citizens enjoyed against possible hostiles’ and the defenders 
‘had no parallel to the keep in a castle to which they could retire if things went badly’.114 Even 
during 1267 the royal army seems to have conducted nothing more than a blockade of the city, 
harassing and skirmishing with foraging parties of the Disinherited.115 In all incidences when a 
proper siege of London was potentially imminent there are of course additional factors to explain 
why it never took place. After Northampton in 1264, Henry was focussed first on securing the 
south coast for reinforcements before committing himself to a lengthy siege. In 1265, after the 
battle of Evesham, the citizens debated as to whether they should fight but, to London Alderman 
fitz Thedmar’s relief, cooler heads prevailed and the city submitted.116 The arrival of significant 
reinforcements for Henry III in 1267 might have encouraged him to commence a proper siege, but 
the same force also played a role in persuading Gilbert de Clare to settle matters peacefully.117  
Towns during the Barons’ War, while frequently effective in defeating direct assault, simply 
covered too large an area to be effectively defended. As a result they were usually left vulnerable 
by blind spots resulting from the sheer breadth of their circuits and the competing jurisdictions 
within the town. Additionally the defences were sometimes in a poor state, and the citizens perhaps 
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too inexperienced to spot flaws in the defence. English towns were simply not the military powers 
that their continental cousins were and were less used to the prospect of major attack. 
Towns and the Active Conduct of War 
Towns were not simply passive bystanders during the civil war but could also conduct active 
warfare against targets of local concern. Boasting comparatively large populations, they could raise 
significant numbers of men more quickly and easily than rural areas. In 1267, the citizens of Lynn 
spearheaded the attack on the Disinherited on the Isle of Ely.118 While Rishanger considered the 
attack as partly motivated by the desire to persuade the king to return their liberties, the ravaging of 
the towns of Cambridge, Huntingdon and Norwich by the Disinherited combined with their attack 
on Lynn itself in the Easter week of 1266, would have easily convinced the citizens of the merits of 
destroying this local threat.119 Towns also contributed to the preparations against the queen’s 
threatened invasion in 1264. A distinction, however, seems to have been made between the 
summonses issued to the commonalties of Norfolk, Suffolk and the other counties and those to the 
towns of Lynn, Yarmouth, Dunwich, Orford, Ipswich, and ‘all other persons of the cities, boroughs 
and towns by the sea coast’, who were to be placed separately under the supervision of Roger 
Bigod, earl of Norfolk.120 These coastal towns aside, it is unclear whether the towns as a whole sent 
troops to the muster or merely contributed financially. The Bury Chronicle adds that ‘every 
borough and town’ as well as the countryside and clergy were taxed ‘to provide for the coastal 
defences and men to fight, and pay them adequately for as long as they remained there’.121 Bedford, 
for example, was required to raise money and provide a relatively high wage of 3d and then later 
4d per day for an unstated number of footmen.122 The ports were required to prevent ships landing 
and to guard the seas, presumably through their ship service.123 Other large military operations such 
as the 1266 siege of Kenilworth involved the call up of detachments of militia from nearby towns. 
Northampton, for example, contributed forty men while the mayor and bailiffs of Oxford were 
instructed to ready their horses and arms and whole posse to go forth and ‘grieve and subdue’ the 
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king’s enemies.124 The provision of mounted troops in Oxford’s case is worth noting as it 
highlights that towns could provide more than just infantry. The Disinherited’s presence on the Isle 
of Ely in 1266 necessitated the call up of an unknown number of levies from the area of East 
Anglia, probably including townsmen.125 
These forces would have also acted in defence of their town: the townsmen of Lynn fought off 
the Disinherited in 1266, while at Rochester in 1264 at least four or five of the burgesses died 
defending the city’s walls against Montfort’s assault.126 Similarly we know that the townsmen were 
defending Winchelsea, for their relatives were still allowed to inherit despite their family members 
being killed during the assault. At Winchester in 1265, as Robert of Gloucester comments, ‘the 
people who were in the town made fast the gates and kept the town against’ Simon the Younger.127 
Local concerns usually dominated the active military involvement of towns during the war. 
The active military contribution of London was exceptional, but its militia also concentrated 
most of its activity on local targets. The burning of Richard of Cornwall’s manor at Isleworth in 
March to April 1264, as well as other outlying royalist estates around the city, was among the first 
outbreaks of violence in the war.128 The London militia reportedly distinguished itself at the siege 
of Rochester, while it formed a significant part of the baronial army at the battle of Lewes.129 Here 
they were routed by the Lord Edward with apparently large loss of life. Though Fitz Thedmar does 
not give any indication of the casualties suffered it seems likely that there would have been a 
significant number of dead and wounded, given the apparent length (an hour according to the 
Flores) and ferocity of Edward’s pursuit. The predominance of references to the Londoners’ 
casualties suggests a high percentage of those slain on the rebel side may have been from the city’s 
militia.130  
London’s low military involvement following Lewes is notable. Whether the region around the 
city was largely pacified is not mentioned nor, perhaps unsurprisingly, are any Londoners 
described as accompanying Montfort in his pursuit of Gilbert de Clare in 1265. Wykes alone refers 
to a troop of Londoners with Simon the Younger’s army besieging Pevensey; though whether they 
                                         
124
 CLR 1267-1272, p.21; CPR, 1258-66, p.663. 
125
 See Chapter 5, pp.184-94. 
126
 Bury, p.34; Ann. Dun., pp.230-231. 
127
 CPR 1258-1266, p. 574; Church Historians, v, p.373; Wykes, p.169. 
128
 Cron. Maior., p.61. 
129
 Cron. Maior., pp.62-63; Bury, p.28. 
130
 Chronica et annales, pp.27-8; Flores, ii, pp.495-496; Wykes, pp.150-151. 
 166 
 
accompanied his attempt to relieve his father prior to Evesham in 1265 is unknown.131 On such 
evidence it seems as though London’s military activity was largely confined to the south-east of 
England, probably due to issues of security and practicality. William fitz Stephen’s Life of Thomas 
Becket (1170-1183) remarks that the city had an estimated twenty thousand horsemen and sixty 
thousand men on foot ‘fit for war’ at the time of King Stephen.132 The accuracy of this figure 
cannot be verified, nor can we with confidence apply it to London seventy years after Fitz 
Stephen’s death. The three-to-one ratio of foot to horse, however, may provide an indication of the 
general proportion of London’s forces. Fitz Thedmar refers to the Londoners consisting of ‘horse 
and foot’ at Lewes and also comments that during the standoff between the Lord Edward and 
Richard de Clare, earl of Gloucester in 1260 at London, it was instructed that all persons of fifteen 
years and upwards, each to the best of his ability, should be well provided with arms’.133 By this 
reckoning a full muster dispatched from London could have effectively stripped the male 
population of the city and left this key base poorly defended; a concern that must have influenced 
other town militias. This worry about the vulnerability of the city with the bulk of the militia away, 
and the relative slowness the preponderance of infantry suggests, may in part explain the decision 
of the Londoners and the barons to withdraw to London again at Henry III’s approach following 
the failure to take Rochester castle in April 1264.134 
Little information is available for the mounted forces which the city of London, or any other 
town, was able to raise but it would seem likely that such cavalry forces were capable of being sent 
further afield than the infantry. Ironically, the only Londoners we know to have been active outside 
the South-East in 1265 were royalists. With the escape of Edward on 28 May, Stephen de Cornhill, 
a royalist draper ‘of patrician stock’, gathered his men and rode out to join the royalist army.135 His 
loyalty was well rewarded with exemption for life from all tallages and prises at the instance of 
both Gilbert de Clare and William de Valence.136 Apart from these references it seems that, as with 
other towns, London’s offensive military ability was geographically limited. 
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London’s military power may have suffered a decline after 1264 due to the heavy casualties 
received at Rochester, Lewes and Croydon. The latter incident, according to Rishanger, occurred 
when the royalist garrison of Tonbridge heard that the Londoners who had fled Lewes had 
regrouped at Croydon. The garrison fell upon the Londoners, killing ‘very many’ and carrying 
away the spoils.137 When the Disinherited encamped at Southwark in 1267, fitz Thedmar comments 
that ‘the citizens themselves had not the means of attacking them without the assistance of the earl’ 
of Gloucester. While fitz Thedmar may have been trying to excuse London’s failure, this remark 
might also suggest an acknowledgement of the weakening of the militia since 1264, or perhaps, 
more mundanely, simply that it could not match the number of heavily armed knights in the forces 
of the Disinherited.138 
Case Study: The Ports 
Control of the ports was a crucial issue during the course of the Barons’ War.139 The importance of 
port towns was dictated by their ability to control the sea and coast of England, acting as conduits 
for trade and, crucially, providing access for foreign support. Both in 1215-17 and in 1260, foreign 
troops had been brought in to help each side. In 1215-17, King John had brought in large numbers 
of mercenaries through Dover, mostly from Flanders.140 By contrast, Prince Louis’s campaign in 
1216-17 was hindered by the royalist fleet, which not only helped disrupt Louis’ two sieges of 
Dover castle, but was also able to destroy a major French relief fleet at the battle of Sandwich.141 In 
1260, when Henry III re-seized control of the realm he brought foreign soldiers with him and on 7 
April issued protection to those foreign knights in royal service landing at the Cinque Ports.142 
Henry’s concern over the possibility that Montfort might bring foreign troops with him caused him 
on 18 May 1261 to instruct the ‘bailiffs and barons’ of the Cinque Ports to prevent Simon de 
Montfort from bringing ‘into the realm aliens with arms against the king to the disturbance of the 
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peace and grievous cost to the realm’.143 On 8 May 1263, the king dispatched a letter to the barons 
and bailiffs of Dover, chastising them for not arresting men landing at their port with horses and 
arms. He reemphasised the same injunction to the other Cinque Ports, as well as Portsmouth, 
Ipswich, Dunwich and Yarmouth.144  
That both sides were fully alive to the necessity of controlling the ports was demonstrated on 
several occasions during the war. Montfort’s efforts to obtain the removal of the royalist garrison of 
Bristol in 1264 and his favourable approach to the town, exemplified in his letter patent 
commending the townsmen for their loyalty on 26 June 1265, is partly indicative of the strategic 
importance of Bristol itself as the principal port in the region. The Gesta Stephani in the twelfth 
century named Bristol as ‘almost the richest city of all in the country, receiving merchandise by 
sailing ships from lands near and far’.145 The Bristol fleet nearly rescued Montfort from Wales in 
1265, and by persuading the royalist garrison to depart Montfort broke the garrison’s ability to 
communicate with the queen and other royalists on the continent.146 Montfort’s assumption of both 
Bristol and Chester castles, both situated in the port towns, into his hands, also allowed him to 
more readily control contacts with Ireland. Ireland remained primarily royalist by 1265, despite 
Montfort’s efforts to impose his own justiciar there and make common cause with the Geraldines 
against the de Burgh family.147 That a number of major royalists possessed lands in Ireland, 
including Edward, Roger Mortimer and William de Valence, perhaps made this support 
unsurprising, though a number of Montfortians, including Montfort himself via his wife Eleanor 
also had lands there.148 On 17 November 1264, orders were issued for the release of a ship 
belonging to the abbey of St. Mary’s, Dublin, which had been impounded on the Isle of White. The 
ship had been seized because a knight on board was carrying suspicious letters to Ireland’s 
magnates.149 If Montfort had concerns over potential Irish aid for the royalists these would have 
been justified in the late summer to early autumn of 1265 by the arrival to assist Edward of a 
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number of Anglo-Irish lords, including Sir Maurice fitz Maurice, Sir Maurice fitz Gerald and Sir 
Walter de Burgh.150  
The Cinque Ports were to prove the most strategically vital, prominent and active of the 
English ports and they were subject to several concerted campaigns during the war.151 Situated on 
the coast of Kent and Sussex, these comprised the five head ports of Dover, Winchelsea, Sandwich, 
Hythe and Rye, together with a number of smaller affiliated ports.152 As well as being sited on the 
section of coast closest to France and Flanders they were also responsible for ship service to the 
crown of fifty-seven ships with forty days warning and two weeks service.153 With only a small 
royal fleet, the existence of which was unclear by the 1260s, Henry III was as reliant as his 
predecessors had been on the fleets of ships the Cinque Ports and other port towns could provide 
him.154 These ships could command the Channel and thus control who could cross it.155 The 
importance attached to the ports was such that two special crown offices existed, the Wardenship of 
the Cinque Ports and the Chamberlainship of Sandwich, and throughout the war the post was filled 
alternately by some of the most trusted men in each faction. On 5 December 1263, Roger 
Leybourne was appointed Warden and given the Chamberlainship. Fourteen days after the battle of 
Lewes he was replaced by Henry de Montfort.156 Leybourne was reinstated on 24 August 1265, just 
twenty days after the battle of Evesham, but in late November Henry III appointed the Lord 
Edward as the Warden and gave him the constableship of Dover castle, which was frequently 
attached to the post.157  
The control of the Cinque Ports essentially determined the very rationale for the campaign that 
culminated in the battle of Lewes in April to May 1264: their loss would not only have undermined 
Simon’s position but would have spelt the reformers’ certain defeat. When Henry was rebuffed 
once more from Dover castle, he set about trying to bring the Cinque Ports into his peace as a 
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crucial step towards receiving reinforcements from abroad. With the presence of the large royal 
host on their doorsteps and Montfort entrenched at London, the ports started to submit to Henry, 
beginning at Winchelsea after 1 May 1264.158 The threat of these losses helped spur Montfort’s 
decision to quit London and seek battle. 
The ports again became crucial to the war effort during the Montfortian government’s 
preoccupation with the potential invasion by the queen’s army in the summer of 1264. Merchants 
and envoys were restricted to travelling only through Dover while towns like Lynn and Yarmouth 
and ‘all other persons of the cities, boroughs and towns, by the sea coast’ in Norfolk and Suffolk 
were to prepare defences against invasion.159 The men of Hastings, Winchelsea and Rye were also 
ordered to try and intercept ships carrying men and supplies to Pevensey castle during the siege.160  
The Montfortian government encouraged the Cinque Ports to police the channel, which the Cinque 
Ports seem to have taken as a free licence for piracy. Such behaviour was actively encouraged by 
the Montfortians themselves. The Ship of St. Lawrence from Bayonne, for example, was seized in 
Portsmouth by Simon the Younger on the assertion that its master, one Demonionus de Argilaz, 
favoured the Lord Edward. Its cargo was dispersed between Simon the Younger and others and the 
ship was handed over to the men of the Cinque Ports rather than those of Portsmouth.161 Such 
favouritism may have ensured the Cinque Ports’ loyalty to the Montfortian cause but it had the 
effect of pushing the Cinque Ports’ rivals towards the royalist camp. Yarmouth, for example, party 
to a longstanding dispute with the Cinque Ports over the holding of herring fairs, seems to have 
remained more inclined to support the royalist cause. On 24 October 1264, in a display of clear 
favouritism, Montfort blatantly rewarded the Cinque Ports by promising a ‘special grace’ and 
ruling against Yarmouth in a dispute between the two.162 On 12 February 1266, Henry III used this 
rivalry to encourage Yarmouth’s loyalty by granting the men of the town the right to keep all spoils 
they might seize when hunting the pirates of the Cinque Ports.163 Following the battle of Evesham, 
the Cinque Ports remained stubbornly defiant in support of the Montfortian cause. Continuing their 
campaign of piracy, the Cinque Ports targeted their rival, Portsmouth, burning the town on 25 
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November.164 This act was carried out despite an apparent agreement by the ports to pay a fine to 
return to peace.165 On 12 December, Ralph de Saunzavers and his son Hugh were appointed 
Wardens of the Seashore in the parts of Sussex to go against the king’s enemies in the Cinque Ports 
who ‘with a great fleet keep at sea and continue to commit offences and will commit greater’.166 
The ports’ continued loyalty to the Montfortian cause subsequent to Montfort’s death is not too 
surprising. The ports had done well under the Montforts and their continued loyalty offered the 
potential of a Montfortian revival if Simon the Younger could raise an army abroad. Furthermore, 
the severe retribution meted out by the royalists to Montfortian London, did not provide the Cinque 
Ports with much incentive to surrender. Their continued rebellion, therefore, might have also been 
a tool to extract concessions from the royal government. 
The reduction of the Cinque Ports swiftly emerged as the first major objective for the royalists 
in 1266. On 1 January, Yarmouth was ordered to provide 20 ships with 800 men to attack the 
Cinque Port galleys at Sandwich.167 On 4 January, Roger Leybourne was ordered to take Sandwich. 
Edward had reappointed Leybourne as Chamberlain of Sandwich in his stead in addition to 
Leybourne’s positions of sheriff of Kent and constable of Rochester.168 On the 15th, Leybourne 
arrived at the port and took it with the first assault. That he had been prepared for a longer siege is 
demonstrated by his financial accouts which record wages for a Master Peter the Engineer and his 
assistants, alongside money to masons for carving the stones for an engine. The assault was 
physically costly, however, with £200 spent on horses lost. 169  
A pause took place following the fall of Sandwich on 15 January, perhaps to allow negotiations 
with the other ports. This pause ended, however, around the time of Simon the Younger’s escape 
from London to Winchelsea on 10 February.170 With the threat posed by the Cinque Ports now 
exacerbated by Simon’s presence, their surrender became a crucial issue. Leybourne advanced to 
Hastings and either captured or forced the capitulation of the defenders before proceeding to 
strengthen the castle between February and early March.171 Leybourne was reinforced, according to 
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the Waverley Annals, by Edward and Gilbert de Clare, before an assault was finally launched on 24 
March (the 18th according to the Dover Chronicle). Naval support was provided by a fleet mustered 
from East Anglia, including Yarmouth, Ipswich, Orford, Lynn, Blakeney and Gosford.172 The land 
force included a combined force of 577 Weald archers in Leybourne’s pay, 323 of them paid for 
two days and 254 for one day.173 The assault was apparently a bloody one with many killed, a 
number of the defenders in particular were drowned when they were forced to flee towards the 
harbour.174 By late March, the royalists had brought the ports to heel. Perhaps most crucially they 
had both removed the Disinherited’s allies and also denied them the possibility of receiving foreign 
reinforcements from Simon the Younger. The ground work was being laid for the siege of 
Kenilworth. In this success the assistance of the royalist ports had played an important role. 
Legacy 
Despite their shortcomings, town defences were still perceived to have value in the post Evesham 
period, particularly against opportunistic raiding conducted by the Disinherited and other 
marauders. St. Albans, the continuator of Matthew Paris noted, was diligently garrisoned and the 
gates locked and barred. All those wishing to cross through the town, especially horsemen, were 
denied entry.175 The spate of attacks committed by the Disinherited against towns, particularly their 
1266 raid on un-walled Norwich, concentrated minds on the value of defences. On 27 April 1266, 
for example, the king ordered the mayor and citizens of Oxford to repair ‘the barriers (barreras), 
crenallations (kernellos), embankments (alivas) and defects of the wall and dyke of the town’ and 
to ‘dig out the ford below the priory of St. Frideswyde’.176 In May 1266, murage grants were 
granted to Lynn and Lewes for the first time.177  
In 1267, Henry chose to base his headquarters at Cambridge for his campaign against the Isle 
of Ely. Un-walled and a previous victim of the Disinherited’s raiding, the town was acutely 
vulnerable and Henry invested considerable expense and effort to fortify it. The Barnwell 
Chronicle recounts that Henry ordered gates to be erected and a ditch dug around the town, not 
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permitting the workers to cease work even for feast days.178 Henry’s works seem to have left a 
lasting impression on the town as the ditch seems to have acquired subsequently the name ‘King’s 
Ditch’. The work is confirmed in the Pipe Rolls. The friars of Mount Carmel were required to 
provide timber for the palisade worth 2 marks and for the ‘barriers and obstruction of diverse gates’ 
worth 16s. Twenty-five measures of iron were purchased and allowance provided for Master John 
de Richmond, the king’s builder, ‘for the work on the barrier within the town before said,’ for 25s 
through the king’s writ, and 36s 6d paid for the king’s carpenters and workers. Another 48s were 
paid out for ‘timber for the barriers and palisades and iron for chains therewith made in the town of 
Cambridge’.179 
It is hard to say if the events of the Barons’ War provoked a distinct growth in town defences in 
England. Turner remarks that, ‘from the early thirteenth century onwards a connection between 
fighting and the provision of defences can be established.’ In particular Turner notes that 
chronologically the murage grants fall into ‘clear geographical groupings’.180 In that sense the 
Barons’ War holds at least partially true to that pattern. A study of murage grants show a spurt of 
grants between 1251-99 for towns affected by the Barons’ War in East Anglia, such as Lynn and 
Norwich and also for Lewes in Sussex. In Norwich’s case, however, no murage was granted until 
in 1297, which is not very compelling evidence for the direct impact of the Barons’ War on the 
construction of the fortifications. Some of the gateways, however, predate the walls and might be 
related to the conflict.181 The bulk of new defences constructed in the post-war period seem to have 
been concentrated in the Welsh March and have more to do with the long running warfare in the 
region than with any impact of the civil war.182 Likewise, it is not really possible to say with any 
degree of confidence that the war produced any redesigns in town fortifications. The only 
noticeable change from c.1260 until 1390 was the introduction of D-shaped mural towers in all the 
towns defences built within this period. These projected further out from the wall but usually with a 
reduced diameter compared to their predecessor, providing a smaller area exposed to enemy attack 
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while simultaneously permitting a better angle for flanking fire along the wall.183 To assert a direct 
causal link with the Barons’ War would, however, be pushing the limited evidence too far again. 
Very unusually the defences of Oxford were augmented in the later thirteenth century with the 
addition of a concentric line of defences along the northern perimeter, although once more any link 
with the war is unclear.184 The war may have spurred changes to town defences or at least 
highlighted their deficiencies to men like the Lord Edward when it came to fortifying towns in 
Wales, but the link is currently speculative. 
Towns’ involvement in the Barons’ War retain a number of features distinct from castles. The 
economic and strategic significance of towns and particularly London and the Cinque Ports, 
resulted in their control becoming crucial objectives for both sides during the war’s course. Walled 
towns were frequently utilised as bases of operations by larger armies as the defences provided 
security for a larger area than offered by most castles. Much like the lesser castles in the war, town 
defences, however, frequently proved themselves unable to cope in the face of an attack by proper 
armies. An exception to this perhaps was London. Town defences, while they demonstrated the 
capability to repel direct attacks even by large forces, suffered from enceintes that were often too 
great in size to guard effectively and which were compromised by decades of neglect and 
competing jurisdictions. Nevertheless, town defences remained relatively popular, particularly in 
the face of the Disinherited’s campaign from 1266 onwards. Town sacks were relatively common 
and while judged a normal part of the conduct of war, these events had a serious impact on the 
citizens, most notably at Winchester. Not confined to simply defensive involvement in the war, 
towns, most particularly London, were an important source of man power and some towns, 
particularly the ports like Lynn in 1266, could engage in offensive operations of their own. As such 
the towns were a significant factor in the shaping the nature of the Barons’ War both as participants 
and objectives.
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5  ‘To the Woods and Fields’ 
This chapter examines the importance and use of the wilderness in warfare during the civil war as 
well as its limitations as an effective method of resistance. In this we shall focus principally upon 
the type of warfare used by the Disinherited and in the royalist campaigns to supress them from late 
1265-67. While Knowles’s thesis provides a good narrative account of the campaigns of 1266-67 
his focus is to provide a framework for his discussion of the Disinherited themselves rather 
providing an analysis of the type of warfare and its location. This chapter will follow a more 
narrative structure at points than the preceding chapters as this provides the most effective format 
for analysing the development, problems and effect of this kind of warfare and particularly how it 
was inextricably linked to the siege of Kenilworth. We shall see that the use of the wilderness areas 
as safe havens for rebels was a distinct form of warfare tracing itself back to earlier centuries and 
also how the nature of the Disinherited’s rebellion had a potentially wider cultural impact in the 
development of the Robin Hood legend.  
 
An Uncivil Peace: The Disinherited’s Rebellion 1265-67  
It is important first to clarify the nature of events in the period of late 1265 to the summer of 1267. 
Legally the civil war was declared over at Winchester in September 1265. Although the declaration 
is important for purposes of assessing the legal context of subsequent events, in reality the fighting 
continued for another two years and England cannot be considered realistically to have been in a 
state of peace during this period. What can we call this period then? Alun Lewis referred to it as 
‘the Pacification of England’, but pacification suggests that peace was restored principally by brute 
force. Such was not the case.1 Most of England returned swiftly and peacefully to the royal fold in 
the wake of the battle of Evesham. There is a danger, however, in conferring a new name upon the 
conflict post-Winchester; it potentially suggests it was a new conflict rather than a continuation of 
the old. Yet, the motivations of some of the participants had changed significantly. The resistance 
of the Disinherited, though perhaps ideologically driven for some, was also about obtaining 
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restoration of lost lands.2 For most the restoration of the Provisions must rarely have seemed a 
realistic prospect after Montfort’s death. Bearing these problems in mind, it is still perhaps best to 
maintain the sense of a transition to a new phase of the conflict. The period from September 1265 
to the summer of 1267 may be termed ‘The Disinherited’s Rebellion’ as it not only indicates the 
continuing nature of the conflict, but also its underlying rationale and composition. 
The ‘Woods and Fields’ and the Shadow of Kenilworth 
The ineffectiveness of all but the most powerful castles in the face of major attack, discussed in 
Chapter 3, saw castle commanders on both sides of the conflict abandon their castles and retreat to 
the wilderness rather than face siege. In 1264, John de Eyville had abandoned York in the wake of 
the fall of Northampton; and in 1265 Roger Mortimer had gone to stay in the woods near Wigmore 
while leaving his wife in charge of the castle. Later the same year, Simon the Younger abandoned 
Kenilworth to journey to the Isle of Axholme.3 While the abandonment of castles by their owner 
might seem a strange move, doing so permitted them the freedom of movement to both harry their 
enemies as well as the opportunity to gather more support. By adopting this course of action the 
owner might help relieve pressure on any castle garrison he may have left behind by diverting 
troops away from a siege by raiding and hampering the besiegers’ attempts at gathering supplies. If 
the rationale for the siege was the owner’s capture, then such an act could perhaps undermine the 
desire to conduct it. If he had not left a garrison, he was free to avoid clashing with his superior 
foes and could hopefully harry their lands instead. By contrast, if he stayed in his castle he risked 
being trapped inside by a siege and potentially being starved out. This was a relatively common 
theme since the Conquest; for example, in 1075 Ralph de Gael left his wife in charge of Norwich 
castle while he went to gather aid in Denmark, and in 1224 Falkes de Bréauté decided to leave 
Bedford in the hands of his brother William.4 Gilbert de Clare and John Giffard had adopted 
similar tactics in 1265 when Montfort arrived at Gloucester in May. Instead of staying at 
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Brimpsfield castle, Giffard and de Clare’s forces resided in the woods and hills surrounding the 
city, with Giffard lighting a huge fire each night on Erdlond hill so his enemies knew where he 
was.5 As Montfort left for Hereford de Clare’s forces shadowed him and, as Robert of Gloucester 
comments when Montfort thought de Clare was far off instead, ofte he was ner.6 This freedom of 
movement had much to recommend itself for the weaker party in the war, both for the royalists in 
1264-5 and particularly for the Disinherited in the period between Evesham and July 1267 when 
the rebels on the Isle of Ely finally surrendered. 
The retreat to the wilderness had a long standing precedent in rebellion England and in Wales. 
The wilderness offered the chance for prolonged resistance by those who did not possess, or could 
not expect to hold castles. After the Norman Conquest men like Eadric silvaticus and Hereward the 
Wake had successfully resisted the new authorities from the Welsh March and the wilds of the Fens 
respectively.7 During the civil war of Stephen’s reign, Geoffrey de Mandeville also took refuge in 
the Fens, seizing Ramsey Abbey and turning it into a fortified base.8 Fulk fitz Warin waged a 
successful guerrilla campaign against King John from the woodlands of the March, eventually 
forcing John to agree a settlement.9 During the invasion by Prince Louis in 1216-17, a large band 
of archers from the Weald led by a William of Cassingham (or Willikin of the Weald) used the 
thickly wooded countryside of the Weald to successfully harass and ambush the French army.10 
Exposure to Welsh methods of warfare, with its emphasis on raiding and ambush in the forests and 
hills rather than the defence of castles, meant that the Marcher lords like Mortimer, had 
considerable practical experience of this sort of warfare.11  
The destruction of much of the rebels’ military strength and leadership at Evesham saw the 
survivors turn to these tried and tested methods of resistance. Some men, most probably the 
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northerners such as John de Eyville, had gained experience in this type of warfare as early as 1261 
when Peter de Percy had been tasked with hunting him during the disturbances of that year.12  The 
southern Montfortian knights are less well documented as engaging in this activity prior to 1265, 
though men like Adam de Gurdon seem to have adapted readily enough.  
In 1265, the Isle of Axholme served as the first centre of resistance in the wilderness. In 
September, John de Eyvill surrendered Scarborough castle and subsequently retreated to Axholme 
which bordered his own lands at Adlingfleet.13 From thence forward Axholme began to serve as a 
focal point for resistance. Reinforcements arrived after Martinmas (11 November) including 
Baldwin Wake and Simon the Younger, following the latter’s departure form Kenilworth. Axholme 
was a natural fortress, according to Wykes, a region of marshes ‘surrounded by great rivers’.14 This 
had been a base of Roger de Mowbray in the Young King’s rebellion of 1174.15 Utilizing these 
ready-made defences, the rebels employed guards to observe the ‘narrow ways and crossings of the 
waters’.16 From this region they struck out and ‘began to ravage the neighbouring provinces’.17  
The royalist response to this new threat was swift and demonstrated a clear appreciation of the 
problems that the terrain around Axholme would cause. Preparations for the muster against 
Kenilworth were abandoned and some of the troops raised for it, possibly including the 
Warwickshire workmen, were redirected to assist Edward.18 The county posses of Nottingham and 
Derby were summoned to join Edward, as was a force commanded by Henry of Almain. Edward’s 
solution for overcoming the natural defences was direct and clever. Rather than trying to spread out 
to besiege the entire island he had ‘skilfully designed’ wooden bridges constructed which allowed 
him to move freely across the rivers and marshes, allowing his forces to corral the Disinherited’s 
movements.19 Wykes’s account is sparse on geographical details, but Edward’s operations 
apparently forced the rebels into the southern end of Axholme, because they negotiated a peace at 
Bycarr’s Dyke (between the Rivers Idle and Trent) in December that year. There Simon the 
                                         
12
 CLR 1267-72, no.699. 
13
 De Ville, ‘John de Eyville’, p.21.  
14
 Wykes, pp.180-81, provinciam quandam paludosam et magnis fluminibus circumcinctam.  
15
 Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis, 1169-92, ed. W. Stubbs, (Rolls ser., 1869), p.68. 
16
 Wykes, p.181, viarum angustias et transmeatus aquarum adhibitis custodibus observabant. 
17
 Wykes, p.181. 
18
 See Chapter 3, p.131; Rishanger, De Bellis, p.41. 
19
 Wykes, p.181, pontibus ligneis artificiose excogitates. 
 179 
 
Younger agreed to depart with Edward to London.20  Though Simon had surrendered, his 
companions including Baldwin Wake and John de Eyville seem to have revoked their pledges and 
resumed raiding.21 Edward’s use of pontoon bridges to outflank an enemy may mark the beginnings 
of his wider interest in this form of military engineering. He repeated the tactic in 1303 when he 
ordered the construction of a pontoon bridge across the River Forth to outflank Stirling castle and 
the bridge which remained in Scottish hands.22 
Events at Axholme had demonstrated to those involved that remaining in one place for too 
long, even one with good natural defences, risked isolation and defeat for the rebels. Bycarr’s Dyke 
therefore marked a change in strategy for the Disinherited. The chronology of events and the 
movements of the Disinherited are very difficult to trace for this period. Some men, such as John 
de Eyville, were believed to have come to peace in late January.23 Others, however, continued, or at 
the very least quickly resumed fighting. On 10 February, on the same day as Simon the Younger’s 
escape to Winchelsea, Henry of Almain and the northern lords, including John de Eyville, were 
ordered to defend the parts of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and Yorkshire as the raiding there 
intensified.24 They failed, however, to bring the Disinherited to battle and de Eyville was already or 
soon back in rebellion.25 Wykes reports that de Eyville, Baldwin Wake and Henry Hastings, at 
some point after the withdrawal from Axholme, retreated to a wood called ‘Suffieldfrith’. 
Denholm-Young identifies this as Suffield Wood to the north of Norwich.26 While possibly still in 
Norfolk, this group was joined by Robert de Ferrers.27 This withdrawal was possibly in response to 
Henry of Almain’s activities, but the retreat was only temporary. In early May, the strain of the 
anti-Disinherited campaign and the concurrent preparations for the siege of Kenilworth began to 
cause complications for the royalist operations. A number of northern lords, Balliol and de Neville 
included, were summoned with their military service to attend the muster for the siege. Already 
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committed to aiding Henry of Almain a number of them were subsequently excused from going to 
Kenilworth after it was confirmed they had served their forty days in the north.28  
It took the royalists until 15 May to finally catch the rebels. The Disinherited had made their 
base at Baldwin Wake’s manor of Chesterfield. On the morning of 15 May, while twenty-two of 
them, including Hastings and Wake were out hunting, Henry of Almain descended upon the town 
and routed the rest. De Eyville and a small group of the remaining guards made a break for it and in 
the process de Eyville reportedly unhorsed an opponent and wounded several others.29 
Chesterfield, like Bycarr’s Dyke, marked a change in strategy for some of the Disinherited. De 
Eyville and Wake opted to take to ‘the woods and to the fields’, as Robert of Gloucester put it.30 
Henry Hastings and some others, however, decided that the defence of Kenilworth was a greater 
priority. Chesterfield was undoubtedly a blow to the Disinherited. One knight, a Robert de 
Wollerinton, was caught and promptly hanged by Henry of Almain, while many folk were slain, 
though whether these were rebels or citizens of Chesterfield is never made clear. Most importantly 
Robert de Ferrers, who was being treated for his gout that morning, was captured.31 According to 
the Bury chronicler, the survivors ‘collected in bands in the woods, which were suitable hiding-
places, and made hide-outs in various places. They were more dangerous to meet than she-bears 
robbed of their cubs and seized everything they wanted from anywhere.’32    
 
The small bands of outlaws plaguing the forests became a widespread problem in England during 
the civil war. The royalists launched a series of operations to tackle these groups. From 8-11 
October 1265, Roger de Leybourne advanced into Essex, though as Lewis notes, this ‘can have 
been little more than a reconnoitring expedition’.33 Between 4 and 11 November he conducted 
another short expedition, leading several hundred men to pacify the Weald and to keep ‘the fairs 
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and woods of those parts free of bandits and conspirators’.34 Fairs provided a ready concentration 
of supplies that raiders could target. The rebels at large in the region were probably working in 
small bands unlike the large group that had formed at Axholme. Leybourne, having reportedly 
suffered several ambushes, seems to have quickly decided that his force was ill suited to hunt such 
opponents. He retired leaving 200 archers paid 3d a day for ‘guarding the king’s peace in those 
parts’, apparently judging that they would be sufficient for the task.35  
Of particular significance is that the region of Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire and South 
Yorkshire were so frequently involved in the predations of these bands at this period. As early as 
the beginning of March 1264, problems in Sherwood were noted when the king’s messenger, riding 
north to bring the king’s summons for the northern royalists to gather at Oxford, was seized and the 
royal letters taken.36 As well as the ravages of the bands of de Eyville in 1265, fighting also 
continued to plague Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire in late 1266 and well into 1267. A group of 
rebels who had been operating for an unknown amount of time, including John de Eyville’s cousin, 
Nicholas de Eyville, and the former baronial sheriff, William fitz Herbert, were becoming an 
increasing strain on the garrison of Nottingham. On the 5 November, a letter close noted that they 
were preventing the sheriff John Balliol and his under-sheriff Simon de Hedon from collecting the 
issues of the counties.37 The situation in Nottinghamshire was clearly deteriorating, so much so that 
by 6 January 1267 Roger Leybourne, now appointed the guardian of Nottingham castle, dispatched 
William Leybourne with eight knights and thirty sergeants to boost the garrison. The fighting 
claimed a heavy toll, with many men and horses from the garrison either wounded or killed when 
they engaged the enemy at the Forest of ‘Rossold’ (possibly Rufford) during Passion Week.38 On 
20 March 1267, William Mortain was appointed sheriff of Nottingham and Derby and was 
instructed to hunt down the rebels, while Leybourne and his sub-constable Alan de Kirkby were 
ordered to let Mortain and his household use Nottingham castle as a base.39 Even after the war’s 
conclusion the region remained plagued by those rebels who had not come to the king’s peace as 
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well as other outlaws.40 This period seems to have played a role in the development of the Robin 
Hood legend. Holt points to the prevalence in the legends of the locations of both Barnsdale in 
South Yorkshire and Sherwood; the former is located very close to Axholme. He also notes a 
number of parallels between the story of Robert Godberd, a former member of the Montfortian 
garrison of Nottingham who plagued Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire until 1272, with some of the 
tales of Robin Hood.41 Walter Bower, writing in the 1440s, believed that Robin Hood had been 
active in the post-Evesham period of the war, noting that ‘John de Eyville occupied the Isle of Ely; 
Robin Hood was an outlaw amongst the woodland briars and thorns’.42 Crook notes an entry in the 
1261 eyre roll concerning an outlaw William son of Robert the smith. The record of the same case 
in the 1262 memoranda roll alters the surname to ‘Robehod’. Crook argues that ‘the implication 
must be that whoever altered it was aware of the Robin Hood legend in some form or other’.43 The 
amount of evidence to support this thesis is very limited, but it may suggest that some of the ideas 
underpinning the legends were beginning to form by this period. The nature of the war being 
waged by the Disinherited had historical precedent and demonstrates evidence of a deeper cultural 
impact on society. 
 
The siege of Kenilworth and the royalist preparations for it played a key role in determining the 
tempo and shape of the royalist campaign against the rebels in 1266. During the winter of 1265 and 
spring of 1266, royalist efforts were principally reactive and involved the dispatch of forces to 
either hunt down particular bands of the Disinherited or to tackle hotspots of disorder. Combined 
with the royalist victory at Chesterfield, May 1266 marked the royalists’ most successful month. 
The king, concerned by the lesser citizens’ (minores) displays of support for the imprisoned 
Thomas fitz Thomas, the Montfortian mayor of London, ordered Roger de Leybourne to the capital 
in a show of force. Leybourne’s arrival on 8 May with a great company of knights and sergeants, 
armoured beneath their clothes, impressed the Alderman Fitz Thedmar. These clothes may have 
carried the king’s arms as an added display of royal authority for Leybourne’s expenses reveal that 
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he had purchased tunics for his troops prior to the campaign.44 Leybourne rounded up a number of 
trouble makers in the city and reasserted royal authority there. His real objective though was to the 
north. Henry ordered the sheriff of Surrey and Sussex to raise 200 ‘good archers’ to join John de 
Warenne at London from either 13 May or 21 May. These reinforcements were probably to relieve 
Leybourne of the duty of holding down the city.45 Leybourne then departed for Essex, launching a 
campaign against the Disinherited in the district that lasted approximately from 20 May to 16 June, 
assisted by another force led by William de Valence and John de Warenne.46 The force raised by 
Leybourne was large and consisted of a substantial body of men serving under royal pay. Thirty-
two knights served for twenty three days for a total of £73 12s. Seven royal sergeants-at-arms and 
seven king’s crossbowmen served for thirty and twenty six days respectively while 500 Welsh or 
Weald archers served for twenty three days (the documents confusingly say both) of which 200 
were provided with tunics (tunici).47 Stopping at various places during his campaign he used 
Colchester, and presumably its royal castle, as a base between the 9 and 12 June. The losses in the 
campaign led Leybourne to claim £110 for horses killed.48  
Adam Gurdon, a knight with lands in Hampshire, Dorset and probably Gloucestershire, had 
also retreated into the ‘woods and fields’ following his disinheritance. He initially seems to have 
retained a strong popular following in Somerset and Devon from his time as the Montfortian 
constable of Dunster and Lundy castles.49 He subsequently withdrew from there to Essex and 
joined forces with another rebel, David Offington. This group and the other bands plagued the 
regions near London. Gurdun’s plundering and burning attracted particular attention from 
chroniclers like Wykes and was one of the spurs for Leybourne’s campaign into Essex.50 Gurdun 
and Offington led a band of horsemen up to twenty four strong to raid the priory of Dunstable’s 
manor of Shortgrave in Bedfordshire. Staying for a day and night they apparently got wind of the 
impending campaign and retreated over the Chilterns, stopping at Kimble in Buckinghamshire and 
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then moving south to base themselves in the woods of Alton in Hampshire.51 Sometime in this 
period David de Offington apparently left the group as he reappeared amongst those Disinherited 
surrendering in August 1267.52 On 6 May 1266, Edward decided to flush out the band and managed 
to locate their camp in the woods. In the ensuing fight Gurdun was captured and his companions 
were hanged.53  
The combined campaigns of Edward, Henry of Almain and Leybourne’s forces, demonstrate 
that the royalists were making strong efforts to bring the Disinherited to heel prior to the 
commencement of the siege of Kenilworth. This strategy achieved some notable successes with the 
capture of Adam Gurdon and Robert de Ferrers.54 Royalist efforts to combat the bands of the 
Disinherited intensified noticeably in the periods of November 1265 and from March to May 1266, 
each contemperanous to the commencement of active preparations for a siege of Kenilworth. While 
the reduction of Axholme in November was in part motivated by the chance to combat the large 
concentration of rebels under a key figure like Simon the Younger, it also served as a necessary 
preliminary for a siege. Simon’s agreement to order the garrison’s surrender is indicative that in 
royalist minds the reduction of Axholme was linked to that of Kenilworth. Strategically, the anti-
Disinherited campaigns of this period demonstrate the royalists’s awareness that the siege required 
the concentration of their resources and would concurrently increase the threat that the bands of the 
Disinherited posed to the peace in the kingdom, and also particularly to the logistical efforts needed 
for the siege. Yet, although the Disinherited had suffered several heavy blows by June 1266 they 
still remained at large and the siege provided these groups with the very respite from major pursuit 
that the royalists efforts had sought to avoid.  
The Campaign in the Fens 
This section principally details the Disinherited’s seizure of the Isle of Ely and the campaign to 
retake it; examining the historical context of rebellion in the region and the topographical 
challenges that supressing it involved. Other than Knowles’ brief overview the campaign has 
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attracted little in the way of detailed study and due to its important role in the lead up to the war’s 
conclusion this section will provide a closer focus on the conflict. 
The concentration of royalist forces on the siege of Kenilworth eased the military pressure on 
the bands of the Disinherited remaining in the ‘woods and fields’ and as a result spurred their 
activities. Sometime in the early to mid-summer of 1266, John de Eyville and Baldwin Wake’s 
band began to ravage Lincolnshire again, this time launching a major raid against Lincoln. 
Attacking with some strength, the Disinherited stormed the city and sacked it, breaking open the 
coffers and seizing all the charters and deeds of the Jews. The attack reportedly resulted in the 
killing a hundred and sixty people, including women and children. The Disinherited even assaulted 
the castle, though it is unclear if they succeeded in taking it.55 They were long gone by the time 
Edward could arrive with reinforcements.56 The sack of Lincoln arguably marks a transition to a 
fresh phase in the rebellion of the Disinherited. The successful sack of a city and the Disinherited’s 
ability to avoid reprisals served to encourage the expansion of their campaign and its audacity in 
the wake of their defeats in May. The sack of Lincoln also marked the decision of de Eyville and 
Wake’s band of Disinherited to abandon Axholme again and return once more to East Anglia. They 
began to ‘plunder all’ and joined forces with another rebel band led by Sir Hugh Peche, the steward 
of Henry de Hastings’ lands at Bury St. Edmunds (possibly the manor of Lidgate which Henry held 
from the abbot of St. Edmunds, close to Peche’s manor of Kedington). On 9 August, they arrived at 
the Isle of Ely.57 Several different dates are given for the seizure of Ely, including Michaelmas 
1266, but the Bury Chronicle and Rishanger account’s mention of 9 August would seem to be 
supported by an inquisition launched on 25 August 1266 that questioned whether three individuals 
were at the sack of Lincoln ‘or with the king’s enemies at Ely’.58   
Ely was the perfect base from which the Disinherited could operate. The Isle was a natural 
fortress and largely inaccessible except via a causeway and by boat. By using the complex web of 
waterways in the region, the Disinherited could launch a raid and then escape back into the Fens 
before royalist reinforcements could arrive. The Liber Eliensis’ account of William the 
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Conqueror’s attempts to take Isle in 1070-1, paints a vivid picture of the difficulties the Fens 
presented to an invading army. 
It deterred many to be advancing in armour across marshy ground which would hardly support 
the footsteps of a man or of any animal. And you could see that it posed threats, easily targeted 
as it was by an arrow shot from afar: collapsing like chaos into a whirlpool of solid matter into 
which, when loosened by the slightest rain, flow <waters> in streams and rivers, disguised all 
the time by the hazardous beds of flag-iris in general marshy ground encourages to grow.59 
The approach by the causeway was apparently little better for its ‘narrow windings’ …‘were 
hindrances to sight and speech’.60 The author of the Gesta Stephani remarked that it was 
‘inpenetrably surrounded on all sides by meres and fens, accessible only in one place, where a very 
narrow track affords the scantist of entries’.61 The Isle itself, seven miles long and four wide, could 
provide its occupiers with food, with substantial local fishing available, and, as the author of the 
Gesta Stephani remarks, it was ‘rich in land that is fertile and fit for pasture’.62 There were no 
extant castles in the Fens, those that had existed appear to be gone by the 1260s. Instead the region 
was dominated by a number of monastic houses including Ely, Ramsey, Crowland, Thorney and 
Peterborough.63 During Stephen’s reign, the rebel Geoffrey de Mandeville had used Ramsey Abbey 
as a base for ravaging the surrounding area, and decades earlier Hereward the Wake had used the 
Isle of Ely.64 Henry III was alive to the strategic danger a rebel occupation of the Isle could pose 
and during his preparations for the siege of Kenilworth he had made provision for its defence. The 
Barnwell account describes how the bishop of Ely, Hugh de Balsham, in following the king’s 
orders, constructed barriers on the Isle which were to be guarded day and night by armed men. For 
a number of months these efforts succeeded in protecting the Isle from those Disinherited operating 
in the region. In August, however, the rebels ‘stealthily’ managed to penetrate the defences and 
seized control. The Bury chronicler attributes this fall to the fact that the bishop had ‘gone away 
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and abandoned it’. Henry was reportedly furious with Balsham when the bishop informed the king 
of the very disaster that Henry had specifically sought to avoid.65  
 
Figure  5:1 The Fens and Isle of Ely66 
Initial royalist efforts at containing the Disinherited at Ely were reliant upon the levies of the 
counties surrounding the Fens.67 On 16 December, unable to face the well-armed and trained 
knights who formed the core of the Disinherited, an attempted siege by these forces was routed 
with some of the Disinherited pursuing the survivors into Norwich and sacking the city.68 Raids 
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were made on Cambridge and Bury, and fines were extorted from the inhabitants, the proceeds of 
which the rebels may have used to buy the ‘necessaries of life’ from towns, or at least so alleged a 
Cambridge jury during the Dictum Eyres of 1269.69  
 
The surrender of Kenilworth castle on 14 December finally enabled the king to release forces to aid 
in the suppression of the Disinherited and particularly against those occupying the Isle of Ely. On 
30 January, William and Richard de la Zouche were appointed to keep the peace in Essex, with 
express authorisation to treat the rebels ‘as if he [Henry] were there in person’.70 Henry’s efforts 
were slow to materialise, however, much to Wykes’ indignation. The delay was in part the result of 
the negotiations led by the papal legate, Ottobuorno, aimed at reaching a compromise with the 
Disinherited. These efforts had failed by 22 February and by the 24th the king was at Cambridge 
where he began to fortify the town. Wykes imputes the failure of the talks to the Disinherited’s 
belief that the inaccessible nature of the area meant that they would not be attacked.71 The task of 
besieging the Isle was indeed a formidable one. In 1140, King Stephen had successfully taken the 
Isle from the bishop of Ely by crossing the narrowest point of the channel on a pontoon bridge built 
from boats lashed together. The final leg of the journey was made with the assistance of a local 
monk who knew of a shallow ford to cross the remaining stretch of fens.72 Against de Mandevilles’ 
rebellion Stephen’s strategy had been to construct a series of castles around the Fens to hem in de 
Mandeville’s forces. This strategy had eventually succeeded when de Mandeville was mortally 
wounded attacking Burwell castle. The downside to such an approach, however, was that it was 
slow and expensive and there are no signs that Henry III attempted to repeat Stephen’s strategy.73 
In further contrast to de Mandeville’s rebellion, the Disinherited apparently concentrated their 
forces to the Isle of Ely, instead of occupying the other abbeys of the region such as Ramsey and 
Fordham.74 Despite the numerous challenges, the royalists attempted to place the region around Ely 
under a form of siege. Henry’s decision to choose Cambridge as his base was a sensible one. As 
well as possessing a royal castle, the town lay right on the edge of the Fens, about thirteen miles as 
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the crow flies from the Isle. The river Cam flowed into the Fens by Ely and Cambridge itself 
formed an important part of the water borne trading network of the region. In 1120, the town had 
acquired a charter from Henry I decreeing that it was the only port in Cambridgeshire that ships 
were allowed to put into, although there is evidence that many of the other Fen edge communities 
had their own ports.75 Richard of Cornwall based himself further north at Barnwell Priory, close to 
the River Nene which fed into the Fens past Peterborough.76   
 
Figure  5:2 Approximate Areas of Royalist Defence Responsibility 1267 
Henry appointed a number of knights to help organise the defence of the region around the Isle. On 
4 March, Peter de Neville was dispatched to Lynn to guard the town and sea coast, with orders 
issued to the men of the town and those ‘of the king’s faithful’ coming there ‘with horses and 
arms’.77 He, however, was to be under the authority of John de Vaux, keeper of the king’s fleets in 
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the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk.78 Sir Robert de Tattershall was appointed to keep the peace 
and to aggrieve the king’s enemies in the northern fens and a writ of aid was issued to the knights, 
free men and others in the region of Wisbech and Meresland (possibly modern day March) to assist 
him.79 Berengar le Moine was named captain and granted the same powers for Huntingdonshire. 
Berengar expressed some doubts as to the loyalty of the men he could recruit in the Huntingdon 
area, and requested permission to raise men from outside the shire ‘who would be readier to carry 
out his orders’.80 That the local population’s views of the Disinherited were somewhat mixed is 
indicated by eyre returns that show a number of local men serving on the Isle. John de Eyville’s 
decision to write to the citizens of Lynn to try and tempt them to abandon the royalist side suggests 
that he did not consider such an effort to be entirely futile.81 Berengar was granted permission to 
assess all persons in the county in order to raise money to maintain his men for the defence of the 
region.82 While it is unclear who was responsible for defending the region to the East and South-
East of the Fens, this area did possess a larger number of royalist fortresses, including the royal 
castles of Colchester, Norwich and Hadleigh as well as John de Warenne’s castles at Eye and 
Castle Acre and Roger Bigod’s at Framlingham. The royalist efforts resulted in skirmishing 
between the two sides. At Horningsea, close to Cambridge, a rebel raid by boat was driven off and 
four men captured. The disinherited knight Walter Cothenham was caught and, like Robert de 
Wollerinton after Chesterfield, was hanged. The other three captured rebels were beheaded.83  
Henry seems to have appreciated quickly that a naval dimension perhaps offered the best 
method of dealing with Ely. Arguably, it was also presented the cheapest strategy for the cash-
strapped Henry. In the early spring the water level of the marshes was probably still high, rendering 
a land attack impractical. The best Henry could hope to achieve with his own forces at this point 
was to try and restrict the Disinherited to the marshes and the region of the Isle itself. The East 
Anglian ports, however, owed him military service and Henry did not necessarily need to spend 
another penny if the men of the ports could take Ely for him. A fleet of ships from Norfolk and 
Suffolk, including the ports of Ipswich, Dunwich, Yarmouth and Lynn were scheduled to meet at 
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Lynn on 5 March to attack the Isle, but this force proved difficult to raise. Indeed, on 5 March, 
Henry issued another letter patent that promised that any townships that raised enough men 
according to the ordinances of John de Vaux and Sir William Charles (who were responsible for 
mustering the troops) would ‘be quit elsewhere of the aid which the king exacts from others who 
do not make such subsidy, so long as they have their people at their own cost in the said service’.84 
Aware of the rivalries between the port towns, Henry also issued stern injunctions against any 
disturbance that would affect the muster, giving power to Vaux and Charles: ‘…so that if any one, 
by word or deed, molest them [the towns] whereby impediment of the business result, they shall 
punish him by penalty of prison, life or limbs, according to the quantity of his offence according to 
that which may be done by the rigour of justice, sparing none by prayer or price, grace or favour’.85 
On 20 March, Henry noted that William Charles had been authorised to amerce all those on the 
coast of Norfolk and Suffolk who had resisted efforts to provide well equipped barges for the attack 
on Ely. William was given full power to levy the amercements.86 When the fleet attacked the Isle, 
its ships were laden with crossbowmen and archers and ‘all kinds of repaired arms’.87 Yet the East 
Anglian naval force, apparently spearheaded by the men of Lynn, was defeated heavily. No knights 
or stipendiaries are recorded as being with them and it is not clear if any of Henry’s appointees, 
Vaux, Charles or Tattershall even accompanied the attack. Outclassed, the posse were routed with 
many killed or wounded and the men of Lynn, according to the later account of Rishanger, returned 
home in disgrace.88 The royalists now needed to attempt the potentially expensive and tricky task 
of taking the Isle on foot. The Lord Edward though, had already proved this could be done at 
Axholme.  
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Figure  5:3 Depiction of naval combat at the Battle of Sandwich 1217, illustration by Matthew 
Paris, c.1250 (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, ms. 16, fol. 52). 
The campaign against Ely was curtailed, however, by the upsurge in rebellion elsewhere in the 
kingdom. By late February to March 1267, revolt was flaring in the Weald again and Roger 
Leybourne was once more dispatched to police it.89 In Hampshire, William de Wintreshull and 
Gerard le Grue were instructed to ‘enquire touching malefactors wandering in the county of 
Southampton and committing robberies, burnings, homicide and other enormities there’. The 
sheriff and the county posse were to assist them, but with the caveat that ‘all who owe service to 
the king and who are summoned before the king at St. Edmunds, be there to do what the king shall 
enjoin upon them’. The exceptions to this were ‘the services of the bishop of Winchester and the 
abbot of Hyde, Winchester, which he has assigned to the steward of the bishop and the sheriff of 
the county to keep the peace in those parts’.90 Sussex and Surrey apparently were not required to 
send men to the king in January, for on 28th John fitz Alan, earl of Arundel, was instructed along 
with the sheriff and county posses to: 
enquire touching these things as well within liberties as without, and to take and keep those 
whom he finds guilty until further order; and to act vigorously in this behalf for the preservation 
of the peace and the confusion of the king's enemies.91 
 
On 30 February, Nicholas de Yatingdon was appointed to keep the peace in Oxfordshire and 
Berkshire ‘and to pursue and repress the king’s enemies there’ with the aid of the freemen and 
others of the county, except those already summoned, ‘with horses and arms’ and due service to 
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come to the king at Mid-Lent.92 In the North, the Lord Edward was forced to put down the 
rebellion of John de Vescy and he stopped at Pontefract enroute to Alnwick in mid-March.93 The de 
Vescy rebellion provides an interesting contrast of the effectiveness of castle based rebellion 
compared to more mobile guerrilla operations. The assault and seizure of de Vescy’s headquarters 
of Alnwick castle put down the rebellion with great swiftness.94 The Disinherited in East Anglia 
could not be quashed with the same ease.  Despite these efforts, de Clare’s renewed rebellion and 
seizure of London on behalf of the Disinherited in April caused the abandonment of the siege of 
Ely and Henry’s advance on London to Stratford along with his summoning of foreign 
reinforcements and orders to Leybourne to ensure the provisioning of Dover and Rochester castles 
against attack.95  With the king gone, those Disinherited who had remained on the Isle descended 
on Cambridge, burning the new gates and the buildings Henry had resided in and generally 
plundering the town. The burgesses fled the town in advance, conscious of the coming danger. The 
Disinherited even threatened to burn Barnwell Priory in revenge for the Prior’s alleged role in 
trying Walter Cothenham. Only intervention from the brothers, Hugh and Robert Peche, allegedly 
saved it; nevertheless the Prior fled to Waltham Abbey.96  
The resolution of the London stand-off meant that by 1 July 1267 only the diehards holding out 
in the Isle of Ely and in a few other places remained in rebellion. Edward therefore returned to the 
Fens with an army and the intention of finally bringing the Isle back under control. Roger 
Leybourne was also dispatched with several hundred men to quash a rising in Winchelsea, which 
was apparently retaken on 20 June before he had even arrived.97 Edward, as with the Isle of 
Axholme in 1265, took a more direct approach to the problem of the Isle’s natural defences than his 
father, reinforcing the pattern of decisive behaviour that he had exhibited repeatedly through the 
war from the siege of Gloucester to the capture of Alnwick. Several factors were present to assist 
him though, which had been absent during Henry’s efforts. Firstly, the Disinherited upon the Isle 
had been heavily weakened by the surrender on terms of many of their number at London. 
Secondly, Edward may have been able to build upon the ground work of Henry’s preparations and 
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planning during Lent. Finally, Edward was now able to play upon the existence of the compromise 
reached at London. Fighting was not the only realistic option for those on the Isle.  
Entering the Fens itself with his force, Edward made his base at Ramsey Abbey. With the 
assistance of either the rebel Nicholas Seagrave or Seagrave’s mother, according to Wykes and the 
Annals of Dunstable respectively, as well as some locals who knew the region, they scouted a 
crossing place onto the Isle.98 Edward’s advance was assisted by his good timing, for by now the 
natural defences of the isle had been weakened as a dry summer had rendered the ground more 
navigable. He approached the Isle and sent forward archers and crossbowmen to cover the crossing 
of the stream. At the same time he issued an edict threatening that any rebels who might prepare 
obstacles for him would be either beheaded or hanged. Faced with the choice between the 
possibilities of summary execution or submitting quietly on now more acceptable terms, the 
remaining Disinherited submitted and let Edward enter the Isle.99 After nearly a year’s occupation 
the Isle had been retaken. 
Conclusions 
The period from Evesham to the fall of Ely demonstrate the same key themes mentioned at the 
beginning of this section. Castles were not used as the primary tool of rebellion; instead guerrilla 
warfare utilising areas of difficult terrain to prevent discovery or to act as a natural fortress was the 
preference of the Disinherited. Kenilworth stands as the exception to this rule, and itself 
exemplifies the problems and advantages of a major siege for both sides. The expense and time 
needed to reduce Kenilworth were formidable and a test of fortitude for the royalists. Without the 
possibility of outside relief, however, the garrison could be starved out eventually. Conversely the 
rebels operating in the wilds enjoyed a freedom of movement and the ability to plunder for supplies 
that castle garrisons lacked. They could threaten large swathes of the country, disrupting the 
royalist attempts at restoring order and as a result fundamentally challenge Henry’s kingship via his 
failure to provide security for his subjects.  
Did the Disinherited ever have a realistic chance of military success? If we view the movement 
principally as one aimed at persuading the king to concede the restoration of their lands, then yes; if 
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some retained greater ambitions about defeating the royalist party, then no. The principal problems 
faced by the royalists post-Evesham were the number of the Disinherited and their popular support. 
This facilitated both the geographical spread of the rebellion and its maintenance in the localities to 
a degree that made it difficult for the royalists to tackle. This problem is most clearly demonstrated 
by the events of 1267. The outbreak of multiple rebellions between February and April strained 
royalist resources immensely. Despite these problems the royalists, by the conclusion of the 
London stand-off, remained in a militarily superior position. All castles were supplied and in 
royalist hands, major reinforcements had arrived from the continent and as a result the rebels were 
left with few realistic chances for achieving a greater victory. Once Henry was able to fully 
mobilise his resources he could overawe the opposition. 
 The Disinherited achieved most success when Henry’s main force was tied down in a 
protracted siege, such as those of Kenilworth and Ely, which prevented the royalists from actively 
hunting down the rebel bands. It is hard to say whether this was a deliberate tactic by the 
Disinherited or merely good fortune. When Henry was not engaged in such a siege, as in early 
1266, the Disinherited remained on the back foot, losing the Cinque Ports and suffering defeats at 
Alton and Chesterfield. The recipe for rebel success, however, was problematic. It required a 
significant concentration of rebels in a location that could withstand even the main royal host for an 
extended period. The strength of Kenilworth made it ideal for achieving this and after the surrender 
of Dover indeed it was the only castle of that strength still in rebel hands. Its defiance allowed the 
other groups to continue their raiding relatively unmolested. Yet if the castle fell, not only would 
the rebels lose a major base, but they also risked the capture or death of a large proportion of their 
number. It was this calculation that seems to have in part driven the royalist siege. The Dictum of 
Kenilworth was a partial victory therefore for the rebels who sought a way to gain restoration of 
their lands, but with the fall of the castle they had also lost one of their last and greatest bargaining 
chips. The castle’s surrender was also a critical failure for the probably dwindling number of 
diehards who might dream for some form of wider victory. Simon the Younger did not come to its 
relief, and only the intervention by a third party could hope to tip the military balance in their 
favour. Unlike in 1216-7, this help was not forthcoming from France or Scotland. The intervention 
of Gilbert de Clare at London several months later again marked a victory for the Disinherited in 
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that it allowed further amendment of the harsh terms of the Dictum, it did not however, mark a full 
victory; de Clare still supported the principle of restoration by redemption.100 A military defeat of 
the royalist party remained unlikely, despite de Clare’s support. The holding of the castles, 
including the Tower, and the arrival of reinforcements for Henry guaranteed this failure.  
 The rebel strategy, whether deliberate or not, was effective at maintaining itself and 
persuading moderate royalists of the necessity of pushing for terms, but it was not likely to achieve 
more while Henry kept his castles manned and ready. These played a key part in his efforts to re-
establish control in the localities, notably at Rochester and Nottingham. The Disinherited’s very 
strategy of avoiding holding castles meant that they could make little in the way of concrete long 
term military gains. When Kenilworth fell so too did any real chance of defeating Henry. Had 
Henry withdrawn from the siege the damage to the royalist side would have been immense, though 
not fatal. Kenilworth could have continued to dominate the Midlands and the other groups would 
have remained emboldened. As it was the fall of Kenilworth marked the effective death of any 
ambition the Disinherited may have had for major military resurgence. Without Gilbert de Clare’s 
seizure of London, Henry would have reduced Ely and effectively broken the Disinherited by 
removing their last base. The Disinherited’s taking to the ‘woods and fields’ helped win them their 
lands, but without the castles they lost the war.
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6 Conflict in the Localities 
The Furness chronicler, when commenting on the widespread outbreak of local violence in England 
that followed the battle of Lewes, noted that ‘old quarrels between neighbours broke out renewed 
in communities, while it seemed whoever was more powerful preferred to [rob] with impunity, and 
to oppress the weak and the low’.1 In his pioneering work of 1926, Essays on the Period of 
Baronial Reform, E.F. Jacob provided a concise and detailed study of the nature of local violence 
during the war, utilising a plethora of mainly unpublished legal records. Jacob’s observations are 
acute and he notes early on the importance of examining the role in the rebellion of the lesser as 
well as the greater folk in society.2 Similar efforts have been continued by Carpenter on the role of 
the peasantry, King on the clergy, local studies such as Hunt’s on Staffordshire and more generally 
by Valente.3 The aim of this chapter is to build upon this pre-existing works’ conclusions and to 
examine the impact and nature of the war at the local level and to assess how far this differed from 
violence in peace time. After discussing the available legal source material, we shall first examine 
how the wider war’s conduct and demands impacted on communities. Next we will consider the 
nature and possible extent of local conflict, how it related to the major campaigns of the war, and 
finally the problems of maintaining the peace and pursuing justice. The chapter will conclude with 
a case study of Richard de la Vache and the Windsor garrison in 1264-5, which throws light on 
many of the themes raised.   
Legal Difficulties and Definitions 
The two principal sources for local violence are the judicial eyres held from 1267 onwards that 
were prosecuting rebels under the terms of the Dictum of Kenilworth, and the Inquisitiones de 
Rebellibus conducted in September to October 1265. While legal records relating to acts committed 
during the war survive in other sources, such as the Curia Regis rolls, the eyres and Inquisitiones 
offer the most systematic coverage for the period of the civil war.4 King, in the best modern 
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discussion of the inherent problems in using legal records from the Barons’ War, notes in relation 
to the Dictum eyres that, ‘the use of the presentments as historical evidence involves almost all the 
problems which are characteristic of the legal sources generally’.5 The difficulty with these sources 
lies in the fact that both the Inquisitiones and the Dictum eyres are summary records of the 
testimony given to the jurors of a hundred and of the jury’s subsequent verdict. As such, questions 
remain both over the reliability of such testimony and the extent to which juries were biased or 
subject to local pressure. In the wake of the civil war these juries, frequently composed of former 
active participants in the conflict, were hardly impartial bodies. Acts committed by the royalist side 
were not pursued, and those juries with predominantly Montfortian sympathies would be 
understandably reluctant to convict their fellows. For many jurors delving too deeply into the past 
was hardly to be encouraged when their own wartime misdemeanours might potentially come to 
light. The confused picture in England as a whole during the war meant it would have been - and 
still is - difficult if not impossible to establish if the jury’s verdict was not unduly swayed by the 
above factors. There are many cases where the jury reached an apparently considered verdict in the 
eyres, clearing the accused of some charges and convicting them on others to impose a fine under 
the Dictum of Kenilworth.6 Yet the choice in some instances to convict on certain charges and not 
on others was not necessarily a sign that a jury was acting impartially. Being compelled by force 
into an act of rebellion was on its own worth a lesser punishment than being convicted of 
plundering, a difference of between one and as much as five years revenue under the Dictum’s 
original terms. For example, in Berkshire the men of Kintbury were forced to redeem their lands at 
one year’s value due to their involvement in the siege of Marlborough (the fine was one year 
because they were not men of the earl of Leicester; their compatriots in the attack, the men of 
Hungerford, who were the men of the earl, were only fined two marks). By contrast, Andrew 
Badking, who was found guilty of plundering animals with Robert de Ferrers’ men, was required to 
pay two years’ value.7 The number of men who admitted the charge of being compelled into an act 
of rebellion but denied engaging in plundering begs the question of whether in some juries these 
                                         
5
 King, ‘Friar Tuck’, p.31. 
6
 Jacob, Studies, pp.196-9. 
7
 JUST 1/42, m.  2. 
 199 
 
defences were accepted with a perhaps less than thorough examination.8 Often those accused could 
be neighbours of the jurors themselves and tied together by local society and even family.9 The 
pitfalls of the jury system in treating rebellion are well illustrated by a case Asaji highlights in the 
Cambridgeshire Eyre. In Radfield hundred it was revealed upon questioning by the justice, that out 
of the twelve jurors, three of them had been in the Tower of London against the king and another 
three had received gifts from another rebel, Michael Kirkby of Burgh, when he too was based at the 
Tower. As a result the jury was placed in mercy.10 This fits a broader historical pattern of behaviour 
with Hanawalt noting the existence in fourteenth century cases, of ‘mutual agreements not to 
convict in order to avoid reprisals within villages’.11 This issue could, of course, work the opposite 
way, with jurors potentially convicting men as rebels on a number of possible grounds, ranging 
from the personal unpopularity of the accused to pressure from local royalist lords. These factors 
are similarly close to impossible to trace with the sources available. 
Edward Powell’s critique of the approaches of historians such as Hanawalt, in regard to the 
sociological study of medieval crime, raises the cogent point that historians have relied upon the 
information of presentments rather than those of convictions when formulating their results. In 
essence they presume guilt in all cases.12 Here I work not on the assumption that all accused are 
guilty, but rather that the crimes alleged to have taken place may have occurred in some form, 
albeit without those accused necessarily being the guilty party or all details being correct. This 
reflects the actual contents of the records themselves, for while men are cleared of a crime by a jury 
the same jury rarely deny that the crime took place only that its alleged participants did not attend. 
The eyres raise several other issues. As Valente notes, ‘the nature of the records is to 
exaggerate violence’ with the legal formulae often encouraging hyperbole from the plaintiffs 
regarding the level of destruction inflicted.13 During the Barons’ War the formula to denote 
rebellion was often that the individual was present ‘with horses and arms’ (cum equis et armis). 
The eyre returns are only extant for Cambridgeshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Norfolk, Essex, 
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Warwickshire, Suffolk and Northamptonshire. It is unclear whether the others were ever completed 
or simply have not survived. The biggest issue of relevance to this present study, however, is that 
frequently the presentments and verdicts do not mention the alleged date of the incidents they 
record. In particular, suits brought to court, and trespass actions in particular, were extremely loose 
in their legal phrasing. Not all incidents relating to the war were actually designated as ‘in the time 
of war’ (in tempus guerrae) or ‘in the time of the troubles’ (in tempus turbatio).  As King 
comments, ‘there is much evidence that the identifying phrases (such as in tempus turbatio) were 
not used with sufficient consistency to warrant excluding cases which lacked them from 
consideration’.14 Context may well suggest the time frame, but some cases ‘in the time of the 
troubles’ which may refer to 1263 could equally refer to events from 1264-5 or perhaps even up to 
1267 depending on the interpretation of those presenting or recording them. Regnal years are not 
usually provided and only very rarely are other methods of dating used. Part of the reason for this 
relates to the fact that the eyres were being conducted in some cases from two to as many as seven 
years after the alleged events: memories could be hazy, sometimes deliberately so. We can 
therefore plot a map of all the incidents of plundering occurring in a given county, but we are not 
able to assign the cases to particular years so as to analyse the ebb and flow of violence, though we 
may make an informed guess as to the particular peaks from other sources.  
The Inquisitiones de Rebellibus returns from 1265 present further issues. The inquest, still 
largely unstudied, was set up on 21 September 1265 and was to be run by two commissioners 
assigned to one or two counties. The knights William de Engelfield and Thomas de Valoines, for 
example, were appointed to cover Oxfordshire and Berkshire.15 All counties of England existing at 
that time are listed, except Cheshire and Durham, which were administratively separate from the 
other counties.16 Of those listed the returns for Cumberland, Westmorland, Shropshire, 
Staffordshire, Cornwall and Lancashire do not appear to survive or were never made. Why this 
should so particularly affect the counties in the western half of England is unknown.17 Similar to 
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the special eyre, each county reported on a hundred by hundred basis although not every hundred’s 
return has survived. 
Working with the relevant county’s sheriff, the commissioners were to first seize the lands of 
all rebels in the counties, assessing their extent and wealth and sending this information back to the 
king by the Feast of Saint Edward, 13 October 1265. Secondly, they were to appoint two ‘discrete 
persons’ from every hundred or wapentake who were to ‘enquire and collect the rents of this instant 
Michaelmas term’ and were to certify the names of the holders and sum of the rents collected. If 
someone had already collected the rents, they were to be distrained until full restitution was made. 
Finally, if the land had been seized into someone else’s hands it was to be taken into the king’s 
possession. This process appears to have been conducted in part by the use of local juries in their 
respective hundred or wapentake who would report on those who were against the king and value 
their lands for the collectors to act upon. The jury was also asked to name the persons from whom 
any such lands were held, and who was currently in possession of them.   
The inquest, as set out, should therefore have rendered information in the manner exemplified 
by this return from the wapentake of Aslacoe in Lincolnshire:  
The chief messuage of John le Despenser in Kavenby is worth half a mark; land 60s, rents £4. 
18s. 6d. of which 32s. 10d. due at Michaelmas, Robert de Typetoft received [them]. 
 Collectors –William son of Ranulf de Helmeswell, Thomas de Glenteham.18 
The conception of the inquest, however, appears to be broader than the initial outline given by the 
king’s instructions. The reports frequently include details of acts of violence and local conflicts that 
the accused was alleged of being party to and are more akin to inquiries into local disorder than 
their original remit concerning rebel lands. For example:  
William de Longvilers was openly in rebellion in that he was with Sir John de Eyville with 
horses and arms at Cleveland and elsewhere.19 
 
Or  
William de Bulkton, Vivian de Flamborough and Ralph de Hunmanby were in Scarborough 
castle defending it against the king, when it surrendered to Sir John de Oketon.20 
 
In both cases attention is given to the individual’s alleged involvement in the rebellion, particularly 
their presence at what was demonstrably an act of rebellion. In the latter example no mention of 
their lands is given, merely information on their rebellious act. This broader remit or perhaps 
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differing local interpretation of the inquest’s purpose is highlighted by the inquest in the town of 
Louth in Lincolnshire. Its response to the inquest is unique and takes the form of a series of 
answers. Unusually it also lists the questions they have been asked.   
Firstly it states that the jury knows nothing of the rebels’ lands seized since the whole township 
‘is of the alms of the mother church of Lincoln’. Second, they claim they know nothing of the 
Michaelmas rents. Third, they claim ignorance of any rebel lands and tenements restored since the 
Exaltation of the Cross (14 September) nor of any lands ‘not yet seized, or seized and redeemed.’ 
These are all in line with the inquest’s original remit.21  Then, however, they list questions that do 
not appear in the original mandate:  
Of those who robbed their neighbours they name Geoffrey de Hastings. 
Of those who robbed ecclesiastics or religious they know nothing.  
Of those who robbed their neighbours after the peace, they know nothing.  
Of those who maliciously attacked their neighbours who were not rebels they know nothing.22 
They also include accusations concerning five named individuals and various depredations they 
had committed locally23.  
The emphasis of the latter questions is obvious - it is an inquest into breakdowns in law and 
order. Whether this was an approved expansion, a misinterpretation by those conducting the 
inquiries, or alternatively a sign of their initiative is unclear. There is no indication in either the 
Close or Patent Rolls of additional instructions to add to the inquest’s remit. If these additions were 
made by those conducting the inquests then it is possible that pressure by the local populace was 
brought to bear demanding the restoration of law and order. This idea is supported somewhat by 
the regional variations in the information the inquests collected.  
The nature of the conflict reported could vary wildly from hundred to hundred. While some 
reports deal with the accused rebels’ actions in the major events of the war, others concentrated on 
much more mundane conflicts. For example, in the Wapentake of Horncastle in Lincolnshire we 
have an example of these two extremes: 
Sir Robert de Barkworth, of the household of Sir Gilbert de Gaunt, took to flight at 
Northampton and was afterwards taken at Kenilworth as a rebel. 24 
 
Conversely we find: 
                                         
21
 CIM, i, no.795. 
22
 CIM, i, no.795. 
23
 CIM, i, no.795. 
24
 CIM, i, no.790. 
 203 
 
There being a quarrel between Walter rector of the church of Langeton and Richard de Preston, 
John Rokett came without Richard’s consent and set fire to a stack of beans, Richard has 
nevertheless made satisfaction to the said rector for his loss. 25  
 
We are then left with a number of unanswered questions about the conduct of these inquests. Were 
these changes a sign of an appetite for restitution and the return of law and order by local areas? 
Does an expanded inquest in a particular hundred demonstrate that region’s stability or its general 
loyalty to the king in comaprison to other, more conflict wracked or politically hostile, localities? 
Do they reflect local vendettas or methods of revenge upon certain individuals? It must also be 
born in mind that a significant number of the seizures were against individuals who, local juries 
claim, were not rebels. Was the increased remit in some areas a response to the cynical or 
apparently indiscriminate seizure of lands by loyalists as well as rebels? We shall examine some of 
these issues subsequently in this chapter. 
Fighting the Barons’ War 
The deliberate targeting and destruction of an enemy’s economic assets was a fundamental strategy 
of medieval military conflicts, and the Barons’ War was no exception. As the author of the History 
of William the Marshal remarks ‘for when the poor can no longer reap a harvest from their fields, 
then they can no longer pay their rents and this, in turn, impoverishes their lords’.26 Even the great 
men of England were only as great as the income derived from their lands. On the continent large 
scale well organised plundering expeditions, the chevauchée, were a common tactic in the wars 
between the Angevin kings and their opponents. Robbing the opposition of their assets both 
materially weakened them and enriched the attacker. Kaeuper’s comments that ‘if an army 
destroyed stores of foodstuffs, livestock and agricultural implements the economic effect on a 
village or region can scarcely be dismissed’ are equally applicable to the more localised warfare 
inherent in a civil war.27 In the decades before the Barons’ War the wars in Gascony and 
particularly Wales provided ample and relatively recent experience to many individuals of the 
methods of conducting this sort of warfare. In England the civil war of 1216-17 and the rebellion of 
Richard Marshal had witnessed the frequent ravaging and burning of lands.28 In the rebellion of 
1234, Richard Siward ravaged the lands of Richard of Cornwall, Peter des Roches and Stephen de 
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Seagrave just as Richard Marshal’s estates had suffered the same fate at the hands of the king in 
1233.29 In this type of warfare distinction was made rarely between combatants and non-
combatants and to the majority of the population this facet of the war would have had the most 
direct personal impact.30 
The legal records from the Barons’ War shed considerable light on manorial spoliation and the 
important role of castle garrisons and the Disinherited in this, as well as the importance of local 
officials in its organisation, the seizure of land, and the stealing of goods.31 The rest of this chapter 
will look in particular at the physical impact of war, local violence, as well as off shoots of the 
break down in law and order through the emergence of a black market and the methods and 
problems of trying to maintain the peace. 
Officials of Disorder 
According to the Evesham Chronicle, in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham Simon the 
Younger,  
gathered to him a great army indeed and he subjugated to him the whole county of 
Warwickshire, making in his name bailiffs, and under-bailiffs and other ministers through 
the whole county just as if he was the king of that county, and he sent of those now here 
and now there through the neighbourhood to prey upon the villages and manors of their 
adversaries.32 
While this account might be subject to some exaggeration, it is notable that Warwickshire and the 
nearby counties rendered no surviving accounts at the Exchequer from Michaelmas 1265-67, in 
contrast to their year under Montfortian rule.33 The Evesham account provides an excellent 
example of a far broader theme within local warfare during the Barons’ War, namely the use and 
importance of local officials in conducting the war as well as their often symbiotic relationship 
with castle garrisons. In particular, these individuals were crucial for recruitment and leadership in 
localities.   
The returns of the Dictum eyres provide important insights into the important leadership role 
which Montfortian officials apparently played in the localities. William Marshal, the Montfortian 
appointed ‘guardian of the peace’ in Northamptonshire, for example, was said to have ‘collected 
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together’ the county at a location referred to as ‘Cow Meadow’ and tried to persuade them to back 
the party of the earl of Leicester.34 In Stoke hundred in Buckinghamshire, Simon Russel was 
accused of being the ‘constable’ of his district during the turbatio and of ‘keeping watches by day 
and by night against the peace’.35 Fernandes notes that in the county of Northamptonshire, while 
Montfort’s ‘visits to the shire may have been fleeting, yet in his wake he left a powerful apparatus 
of baronial appointees and a number of his own bailiffs.’36 The network of Montfort’s bailiffs 
extended well beyond Northamptonshire. One of these men was William de Stokes, who was 
accused in the Buckinghamshire eyre of being the bailiff and ‘minister’ of Simon de Montfort and 
plundering Aylesbury. In his defence, William said he had been Simon’s bailiff for twelve years 
before the war and that he had raided Aylesbury at the order of the earl.37  
Local bailiffs and ministers were crucial to both sides for the effective muster and organisation 
of elements of the war in their locality. Fitz Thedmar’s account of the Londoners’ campaign of 
burnings in the first months of 1264, for example, reveals the importance of the city officials in the 
organisation and execution of these attacks. According to Fitz Thedmar, the attack on Richard of 
Cornwall’s manor of Isleworth was organised and planned by the newly appointed Montfortian 
constable and marshal, respectively Thomas de Piwelesdone and Stephen Buckerel, who 
summoned the city militia by ringing the great bell of Saint Paul’s. The citizens then followed the 
standards of the constable and marshal out of the city but ‘they were ignorant where they would be 
destined to go or what [they] would be accomplishing’.38 While it is possible that fitz Thedmar was 
trying to shift some blame for the incident, his comment is indicative of the power and influence 
that local officials could wield during the war.  
When John de Eyville and William Bossall were ordered to raise the posse of Yorkshire and 
lay siege to Richmond castle in 1265, it would have been the ministers and bailiffs appointed by or 
sympathetic to the Montfortians, who were tasked with encouraging or distraining the local 
populace into arms.39 In Buckinghamshire, Stephen de la Haye was accused of being a constable 
conducting 200 men to the coast, presumably during the threatened invasion of the summer of 
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1264.40 When Hereford was besieged in late 1264 the royalist army was comprised of not only the 
Marchers, including ‘Hamo Lestrange (the sheriff of Shropshire and Staffordshire) and his men’, 
but also ‘his posse of Shropshire’ which presumably Hamo had used his officials to call out.41 The 
situation in such instances could have been quite confusing for those being distrained to arms. 
Confronted by competing claims and rival local officials from each faction, it would not have been 
easy to determine the validity of orders or to opt to resist such pressure.  
Officials whose activities feature prominently in the eyre returns were frequently closely tied, 
and indeed were often active members of, local castle garrisons. The Berkshire eyre roll in 
particular highlights how the county seems to have been caught between the forces of the 
Montfortian garrisons of Windsor under Sir John fitz John and Wallingford and Odiham castles 
under Sir Richard de Havering. William le Fraunceys ‘bailiff of Curridge’ in Berkshire, for 
example, was accused in the eyre there as having, alongside one Matthew of the neighbouring vill 
of Chieveley, helped muster men from the vills of Hungerford and Kintbury and forced them to 
attack the castle of Marlborough during the war. Both men were part of the rebel garrison of 
Wallingford under Richard de Havering.42 Similarly John Plugenet, William Bithewy and Simon 
Steperand from Lambourn hundred claimed that they were distrained by the bailiff of John fitz 
John, to plunder Odstone.43 The frequent mention of distraint being conducted by men of or 
connected to the garrisons in several regions highlights the gravitational pull of these fortresses on 
their surroundings.  
The eyre returns also reveal a frequently symbiotic relationship between some religious houses, 
the actions of local officials and castle garrisons in war related activities. The accounts of 
Rochester castle in 1267 reveal that the Priory of St. Andrews was a frequent supplier of the 
garrisons’ ale.44 Other houses were likewise tied into the supply of castle garrisons and in wartime 
might supply additional men and material. In the Berkshire eyre, a number of the local religious 
houses were accused of dispatching men and materials to the garrisons of Wallingford and 
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Windsor. The abbot of Chertsey, for example, accepted that he had sent ‘wood, grain and other 
necessaries’ to Windsor, although he denied rebellion, while the abbot of Abingdon was accused of 
using great distraint to send his knights to Windsor castle. The latter claimed he had been in turn 
distrained by the constable of Windsor who bore the king’s writ. The prioress of Goring was even 
accused of giving council and aid to Wallingford castle, which may suggest that she had dispatched 
men to its garrison.45 Such assistance was by no means necessarily unwillingly given. King has 
demonstrated the considerable degree to which the clergy of all ranks were engaged in the Barons’ 
War on both sides.46 One Berkshire court case saw the abbot of Reading defending himself against 
the accusation that he had favoured the rebel cause, not only by sending men and giving aid to 
Montfort, but also by acting as his envoy (legatus). It also recounts a more serious accusation that 
when Warin de Bassingbourne and the men from the royalist stronghold of Bristol castle were on 
their way to the surprise assault on Wallingford, they paused in the village of Blewbury a few miles 
from Wallingford and attempted to rouse the villagers to arms to assist in the attack. Instead of 
assisting them the abbot reportedly informed the earl.47 
It is hard to determine the extent to which men were compelled by local officials into actions 
they would not otherwise have participated in, but the juries’ acceptance of some of these pleas and 
their rejection of others suggest that this was a recognised occurrence. John de Molis, for example, 
claimed to have been abducted and compelled to join the garrison of Windsor but he had never, he 
said, participated in plundering. The jury accepted that he was initially abducted but also pointed 
out that subsequently he had left and returned to the garrison freely.48  Like King for the clergy, 
Carpenter has demonstrated that both the reform movement and the king retained popular and 
active support amongst some of the peasantry.49 Local officials were important in bringing out local 
levies on the Montfortians’ behalf through both compulsion and by exploiting in some cases local 
enthusiasm.  
The importance of officials on both sides of the war does not rule out the existence of more 
spontaneous acts of local warfare. There is, however, in some instances of plundering and raiding 
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evidence of a degree of planning at a broader level. As Jacob notes, while ‘local unpopularity may 
account for many’ of the attacks on royalists in the 1263-64 period it does not account for the 
‘simultaneous or practically simultaneous assaults in different and widely separated parts of 
England’.50 Pressure was brought to bear on individuals by garrisons, Montfortian officials and 
sometimes even by religious houses, presumably using their own  officials, to engage in the local 
war, whether by co-opting men into raids and other military expeditions or into supplying men and 
materials for the defence of fortresses. Doubtless there were those playing equivalent roles on the 
royalist side, but due to the lack of cases concerning their actions they are far harder to trace.  
The Physical Effects of Warfare 
The Evesham chronicle reports that in 1265 the garrison of Kenilworth, in addition to creating 
alternate officials in the shire, burned manors and seized 200 sheep and oxen.51 The plundering of 
enemy manors by castle garrisons was an inevitable part of the war being waged, having not only 
an economic purpose but also being a practical military necessity.52 The increase of a garrison’s 
size in response to wartime demanded a corresponding increase in the amount of supplies required 
for maintaining it, and in time of war access to the usual source of these supplies might no longer 
be possible. In addition to fulfilling the daily requirements of a garrison, demand was further 
increased by the necessity of ensuring that a castle was fully stocked to withstand a period of siege. 
An examination of just a three day period from the surviving expense account of Sir Simon de Cray 
and Sir John de Rivers at Rochester Castle in April to May 1267, provide a clearer idea of the 
demands entailed in the provisioning a major royal fortress during wartime. This account covers 
period of the crisis of Gilbert de Clare’s seizure of London and the subsequent reinforcement of 
castles, such as Rochester, at Henry III’s command. The size of the garrison is unknown, and the 
number of horses recorded each day fluctuates indicating that men were coming and going 
regularly. It is not unreasonable to suppose that from fifty to as many as a hundred men may have 
been quartered in the castle.53 
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- For the day of Saturday following [Passover 1267]. In 4 [quarters] of grain purchased for 
bread. 26s. 8d. In 5 sextars of wine. 9s. 2d. Of ale purchased from the priory. Provisions: plaice, 2 
shillings; whiting (fish), 13d. whelks. 5d; mustard half a penny.  In 2 quarters and a half of oats 
purchased for 64 horses, 5s. 2d. In the wages of 17 grooms [garciones] 3s. 1 ½d. In candles. half a 
penny.  
     - The total is 46s 11 ½ d.  
- For the day of Sunday following bread from stores. In 5 sextars and 1 gallon of wine 
purchased, 8s. 9d. In ale, 9s. 6d. Provisions: 1 limb of bacon purchased, 18d. In meat victuals and 
pork, 19d. In saffron, 1d. In mustard, ½d; In 2 quarters 6 bushels of oats purchased for 64 horses 
5s, 2d. In wages for 16 grooms, 2s. In 4 pounds of wax. 2s. 1d.  
     - The total is 30s 8 ½ d.  
- For the day of Monday following bread from store. In 7 gallons of wine purchased, 2s. 
11d. In ale 2s. 1d. In 2 sides of bacon purchased 6 shillings. beef from stores. In fresh pork, 11 ½d. 
In bread for baking 2d. In pottage 1d. In 100 eggs 4d. - In 2 quarters and 6 bushels of oats 
purchased for 62 horses 5s. 2d. In white candles, ½ d. In parchment 7d.  
     - The total is 18 shillings 7d.54 
What becomes clear from these demands was the sheer amount of provisions required day to day. 
This situation was exacerbated by the short shelf life of many supplies and these factors 
necessitated castle garrisons to engage in continuous resupply efforts.55 The easiest method for a 
garrison to obtain the necessary supplies was to seize them from their locality. This action 
permitted them to feed themselves while simultaneously denying these supplies to their enemies. 
The impact of these actions on the locality was severe. In March 1265, Montfort’s orders to contain 
the garrison of Bamburgh were aimed at curtailing the damage being inflicted locally and 
simulataneously to deny the garrison supplies.56 In Purbeck hundred, the Inquisitiones de 
Rebellibus reports that Sir Robert de Verdon, the baronial keeper of Corfe castle which 
neighboured the hundred, and his followers ‘pillaged frequently at Purbeck and elsewhere’.57 The 
raiding by Pevensey’s royalist garrison attracted Montfortian attention as early as 8 July 1264 when 
it was noted that ‘the king understands that many enormities have been committed by them and 
others of the garrison of that castle’. The writ authorising the siege of the castle on 18 September 
clarified further that the garrison was ‘perpetrating homicides, burnings and plunderings’.58 Some 
of these actions were undoubtedly attacks on rebels, but as many may have been simply aimed at 
stocking the castle.  
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This behaviour was, of course, not limited merely to castle garrisons. The rebels on the Isle of 
Ely, for example, did much the same. The Barnwell Chronicle, written close to events, described 
how the Disinherited seized men for ransom, stole wealth and ‘transferred also the sheep and oxen, 
the corn and malt and whatever they were able to take possession of, into the Isle’.59 The chronicler 
even records a confrontation between the prior and the rebel, Philip le Champion, who arrived at 
the priory demanding ‘I want to have, for the needs of my lord, the whole of your corn, the whole 
of your malt and the whole of your larder. Therefore deliver to me the keys!’.60 Philip was 
reportedly faced down on this occasion by the prior, but the priorities and actions of the 
Disinherited of Ely were no different from those of the garrison of a castle. Jacob theorizes that the 
plunder and fines extracted by the Disinherited elsewhere were used, perhaps surprisingly, to 
purchase some of the goods necessary for their maintenance. The Cambridge town jury claimed 
that the Disinherited ‘bought there corn and other necessaries’ and that in ‘truth the whole province 
sold the rebels necessaries of life which they took back to the island’.61 Permitting markets to 
function helped to prevent the alienation of some communities who supported the Disinherited and 
facilitated their acquisition of supplies. Nevertheless, whether paid for or not, the demands for 
provisions by military forces on both sides of the war had a major impact on the countryside, 
inflicting considerable pressure and damage on its resources. 
Robbery and Local Violence 
Much of the violence recorded in the eyres and Inquisitiones de Rebellibus was not necessarily war 
related, but was nevertheless influenced by it.62 Medieval England was indeed a naturally violent 
society, and many of the issues the remainder of this chapter will discuss also occurred in peace 
time. Yet wartime not only provided an excellent excuse for breaching the king’s peace under the 
banner of the greater war, but it also increased the scope and openness of local violence.63 
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Hanawalt highlights the importance of the concept of ‘conflict theory’ in understanding crime and 
justice, namely that the social groups involved in medieval justice were focussed on the 
advancement of their own power at the expense of others. Furthermore, she contends that ‘most 
groups in society derived some benefits, either financial or political, from corruption of justice’.64 
Justice was essentially a means to an end under this model, and ‘for those people who felt that they 
could not insure their power position in the courts, the only solution that remained was personally 
to right the wrongs done to them through violence or through stealing items they thought owed to 
them.’65 Distinguishing between what was or was not warfare, as opposed to opportunistic crime is, 
however, frequently impossible. 
The focus of many of the plunderings and robberies recorded in the Inquisitiones and the eyres 
were predominantly targets local to the alleged perpetrator and were committed by individuals not 
mentioned as being part of a garrison.66 In Yorkshire, for example, Roger le Poitevin is recorded as 
raiding Towton, barely two miles away from his own land at Saxton, land later seized by Alesia de 
Lacy.67 In Northumberland, Sir Thomas de Lisle of Newton was accused of plundering Rothbury, 
again less than two miles from his lands.68 In Buckinghamshire, a Robert de la Legh of Buckland 
was accused of robbing James, parson of Aston (Clinton), about a mile or less away from 
Buckland.69 Stephen Cheindut, a royalist, in particular seems to have suffered from his near 
neighbours’ predations, as he accused a Thomas Cleric and Thomas son of John Cleric (both from 
Cheddington) of robbing his land at Cheddington. John son of William Gorlec from Halton (about 
one mile from Cheddington) was accused of doing the same, as were a William de Pranbolf and a 
Badecok of Leighton (Buzzard), four to five miles away from Cheddington. These men were 
accused of plundering grain, oxen, sheep, cows and utensils to value of £40 from Cheddington.70  
A downside to the trying of cases before hundred juries was that these juries were never going 
to be an effective setting for the identification and prosecution of malefactors from beyond the 
county borders. This may therefore skew the weight of our evidence unduly towards the role of 
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local perpetrators in these crimes. Several times men are identified in a presentment as being with 
‘other malefactors’ at raids. Some are named, many are not. These others of course could be locals, 
but it is possible they were not. The identity of these ‘other malefactors’ is open to speculation. In 
Berkshire, for example, a William Wlrich (sic) of Wantage was accused of robbing at night the 
house of Reginald Ruffin in Windsor. He, however, instead blamed Welsh malefactors then 
allegedly present in the neighbourhood for the crime, though he claimed ignorance of the identity 
of the culprits. He was deemed not culpable by the jury on this occasion.71 The bands of the 
Disinherited such as those of Adam Gurdon, Nicholas de Eyville and John de Eyville, are likely 
candidates in a number of cases. Some of these robberies, however, may have simply been by 
robber bands with no real connection to the rebellion and who may have drawn their members from 
a number of different counties. Nevertheless, local knowledge does seem to have played a role in a 
number of crimes, permitting the perpetrators to identify and plunder likely targets. The case of 
Robert Cariman’s raid on Kirkstall Abbey on 23 April 1264, suggests this mixture of opportunism 
and local knowledge. Cariman, described as a ‘common robber’, chose his timing well, for around 
20 April 1264, the northern royalists reportedly arrived at Nottingham, presumably taking a 
significant proportion of the royalist troops in the north with them. With most of the armed men 
now at Nottingham, places like Kirkstall could not rely on the support of the local knights and lords 
in either coming to their aid or in hunting down the perpetrators.72  
 
The case of William Grayndeorge of Flashby and Newsholme provides a useful illustration of the 
duality of crime and warfare and its impact on local areas. According to the Inquisitiones, the area 
around the royalist castle of Skipton had a strong concentration of rebel lands including those of 
John de Eyville and William de Longvilers at Gargrave and Mauger le Vavassur at Draftun. 
William de Grayndeorge, who was described as a ‘rebel’ by the inquest, was claimed to have been 
present at the rebel attack upon the castle of Skipton. William, however, seems to have taken the 
conflict beyond the royalist garrison, being accused by the jury of robbing six separate individuals. 
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Whether he did this against royalists or was merely using the war as a cover for personal gain is 
uncertain. The names are given, but not where the victim came from in most instances. We can, 
however, match the victims’ surnames to the following locations, shown by the red dots on the 
map. The close proximity between the victims and the lands of William at Flashby and Newsholme 
are marked.  For example the surname of Sir Ellis de Ryllestun is congruent with Rylstone, little 
over a mile from Flashby. A Sir Alexander de Skos can similarly be linked to Scosthorpe, 
approximately three miles away.73 
 
Figure  6:1 Region of Skipton and Robberies of William Grayndeorge 
William may have been a member of the garrison of Skipton Castle, though he is not charged 
as such. The geographical relationship of the targets to his own lands suggests that these were the 
launching pads for his raids, rather than Skipton castle. William’s motives are impossible to 
identify with certainty, but this pattern does suggest that personal and possibly criminal reasons, as 
much as those relating to the wider war, lay behind the raiding.  
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Redress 
The pursuit of justice through the courts was particularly hard, even impossible, during the war; 
even more so if the alleged offence was committed by royalists. An account in the Chronicle of 
Barnwell provides a useful example of this problem. The Chronicle narrates an incident from early 
1267 in which the prior, Jolanus, received a grant of land in Wiggenhall in Norfolk, from a James 
the Chaplain who had recently inherited it. The overjoyed prior left Barnwell with a ‘great familia’ 
and hurried across the Fens to Wiggenhall, just to the south of Lynn. Engaged in celebration in the 
manor with his household and James the Chaplain’s neighbours, the party was suddenly assaulted 
by an armed band led by the bailiff of William Bardolf. In the ensuing chaos the prior and his men 
were forced to clamber out the windows and over the walls, abandoning their horses and harness to 
the delighted bailiff. Prior Jolanus himself was forced to flee to Dereham Abbey.74 While the actual 
cause of this incident is unclear, the chronicle notes that after the war William Bardolf granted all 
the lands and holdings in Wiggenhall that pertained from the gift of a William fitz Oliver to the 
prior and convent of Barnwell. It seems possible then that this was a land dispute in which Bardolf 
claimed the lands of James the Chaplain. Another possible explanation may be that the prior’s large 
party was mistaken for some of the Disinherited due to warfare then raging in the Fens. The prior’s 
decision to venture into the region at that period, even with a large company, certainly was unwise 
at best. Bardolf had joined the king’s party after the fall of Northampton in 1264 and was captured 
at Lewes fighting for the king.75 He does not seem to have got into much trouble for his bailiff’s 
attack and most significantly the chronicler of Barnwell notes that ‘it was not then possible for the 
Prior to implead through the king’s court against the malefactors at this time, because he [the king] 
was then under threat as it was war time’.76 The legal pursuit of outrages committed by royalists 
during the war was likely to be particularly challenging and chances of regaining any goods taken 
were very small. The chronicler in particular laments that ‘in our days’ there were no longer as 
many good horses in the house of Barnwell due to this event.77   
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Ransoms, Fines and the Black Market 
‘Rich men and clerics they had kidnapped and chained while levying fines on others.’78 
The seizure and ransom of wealthy individuals was not a practice confined to the Kenilworth 
garrison alone.79 In Buckinghamshire, for example, Master Roger Geve accused Alexander de 
Areles of seizing and imprisoning him until he made a fine of 24 marks and a further 4 marks. 
Alexander countered that he took the 4 marks for the unspecified work of the royalist Maurice de 
Berkeley.80 The Disinherited seem to have made a particular habit of this practice, especially when 
they raided towns. During their raids on Norwich and Cambridge in 1266, alongside an abundance 
of loot, ‘they seized Jews and other rich men… for the purpose of fixing on a price for their 
ransom’.81 In one case cited by Jacob, two merchants on the opposing sides, one Harvey Helden of 
Ipswich and one Andrew Gurd of Bury St. Edmunds both succeeded in getting captured by their 
rivals. Harvey was one of the men of Ipswich who joined the unsuccessful royalist attack on Ely in 
early 1267 where he was recognised by the ‘robbers’ on the Isle. When Harvey later went on 
business to Royston in Hertfordshire the ‘robbers’ laid in wait and then captured him, taking him 
back to the Isle. Andrew Gurd reportedly kept Harvey prisoner there and then took him to Bury. A 
ransom is never mentioned but the lengths taken to apprehend Harvey surely suggest a pecuniary 
motive. Andrew himself then ventured into the region of Ipswich and was spotted and captured by 
Harvey’s partners. Pulled into a boat he was taken to Cranwich Wood, beaten, and threatened with 
drowning unless Harvey was released. In fear of his life Andrew sent word to his wife and partners 
to send Harvey on to Ipswich.82  
The extortion of fines from towns or religious houses was another common feature of the war, 
one which the royalists were particularly liable to carry out. Henry III kept a separate roll of fines 
for military service owed but not fulfilled, beginning with his muster at Oxford in March 1264 and 
continuing through the campaign until the battle of Lewes. While this roll is now lost it existence is 
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attested to in other records.83 Henry levelled a 100 mark fine from Battle Abbey for the presence of 
its tenants in the ambushes the royal army faced in the Weald in May 1264.84 In 1264, the 
Dunstable annalist records that the wapentake of Wirkesworth in Derbyshire promised £200 to 
Edward in the wake of the assault on Northampton, though it is unknown under what persuasion. 
The annalist records this because the prior held the manor of Bradbourne there, but it seems certain 
that other towns and hundreds would have received similar ‘persuasion’ from both parties.85 
William de Valence and John de Warenne extracted a fine from the citizens of Bury St. Edmunds 
for supporting the Disinherited.86 This behaviour was not confined to the royalists, however, as 
Cambridge, in order to acquire protection from the Disinherited’s plundering, were forced to 
provide them with 300 marks.87 The fines of both parties had the principal motive of raising money 
and discouraging resistance. 
In addition to ransoms and fines, the eyres reveal that the war also stimulated a black market of 
stolen goods and animals at the county level. In Buckinghamshire, large amounts of stolen 
livestock seem to have been driven to Windsor for the garrison, but a considerable number of the 
smaller raids reported seem to have resulted in the seizure of a horse or horses. Horses, as 
Hanawalt notes, were a particular target even in peace time as their comparative mobility and 
financial value made them attractive targets.88 They were also a crucial military asset; garrisons 
could only be effective if they had sufficient mounts for offensive operations, while the 
Disinherited in particular relied upon mobility for their survival and therefore required remounts 
and replacements for lost horses. We see then a split in purpose between the two sorts of horse 
thefts during the civil war: those for criminal profit and those for practical purpose. The 
Buckinghamshire eyre renders at least fifteen accusations of horse theft, of which five appear to be 
raids in which the horse was the only major thing of value reported taken, while ten involved other 
livestock, usually sheep and oxen, being stolen.89 Three may be robberies directly related to 
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acquiring horses for the war, for example, Sir William de Beachampton, who was in Kenilworth 
castle, was accused of stealing a horse from his brother Walter.90 Those individuals accused of 
raiding Stephen Cheindut claimed in their defence that Stephen’s brother Ralph had sent a horse to 
the earl of Leicester during the war.91 While many of the other instances reported may have been 
for war related purposes, a number are clearly not. In two cases the accused was actually found to 
have purchased stolen goods, albeit unwittingly, while another was convicted of knowingly 
purchasing a stolen mare.92 
Buckinghamshire and probably the other counties during the war had a ‘black’ market of stolen 
horses and other livestock. The small number of cases mentioned above might call into question the 
scale of this phenomenon, but as ever, what we see reaching the justices in 1269 is likely to be only 
the tip of the iceberg. Many instances may have been resolved without the courts, in other instances 
people simply may have never identified with any certainty those involved in the theft or the 
victims may have been still reluctant to accuse those they knew to be responsible in fear of 
reprisals. For example, the almoner’s horses at the priory of Dunstable, worth 100s were stolen at 
some point in 1266; it is unclear if they were ever recovered. The thirteen good horses belonging to 
the prior of Barnwell captured by the bailiff of William Bardolf were never returned, inflicting 
long-lasting harm on the priory.93 Theft of horses and other livestock is likely to have been far 
more widespread than records indicate. In another example, from Berkshire this time, one William 
de Garston was cleared of stealing a horse from a Richard de Henham when it transpired that he 
had arrived at the abbey of Reading only to discover there the horse that had been previously stolen 
from him. William had been imprisoned in Wallingford Castle by a Henry P[er]a of Sholyoch and 
forced to redeem his freedom by giving his horse away. The abbot returned the horse to him while 
Richard was fined for purchasing a stolen horse.94 The keenness of the Disinherited not to alienate 
some Fen edge communities saw the leaders on the Isle of Ely hand over  to the monks of St. 
Edmunds several ‘ruffians’ (ribaldi) and the horses that they had stolen from the abbey. These men 
were required to lay their swords at St. Edmund’s altar ‘as acknowledgement of their impiety’. 
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That the monks had feared the theft of the horses beforehand is suggested by the chronicler’s 
comment that the animals had been ‘hidden in the most secret places within the precincts’.95 
The war allowed other stolen goods, including wood and livestock, to circulate the countryside 
more openly than in peace time. Perpetrators used the robberies to further enrich themselves by 
selling the goods on to others. In some cases those purchasing the goods were perhaps unaware, or 
at least followed a policy of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ concerning the origins of their acquisitions. A 
Nicholas Faber, for example, was acquitted of purchasing two sheep from Ralph Faber of Stenle 
because Ralph was knowingly selling on stolen animals.96 John le Waleys accused Roger, chaplain 
of Hartwell of stealing 120 sheep and forty pigs from him. Roger was convicted of buying twelve 
sheep and eight pigs worth 20s from those plundered from John, and as a result was left in mercy.97 
John himself was in fact accused of rebellion, but received protection for being with the earl of 
Gloucester at London in 1267.98 A Robert P[er]mis of Clifware, one of those in Windsor Castle, 
was accused of selling stolen goods, possibly from the proceeds of the raids conducted by the 
garrison.99 Between Michaelmas 1264 and Michaelmas 1265, the city bailiffs of Norwich were 
faced with a number of cases involving the selling and receiving of stolen goods. This trade was 
apparently being conducted openly within the city, for a Ralph of Hadestock, an approver of 
Norwich castle, accused two men and two women of purchasing stolen goods from him, but not 
paying.100 Ralph’s role suggests that some garrisons may have served as unofficial hubs of the 
black market. The stealing of wheat was another staple crime. Geoffrey Hondde, for example, was 
accused of gaining four quarters of grain from Stephen Cheindut unjustly and against the peace, 
while a Hiweyn de la Broke of Wycombe reportedly seized the land of Simon de Sandredon and 
took his grain to the house of Thomas Angod of Wycombe.101 One man was convicted of selling 
wood from the park of Windsor while an Alexander le Parker was accused of doing the same and 
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receiving money for it.102 Woodland was a particularly tempting target if the perpetrators were 
intent on inflicting long term damage, because it would take years to regrow.103  
Keeping the Peace in tempus guerrae 
Methods of keeping the peace in wartime seem to have differed relatively little from those of peace 
time, the main exception being the preoccupation of the county sheriff and his forces with 
conducting the war.104 While judicial sources generally say little on the subject, snap shots of 
community responses to disorder are provided in commissions of inquisition recorded in the Patent 
Rolls, as well as in a few incidents mentioned in chronicles. In addition to detailing the equipment 
that men were obliged to bring to the muster, the assize of arms of 1242 and 1253 stipulated the 
number of armed men who should guard vills at night.105 Strangers were to be arrested if abroad at 
night, and those of good character to be released in the morning, while others were to be held until 
the sheriff arrived. If they fled, the hue and cry, i.e. the summoning and armed pursuit by the local 
populace of malefactors, was to be raised in surrounding vills to hunt down the strangers. On this 
basis, the duties of providing local security rested heavily on the shoulders of the local 
communities themselves. This remained the case during the war, but with the added problem that it 
would be far from clear in some regions who, when or even if the authorities would turn up.106 
With royalist forces overstretched during 1266 and 1267, Henry seems to have emphasised the use 
of local forces to police the countryside.107 On 25 May 1267, for example, during the earl of 
Gloucester’s renewed rebellion at London, a William de Stanegate accidentally killed a Desiderata 
le Chaumpeneys, ‘a particular friend’ and the god mother of his child. Desiderata reportedly 
accosted William, who was carrying a crossbow and poisoned arrow, asking him in jest whether he 
were ‘one of the men who were going about the country with crossbows, bows and other weapons, 
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to apprehend robbers and evil doers by the king’s order’.108 Armed as they were, the use of lethal 
force against malefactors, even in peace time, was liable to be common and even more so during 
the heightened tensions of a civil war. On 2 August 1264, William de Engelfield was 
commissioned by the council to investigate an incident at Bampton in Oxfordshire, where a group 
of ‘evildoers’ had attacked a mill belonging to William de Valence, possibly assuming that with 
Valence’s exile it was an easy target. The miller raised the hue and cry in Bampton and a John de 
Cranefeld ‘hearing them [the evildoers] with his neighbours, followed them so manfully that he 
killed one of them, John Bastard’.109 On 18 February 1265, Gilbert de Preston was ordered to 
determine whether a William Gorham of Stapelford, who came with certain evildoers to the 
Montfortian Peter de Montfort’s manor of Garthorp (Leicestershire) and maltreated Peter’s men, 
‘was killed in the fields of Wymondham by premeditated assault or not, and to let the sheriff know 
the names of those whom he [found] guilty’.110 When Robert Cariman raided the cattle of Kirkstall 
one of the abbot’s retainers was accidentally hit by an arrow fired at the robbers by another of the 
abbot’s men.111 While these examples were in self-defence or in the course of a pursuit, it is notable 
that they were not automatically exempt from the process of the law, even in wartime. Not every 
incident, however, even in peace time, necessarily followed the law though and, as Musson notes 
for the early fourteenth century, summary justice ‘may have been commoner than is usually 
supposed’.112 While it is impossible to ascertain accurately if incidences of rough justice did 
increase in wartime, anecdotal evidence suggests that it may have done. The Furness Chronicle, for 
example, recounts the case of an unnamed pro-Montfortian knight from Spalding Moor in 
Yorkshire, whose manor was seized by some supporters of the king, his park broken and all goods 
found in the manor destroyed and scattered. The said knight located seven of the perpetrators and 
dealt with the incident by locking them within one of their houses and burning it down with them 
inside.113  
Fear of and anger against armies could also manifest itself violently in communities, 
particularly in the aftermath of a defeat. In the aftermath of Lewes, the Battle Chronicle reports that 
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royalists, ‘dispersed through flight, were everywhere slaughtered by villeins living in the 
countryside’.114 Whether this was down to the political allegiance of the villeins is unclear, but the 
arrival of scattered groups of strange and possibly aggressive armed men likely provoked a violent 
response from the nervous men of the vills. A similar fate was reportedly met by the Welsh 
mercenaries after Evesham.115 
These cases are not proof of systematic execution but rather indicators of a ‘rough justice’ 
approach by some groups or communities. As with the idea of Conflict Theory, there is a sense in 
these cases that people during the war, possibly fearful that the perpetrators could never be 
successfully tried or that justice would be too slow and possibly corrupt, reacted forcefully and 
sometimes lethally to breaches of the peace. While we lack a detailed study of levels of violence 
prior to the war, violent incidents of this kind were liable to be more common during wartime when 
the established channels of redress were undermined.  
Communities could show considerable determination to pursue those who attacked them. The 
Annals of Dunstable recounts the Lord Edward’s pursuit of Adam de Gurdon and David 
Offington’s band following their raid on the manor of the priory of Dunstable at Shortgrave in 
April 1266. Alone amongst accounts of events at Alton, the Annals mention the presence of one 
Robert Chad with Edward’s party. The decision of the annalist to include this otherwise unknown 
individual in the account suggests he held some local significance to Dunstable. Although there is 
no other record of Robert Chad, a Henry Chad appears as a merchant of Dunstable, responsible in 
1272 for assisting in the restoration of the priory church. While the precise connection between the 
two men is unknown, Robert’s presence with Edward’s party suggests that men from Dunstable 
assisted in the pursuit of the raiders who had ransacked Shortgrave.116    
Personal Conflict, Escalation and Revenge  
Tempus guerrae, while providing the conditions for crime to flourish, likewise provided a 
convenient arena for the violent settling of personal conflicts.117 The English crown at this period, 
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unlike others in Europe, had, as Richard Kaeuper puts it, ‘a working monopoly of the means of 
violence associated with war’.118 There was no legal right for an English noble to make war on his 
rivals, save in the Marches.119 Whether attacking lands, persons or goods, these were breaches of 
the king’s peace. Strict penalties, in theory, applied to those who broke the king’s peace, which by 
extension was rebellion against the king.120 While moves in this direction were underway in 
France, reflected for example, in the Commentaria super Titulum de Actionibus written by the jurist 
Jean Blanot around 1256, England was further advanced.121  
Thirteenth-century England was a violent society, even in peace time, but accurately 
quantifying how much more violent the civil war made it is not really possible with the surviving 
legal records. Surviving inquests into violent deaths do indicate that at least amongst the peasantry, 
all armed by law, the violent settling of disputes was not uncommon even in peace time. As 
Valente notes many of the types of offences being committed during the war ‘occurred in 
peacetime as well, as often and as violently’.122 To contemporaries the war did, however, mark a 
noticeable surge in local violence as the Furness chronicler’s quote at the beginning of the chapter 
suggests.123  
The act of burning was often associated with plundering, but it represented a serious escalation 
in a conflict and was a very rare crime in peace time.124 Arson was, as Miriam Mûller comments, 
‘wholly non-acquisitive in nature’; the purpose was purely to hurt the victim.125 The decision to 
deliberately set fire to buildings or crops, as well as having a significant impact on the affected 
individuals in terms of the cost of the physical damage, was also a very public punishment. The 
smoke from a torched manor, castle or crops could be visible for miles around. The burning of 
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Raskelf and Whorlton, for example, were both public acts of revenge by the Montfortians for the 
continued resistance by Robert de Neville and his followers in the north, as was the royalist reprisal 
campaign against the lands of Robert de Ferrers in April 1265.126 The Londoner’s choice to burn as 
well as plunder Richard of Cornwall’s manor at Isleworth in 1264 not merely hurt Richard but 
proceeded to rub salt into the wound, and explains much about the normally restrained Richard’s 
furious defiance of the Montfortians on the eve of Lewes.127 Burning was liable to provoke or 
seriously exacerbate personal conflicts.  
The fighting between Montfort and Roger Mortimer may have been conducted on a far larger 
scale than most personal conflicts, but it is an informative study in their development and 
escalation. Originally a supporter of reform, Mortimer had transferred his allegiance back to Henry 
III prior to the war, joining the familia regis and possibly prompting a deeper antagonism with 
Montfort in the process.128 Mortimer’s original tensions with Montfort may have dated to Henry’s 
grant to the earl of the manors of Dilwyn, Lugwardine and Marden in Herefordshire in 1259 as part 
of the agreed conversion of parts of Eleanor de Montfort’s maritagium into land. Montfort’s 
sudden emergence as a power right in the midst of Mortimer’s lands potentially threatened 
Mortimer’s influence in the region and may have provoked his jealousy. Mortimer was by then 
engaged in his own unproductive legal dispute with the king and Richard of Cornwall over the 
valuable manor of Lechlade and Montfort’s success may have rankled.129 Mortimer remained aloof 
from the coup in 1263, but Henry III won him back to the royalist cause in part by the grant on 18 
December 1263 of £100 per annum from the farm of the manors of Norton and Bromsgrove until 
he could be granted land of equivalent value.130 In December 1263, Mortimer, according to the 
complaints the barons presented to Louis IX, ‘with a considerable army invaded as an enemy’ the 
lands of Montfort in the March at Dilwyn, Lugwardine and Marden bearing Henry’s letters. He had 
the corn threshed; he devastated and carried off other goods and finally usurped ‘to himself the 
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lordship of the manor, extorting an oath of fealty from its men and tenants, and collecting and 
making off with the rent for the Christmas term’. His household also captured and imprisoned 
Montfort’s constable of Dilwyn castle.131 That this attack had been ordered by Henry III and was 
not Mortimer’s initiative alone is clear from Mortimer’s possession of Henry’s letters. If relations 
between Mortimer and Montfort were not already tense prior to this event, then they certainly were 
so after the attack, and it was upon Mortimer that Montfort took his revenge. This commenced an 
escalating cycle of violence between the two men. It is important to note that Mortimer was never 
accused of burning Montfort’s lands in 1263. In February 1264, Henry and Simon the Younger 
were dispatched with an army, supported by John Giffard, to enact revenge. What Montfort’s 
specific instructions to his sons may have been are unknown, but Henry and Simon’s retaliation 
apparently went far beyond the scope of Mortimer’s actions and subsequently escalated the conflict 
into something far more personal. They ravaged Mortimer’s lands in Herefordshire, not just 
attacking his crops but burning as well. To add insult to injury they also captured his caput and 
castle of Wigmore. The annals of Tewkesbury’s account is the most lurid, claiming that all 
Mortimer’s lands were destroyed, his castles ruined and that in one day at least 200 men were 
killed. Tewkesbury is the only source to report killings, but it is not the only one to mention the 
burnings.132 Some of this damage, including to the castle of Radnor, was actually inflicted on lands 
which belonged in right to Mortimer’s wife, Maud, who was lady of Radnor.133 Both husband and 
wife now had very personal reasons for hating the Montforts. Whether Mortimer initially retaliated 
for this is unrecorded, but seems highly likely. In June 1264, when Montfort entered the March to 
force the Marchers’ compliance he again proceeded to burn and devastate Mortimer’s lands.134 It 
seems likely that the burning of Mortimer’s lands lay, at least in part, behind the savage mutilation 
of Montfort’s corpse at Evesham. The parading of Montfort’s head on a spear and the presentation 
of it to Mortimer’s wife, Maud, all speak of a deeply personal revenge perhaps not just for 
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Mortimer and his wife but for his followers as well, many of whom may have suffered from the 
effects of Montfort’s burnings.135  
Mauger le Vavassur 
The conduct of Mauger le Vavassur provides an excellent example of personal conflict under the 
cover of the war. Mauger le Vavassur is recorded in the Skipton return of the Inquisitiones de 
Rebellibus as having attacked Richard de Bolton’s lands at Wheatley and those of John le Vavassur 
at Addingham, both of whom were of the king’s party.136 The inquest notes that his land of 
Draughton ‘is of the fee of the earl of Aumale and is held of John le Vavassur’.137 Mauger was 
almost certainly a first-cousin once removed of John, and Mauger was thus from a junior branch of 
the family holding a sub-tenancy from the senior line.138 He held more land at Walton in fee from 
Henry de Percy and also at Denton (the ownership of which is unclear).139 Mauger’s raid on 
Addingham would seem, on the basis of the return, to be an opportunistic assault on his cousin, and 
but one part of a broader trend of raiding on others in the locality as part of the war. Mauger 
appears again, however, in the 1268 eyre for Northamptonshire where the full extent of his 
activities becomes apparent. His attack on Addingham emerges as part of a larger focussed 
campaign of ravaging against John le Vavassur’s lands in Yorkshire. The eyre records accusations 
that he ‘plundered the before said John [le Vavassur] of horses, cattle and sheep and all other 
goods’ in John’s caput of Hazelwood and that ‘he burned the manor before mentioned and the 
church of the before mentioned vill’.140 Mauger was similarly accused of coming to another manor 
of John’s at Woodhall, plundering it and afterwards burning it, while, at Richard de Bolton’s manor 
of Wheatley it was alleged that he had plundered all his goods before taking them to his manor of 
Denton.141 The final accusation was that he had taken part in the assault on Richmond castle.142  
Mauger’s attacks on John are revealing of a far deeper conflict between the two men, one that 
presumably pre-dated the war. His differing treatment of the lands of Richard de Bolton and John is 
particularly noticeable. John’s were pillaged and burned, Richard’s were only plundered. Mauger 
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clearly went out of his way in an effort to hurt his cousin by burning his manors. The case only 
appears in the surviving eyre rolls because Mauger also held land at Weekley in Northamptonshire 
which had been granted to John Balliol and for which Mauger owed a fine under the Dictum. The 
issue was a sore point for Mauger who contested that the case should be held in Yorkshire where 
the crimes were alleged to have occurred.143 
 
Figure  6:2 Location of Lands and Raiding of Mauger le Vavassour 
Mauger’s case is exceptional in our records for two reasons. First, his crimes in the hundred of 
Skipton are known due to the Skipton jury’s relatively unusual decision to go into more detail on 
some of the offences committed there during the war. This is suggestive of strong local demand for 
justice in the immediate aftermath of Evesham. Secondly, by chance, Mauger’s alleged offences in 
one county were recorded in another county with a surviving eyre. These two factors perhaps 
suggest that activities like Mauger’s may have been less unusual than their infrequent appearance 
in the records might suggest. Personal conflicts were doubtless relatively common during the war, 
as the Furness Chronicle’s lament would suggest. Mauger, it should be noted, was not one of the 
hard core of the Disinherited but received a pardon at the instance of the king’s son Edmund on 13 
May 1266 when the king was at Northampton readying for the siege of Kenilworth.144 This 
suggests that in Mauger’s case he was less ideologically motivated and had made efforts to 
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ingratiate himself back into royal favour. Perhaps his personal conflict with his cousin was in fact 
the determining factor of his involvement with the rebels in the first place.   
Case Study: Richard de la Vache and the Windsor Garrison 
The actions of Richard de la Vache and the Montfortian garrison of Windsor castle provide an 
interesting case study of local violence illustrative of many of the above points and also the 
inherent problems of the available judicial material. A local Buckinghamshire landholder, holding 
4 marks worth of land at Chalfont St. Giles and land at Shenley near Whaddon, Richard seems to 
have been drawn into the rebel camp in part due to his position as a local seneschal to Sir John fitz 
John.145 The latter was lord of Whaddon (putting Richard in his orbit), Aylesbury and Wendover in 
Buckinghamshire, meaning that he was a powerful local landholder, and as such a logical choice 
for controlling Windsor due to its relative proximity to his own lands.146 Richard’s career as a rebel 
is an interesting, if relatively short one. He was part of John fitz John’s garrison holding Windsor 
and seems to have remained part of the garrison while fitz John was absent campaigning with 
Montfort in the March from May 1265 onwards. This seems to have worked in his favour as the 
garrison’s decision to surrender promptly to the royalist advance party was apparently done on the 
generous terms that, provided they stood trial, the garrison would receive safe conduct, be remitted 
the king’s indignation and have their lands returned to them. Richard received his safe conduct and 
remittance respectively on 6 and 9 October.147 By 20 March 1266, Richard’s position had improved 
such that he was appointed to enquire by jury in Surrey concerning an issue of disputed seisin 
relating to John de Warenne.148 By the time of the eyre in Northamptonshire in the late 1260s, 
Richard was listed as a bailiff of the earl Warenne, presumably a powerful disincentive for anyone 
wishing to prosecute him.149 If anything Richard de la Vache was also a perfect example of the 
flaws in the royalist policy of disinheritance post-Evesham.  
According to the presentments in the Buckinghamshire eyre Richard was apparently in charge 
of conducting raids in the region around Windsor. These seem to have been partly for acquiring 
supplies for the garrison and partly for ransacking royalist estates. Principal amongst these events 
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in the presentments was the major raid carried out on the queen’s manors of Wingrave and 
Ivinghoe. To muster the manpower for this, Richard and others seem to have forced a number of 
locals to attend. Herbert Bolbec and Geoffrey Neyrunt asserted that Richard actually attacked their 
house to force them to attend the raid. The principal targets of this raid were the animals and other 
goods kept there, rather than the destruction of the manor itself: horses, oxen and sheep as well as 
other goods valued at £100 were alleged to have been stolen.150 Richard also conducted a raid on 
John de Grey’s manor at Eton, close to Windsor and ordered some of his followers to raid other 
locals; for example, Henry de la Hulle and William Hallinge of Stoke were ordered to distrain one 
Wigam de la Mare of oxen, sheep and one calf. The two were forced to redeem their lands at two 
years income under the Dictum.151 The most striking point from the eyre, however, is that Richard 
himself is never charged, only his accomplices. Richard’s record was not in dispute apparently, but, 
unlike those who had served alongside him willingly or not, he was seemingly untouchable,. 
Richard’s raid on the queen’s manors of Wingrave and Ivinghoe, as well as the royal manor of 
Piddington in Oxfordshire, had several practical benefits. As Jacob comments, ‘it was not de 
Montfort’s policy to strip or confiscate legitimate sources of royal wealth’.152 Though it might not 
have been Montfort’s policy, his supporters apparently had no such qualms. In fact Richard de la 
Vache’s actions were perfectly logical. Royal manors were liable to be comparatively rich and well 
stocked, and with the royalists on the back foot, unguarded. They were therefore a ready target for 
a garrison in need of supplies. In Ivinghoe and Wingrave’s cases the fact that they were possessions 
of the queen, who was still abroad, would have been a powerful added incentive. The same is true 
of the lands of other major royalists and vice versa. If the lord, particularly a rich one, was known 
to be engaged elsewhere then the manors in question would have been tempting targets due to their 
lack of defence. The Isleworth raid by the Londoners is another prime example. Richard of 
Cornwall, just as with the other royalists in early 1264, was not in a position to respond to the 
attack. The same is true for John de Grey’s lands in Buckinghamshire.153  
Buckinghamshire Rebels Claimed Role 
Geoffrey Neyremyt forced 
Herbert de Bolbec forced 
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Eustace de Greynvile  forced 
William du Lay forced others to plunder 
William Angevin making distraint 
Henry le Seler  making distraint 
Robert parson of Hy 
vinglo  forced 
Robert F/Sinel  with Richard ordering others 
Henry de la Hulle plundering through order of 
William Hallinge de 
Stoke  plundering through order of 
Ralph de Vernay  forced 
Robert fitz Nigel  with Richard  
Ralph Crok forced 
Ralph Gorg? Of 
Aylesbury   
Richard Carr of Ivinghoe   
Michael Bator   
Ralph de Ponte   
 
Table  6:1: Rebels' Connections to Richard de la Vache154 
Richard’s position as the seneschal of John fitz John was presumably why he took such a 
prominent role in the garrison’s operations in Buckinghamshire. That he was indeed employed as 
fitz John’s local enforcer is suggested by the claims of some of the accused in the eyre that they 
were acting under coercion. Ralph Crok, for example, declared he was seised ‘for the works of his 
lord, Sir John fitz John’. William Angevin and Henry le Seler, noted in the margins of the 
document as homines of Sir John fitz John, were accused of plundering Walton with others. They 
claimed they were making a distraint and that they had the authority of the seneschal, Richard de la 
Vache, to do so.155 Richard’s official role seems to have been geographically confined to 
Buckinghamshire and Windsor itself. While his name is a relatively common occurrence in the 
Buckinghamshire eyre roll, in Berkshire he only appears in reference to Windsor. This is 
suggestive that John fitz John emloyed several men in his garrison as bailiffs, perhaps each 
focussed on one particular county. In Berkshire’s case the identity of this official is harder to pin 
down, but John of St. Helens appears a number of times in the roll engaged in activities similar to 
Richard’s, though his position is never defined.156 
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The Windsor garrison also used their dominant local position for distinctly non-war related 
objectives, but acting under a veneer of legal process. One John Pollard, for example, was revealed 
in an inquest to have made over to John of St. Helens (St. Helens is near Abingdon), allegedly of 
his own free will, a charter of conveyance giving over all his goods. Under questioning it was 
revealed that one member of the garrison had confronted Pollard and forced him to sign a charter 
that granted away Pollard’s goods. Having unwillingly complied, Pollard was seized and 
imprisoned in Windsor.157 The activities of Richard de la Vache in the Windsor garrison are a 
prime example of the important local role that the officials of major rebels played in the supply of 
the castle and the organisation of the war in the locality.  
Conclusion 
The way war was waged at a local level during the Barons’ War demonstrates how the wider 
organisation of the war, through the actions of castle garrisons and the officials of each side, was 
closely intertwined with local conflicts and disorder. England in the thirteenth century was a 
violent society, and the hostile actions we see performed in war were usually an extension of those 
of peace time. The difference, however, lies in the scale of war time acts and the blurring of local 
acts of violence with those of the wider war. The security of local society was rocked by the 
warfare between the royalists and Montfortians, which resulted in the plunder and ravaging of 
lands. This instability had the simultaneous affects of disrupting law and order and providing 
increased opportunity for the violent resolution of personal disputes. Castles in particular had a 
significant and often negative impact on the peace of their surroundings. Seizure of foodstuffs, 
livestock and horses might, sometimes, be just a part of a garrison’s efforts to keep themselves 
provisioned, but this could descend into plain criminal profiteering during the war’s course. While 
burning was a normal part of war it still, as in peace time, marked a serious escalation in violence. 
Local defensive responses to some of these events were frequently direct and violent, but this 
behaviour can also be seen in peace time. Warfare and violence in the localities was fed by the 
broader civil war and as the examples of Richard de la Vache and Mauger le Vavassur 
demonstrate, was an integral part of its nature and impact. While the extent of local violence no 
doubt varied from region to region, it is worth noting that for the vast majority of society in 
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England this would have been the face of the war that they saw, as opposed to the great campaigns 
of Lewes and Evesham. 
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Conclusion 
This study has sought to provide for the first time a broad view of the nature of war in Barons’ War 
of 1264-67 and to demonstrate the closely interlinked aspects of the conflict, from the state and use 
of castles, down to very local conflicts. The intention of this conclusion is not only to summarise 
the points discussed in the previous chapters, but also to use these points to examine why the war 
developed in the manner it did in comparison to previous conflicts. This aims to not only help 
inform understanding of the development of Barons’ War as a military conflict, but also provide 
insights into its predecessors. 
Of all the aspects of the conflict discussed, the role of castles remains the most important and 
pervasive through all levels of warfare, from the strategic control of England down to the shaping 
of local conflicts. In contrast to Pounds’ assertion that they played little role in the war, castles 
were its crucial implements. Both parties displayed a sustained interest in controlling castles and 
the emphasis placed on them by contemporaries leaves us in no doubt as to their perceived 
importance. Nevertheless, the Barons’ War continued the trend already evident in the 1215-17 civil 
war which saw the low importance of seigneurial castles, and this would be a feature, as Prestwich 
has demonstrated, of the rebellions of Edward II’s reign. The dominance of the major stone castle 
had decisively shifted strategic power into the hands of the crown and the greatest magnates. But it 
was not enough now just to possess stone fortresses, for these, such as Alnwick, Wigmore and 
Tonbridge, seem to have fallen to both sides without long sieges. Only the greatest and most 
powerful fortifications, well manned and provisioned, ever seemed to provide sustained resistance. 
Those castles that featured heavily in the struggle were all present or former royal fortresses and all 
were of key importance both as defensive and offensive military bases and arsenals. These are the 
lessons the Lord Edward would take from the civil war and apply to his conquest of Wales. The 
civil war provided evidence to him of the benefits of newer types of castle design such as the 
concentric fortress, which became a feature of a number of his Welsh castles.  
While castles often seemed to fall very easily, there was also a notable reticence by both sides 
from engaging in sustained sieges due to the cost in time, money and men necessary to complete 
them. The symbolism of the defence of or capture of castles and a commander’s success or failure 
in this regard played a part in this. The successful siege of Kenilworth became a matter of prestige 
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for Henry III, as well as a strategic imperative. The Montfortian siege of Pevensey never gained the 
same prominence for Montfort, probably because he never staked his military reputation personally 
on the action. Even so he expended a great deal of money in the siege, something of which he had 
little to spare. In the instances when one side committed itself to a siege, such as at Gloucester three 
times, Pevensey, Kenilworth and the Tower of London, negotiated surrender or failure were the 
only two outcomes; no major castle ever fell by assault.  
The role of the towns in the Barons’ War was closely linked to that of castles, being vital both 
strategically and economically. Of these, the ports retained especial significance as they helped 
control potential foreign support for each side. Walled towns in particular, due to their size served 
repeatedly as mustering points for major armies, Northampton, Oxford, Hereford, London, 
Nottingham and Gloucester, for example, all served in this capacity. English towns during the war, 
however, never reached the same military effectiveness or importance as their continental 
neighbours. Defences were unsophisticated, frequently too large to defend easily and compromised 
in some cases by a patchwork of competing jurisdictions and rivalries within the towns themselves. 
Furthermore, after decades of domestic peace, walls and ditches were not always in the best repair, 
were frequently viewed as a burden by the townspeople, and were often as much about status as 
they were for defence. They remained useful during the war, however, particularly in repelling 
opportunistic raids. Towns were sacked on every recorded occasion that they fell to assault. The 
populace of towns were frequently subjected to far harsher treatment than castle garrisons due to 
the financial incentives offered by plunder, the sack’s value as an exemplary punishment and the 
customs of war. The presence of castles also tended to drag towns into the conflict, and in the cases 
of Gloucester and Rochester, turned the town itself into a battlefield as one side held the castle and 
the other the town with the townspeople caught in between.  
The Barons’ War, however, was by no means confined to the struggle for control of castles and 
towns. The use of guerrilla warfare, raiding and plundering by armed bands operating from the 
wilderness areas of England became an increasingly important part of the warfare, particularly 
during the rebellion of the Disinherited. Natural fortresses replaced man made ones, conforming to 
a long established method of waging war by a weaker side against a stronger. This was not 
confined to the rebel side, but was also practised by the royalists, particularly the Marchers prior to 
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the battle of Evesham. Castle commanders, sometimes because they knew the weakness of their 
fortresses or preferring to be able to raid at will against besiegers, seem to have frequently 
remained outside their own walls. A mobile form of warfare was deemed preferable. Such an 
approach, however, was an essentially defensive technique and on its own could not lead to victory. 
Castles remained the key arbiter of power with its ability to control territory. The losses of Dover in 
1265 and Kenilworth in 1266 combined with the royalists’ firm grip on the castles denied the 
Disinherited any chance, however small, of a more meaningful military success. Kenilworth’s fall 
was in essence the beginning of the end for those who wished more than just the return of their 
lands.  
 
The deliberate killing of Montfort and his most prominent supporters at Evesham marked a turning 
point in the treatment of rebellious nobles.1  It is less clear, however, if it escalated the brutality of 
the conflict in general. Certainly there were examples of brutal conduct, such as Henry de 
Hastings’ mutilation of the king’s messenger at Kenilworth and the summary hanging of captured 
Disinherited knights. Yet, for the broader war the evidence is less clear. No castle garrisons are 
reported as having been executed. Mass killing never appears as a by-product of the sack of towns 
(with perhaps the exception of Jewish communities), but there was a consensus amongst narrative 
accounts that the sack was an expected event. Killing in general appears to have been principally 
confined to the arena of the battlefield and its immediate aftermath. The mass mutilation of the 
Montfortians not of knightly status caught at Rochester and the execution of the Weald archers in 
1264 mark probably the largest acts of mass brutality outside the slaughter at Evesham, and both 
predated it. All three incidents were committed by royal forces and they retain a veneer of judicial 
authority that the rebels did not possess. Killing and mutilation definitely occurred during the war, 
but it was limited and we never see the sheer level of barbarity that characterised religious conflicts 
such as the Albigensian crusade.2 The setting of a civil war may help to explain this restraint as 
men hesitated at killing neighbours and kinsmen of the same faith and culture. Illustrative of these 
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constraints is the incident recounted by Walter of Guisborough that at the fall of Northampton 
Henry III was so furious with the resistance shown by some Oxford students in the town that he 
wanted to have them executed. He was dissuaded when it was declared; 'Heaven forbid you should 
do this, O King; for the sons of your magnates and other men of your realm have come here with 
the university. If you have them hanged or beheaded, even your own people, who are now loyal to 
you, will rise against you, and will not allow the blood of their sons or relatives to be shed if they 
can help it'.3 
Thirteenth-century England was already a violent society, but the civil war disrupted normal 
methods of law keeping and provided the cover of war for the conduct of personal conflicts, such 
as that of Mauger le Vavassur. Castle garrisons and local officials played important roles in 
stimulating and organising this violence, as the example of Richard de la Vache and the Windsor 
garrison show, and in which the peasantry were widely involved. Concurrently, the disruption of 
the war, both in terms of the violence but also relating to the disruption of the usual methods of 
maintaining law and order and seeking legal redress, created a demand for justice, reflected in the 
Inquisitiones de Rebellibus in the months following the battle of Evesham. The maintenance of law 
and order was a fundamental function of government and as such its restoration was a critical 
necessity for both Montfort and Henry III. The continuing raiding by both sides undermined these 
attempts over the years of the war. 
The returns of the Inquisitiones de Rebellibus demonstrate that all regions experienced the 
effects of the fighting, including a probable upsurge in local conflict and violence. It is harder to 
say which parts of England were affected most by the war. The narrative and legal records do not 
provide the breadth of geographical coverage, nor the chronological details required to make a 
proper assessment of the conflict in some regions, most particularly the northern border counties 
and Devon and Cornwall. Several regions, however, probably suffered the most. The Welsh March 
experienced three separate major campaigns. The North Midlands, including Kenilworth, South 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire suffered the royalist harrying campaigns following the capture of 
Nottingham in April 1264, the Montfortian and Ferrers’ assaults and seizures of royalist castles 
during the summer of 1264 and the Disinherited’s campaign in 1266-67, including the ravaging 
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committed by the garrison of Kenilworth. Furthermore, the battle of Evesham resulted in the death 
of many of the leading landholders in certain counties such as Warwickshire, further undermining 
the state of order in the region.4 Finally, East Anglia during the Disinherited’s rebellion suffered 
the effects of constant raiding and skirmishing. Taken as a whole, the effect of the war on England 
must have been profound. Many towns had been sacked, local law enforcement was badly 
disrupted and many manors had experienced plunder and even burning. Throughout the conflict 
castle garrisons had been a looming presence over many communities, liable to inflict substantial 
damage whether in military action or simply in their efforts to provision themselves. 
It is uncertain if the civil war had a longer term impact on the state of law and order in 
England. The death of Henry III in 1272 and Edward’s absence on crusade until 1274 were 
partially responsible for allowing the rivalries of the earls to go unchecked by royal mediation. 
Robert de Ferrers’ capture of Chartley castle in 1273 and the Lord Edmund’s siege of it certainly 
had its roots in the war.5 Burt argues that for Warwickshire at least, ‘it would be a mistake’ to 
associate all the conflict in these years with the civil war.6 A proper assessment of the extent to 
which the legacy of the Barons’ War had a comparatively negative impact on law and order in the 
late thirteenth century is a topic that requires further research, most particularly of its state in the 
decades prior to the war.  
 
Despite the period of sustained relative peace enjoyed by England since the Marshal rebellion in 
the 1230s, more military experience was open to the participants in the civil war before 1264 than 
is perhaps readily apparent. The nature of retinue and general recruitment for campaigns in Wales 
and Gascony does much to obscure the full scope of the numbers involved and the experience open 
to them. The near constant fighting running through the Welsh marches from 1257 onwards was a 
crucial proving ground for the Marcher lords in particular, but also for figures such as the Lord 
Edward. Warfare there, and in Gascony, retained essential features that would inform the behaviour 
of the participants including hit and run raids and the vulnerability of lesser castles and garrisons to 
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sudden assaults. Few men who took up arms from 1263, however, can have had experience of a 
major battle, for these were extremely rare in medieval warfare. 
Previous studies of the composition of armies and garrisons in the medieval period have often 
failed to appreciate the differences between those raised in times of civil war and those raised for 
foreign expeditions. The number of men receiving wages was only ever one part of the English 
forces at this period as were those of knightly status. The role of knights in particular can be 
overemphsised due to the comparative abundance of documentary evidence relating to them. While 
knights and sergeants, both of the familia regis and seigneurial retinues formed the backbone of 
much of the fighting, both sides also made heavy use of levies and county posses. While levies 
lacked the equipment and training of the knights and sergeants, they provided vital numbers and 
support both in campaigns and in garrisons. Their importance, particularly in the supply of archers 
and crossbowmen for armies, was high. At its heart the forces of both sides were a mixture of men 
from different backgrounds, formed by bonds of tenure, pay and loyalty who fought throughout the 
conflict and in much the same manner as they had since the twelfth century. What we may see, 
however, is the war’s influence on the future organisation of accounting for the expenditure of 
royal generals. The records of Roger Leybourne’s campaign expenses mark the beginning of the 
extant detailed accounts of military campaign expenses that survive in relatively greater numbers 
for the reign of Edward I. This survival could, of course, be down to fluke, but the civil war was a 
crucial training ground for Edward I’s later wars and these records may indicate that the conflict 
helped to inform the underlying administrative framework of these later campaigns.  
The Barons’ War was the proving ground of many of the knights and common troops of 
Edward’s generation, providing them with valuable military experience that they were able to 
transfer to the wars later in his reign. Important royal generals during the Welsh wars included for 
example, William de Valence, John de Warenne, Roger Mortimer, and Roger Clifford. Former 
rebels, such as John Giffard and John de Eyville, served in Edward’s wars, de Eyville, for example, 
eventually became a banneret in Edward I’s familia in the 1280s while Giffard was entrusted as the 
constable of Pondensac in Gascony in 1294-5. 7 Amongst the magnates, Spencer notes that the 
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‘dominant comital figures in the first twenty-five years of Edward’s reign’ had all participated in 
the Barons’ War. This conflict seems to have helped forge bonds between these men and 
interestingly Edward’s two main opponents in 1297, the earls of Hereford and Norfolk, both came 
of age during Edward’s crusade and had not fought in the civil war.8 The experience of the Barons’ 
War did not, however, remain confined to the nobility and it is quite possible that peasant levies 
who had fought in the civil war also served in some of Edward’s early campaigns. The nature of 
war and its impact on society in the Barons’ War deeply affected all levels of society.  
 
The Shape of the War  
The final section of this conclusion seeks to examine why the course of the war developed in the 
way that it did in comparison to earlier conflicts. The intention here is to not only gain a clearer 
idea of the factors shaping the Barons’ War but also to indirectly cast light on it predecessors. This 
will involve discussion of the impact of the battles of Lewes and Evesham, and their contextual 
importance in relation to the issues discussed in the previous chapters.  
There is a curious disparity in the comparative durations of the 1173-74, 1215-17 and the 1264-
67 civil wars and that of the 1138-53 civil war of Stephen’s reign. Castles played an important role 
in all these conflicts, but in Stephen’s reign castles were not only very prominent in the fighting but 
also proliferated during its course and contributed to the development of a stalemate which lasted a 
number of years. The increased expenditure on royal castles from Henry II’s reign onwards, the 
growing cost of new fortifications and the deliberate policy of assuming control of former 
seigneurial fortresses, were all differences between 1138-53 and the later civil wars. These factors 
alone, however, do not fully explain them.9 The decisive pitched battles of Lewes and Evesham 
provide one explanation in the case of 1264-67, as will be discussed shortly. There were, however, 
several other factors at play: mutual support, developments in siege technology and sources of 
authority, which, combined with the pitched battles of Lewes and Eveshm, help explain the 
divergent course of these wars. 
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The strategic situation in 1264-67 differed to that of 1138-53 in part due to the opposing sides’ 
comparative lack of territorial cohesion, as well as in the lower number of extant castles. In 1138-
53, the Empress’s supporters were able to control a block of territory in the Welsh march and west 
of England thanks to the loyalty of three of the region’s most powerful landholders, Earl Robert of 
Gloucester, Brian fitz Count and Miles of Gloucester.10 Together these three men and their allies 
controlled key castles and towns as far east as Wallingford. While this territory’s boundaries varied 
over the course of the war, these men and their followers could offer to one another something that 
the factions in the Barons’ War frequently lacked, mutual support. The presence of multiple 
garrisons within close proximity to each other permitted the swift raising of field armies in the 
event of one of their castles coming under attack. New castles were sometimes erected in order to 
assist in the suppression of enemy garrisons or to solidify control over a region. In 1144, for 
example, in Stephen’s absence, Earl Robert of Gloucester erected three castles in close proximity to 
the royal garrison at Malmesbury. When Stephen arrived and launched a fierce assault on the castle 
at Tetbury, Robert ‘immediately collected a vast force of knights, as he had a great many castles 
near by, some belonging to himself and others most loyally obedient to him’. Outnumbered, 
Stephen was required to abandon his siege of Tetbury.11 This is a noticeable difference to 1264-67, 
when neither side enjoyed a comparable level of territorial cohesion and density of castle control. 
Rogers proposes that even heavily fortified regions required three elements to successfully resist 
conquest: one, adequate garrisons, two, sufficiently motivated garrisons and three, that the 
defending party could also raise a substantial field force in addition to the garrisons. The field force 
was necessary to relieve sieges, by curtailing the besieger’s ability to forage for supplies and 
potentially bring the besiegers to battle.12  For at least part of the 1138-53 civil war the Empress’ 
faction seems to have met all three criteria. This was not the case for the participants in 1264-67. 
The only occasion when one side came close to achieving this state was in the summer of 1264, 
when the royalists controlled a range of royal and seigneurial castles stretching from Bristol in the 
south up to Chester.13 The integrity of this block was undermined though by the threat of Llewelyn 
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from the West, which forced the division of royalist forces, as well as the lack of clear military 
leadership for the royalist party comparable to that offered by Earl Robert of Gloucester in 1138-
53. The royalists could put together field armies in the region in 1264-65, as the attacks on Robert 
de Ferrers in March 1264 and Hereford in November 1264 indicate. In 1264, the royalists displayed 
an unwillingness or inability, however, to successfully threaten Montfort’s operations in the two 
campaigns against them. Combined with Montfort’s swift capture of seigneurial castles, this 
contributed to the collapse of the royalists’ position. In 1138-53 by contrast, the factors discussed 
above rendered the reduction of territory a far slower process as forces were either split to tackle a 
larger area, or if concentrated against one area, risked permitting the enemy progress in another.  
If the erection of new supporting castles was efficacious in 1138-53, why then is there no 
evidence of a comparable strategy in 1264-67? The duration of the conflict could be one factor as, 
with perhaps the exception of the royalist position in the west during the summer of 1264, neither 
side had a real opportunity for a systematic entrenchment. In the Montfortian case for much of 
1264 and 1265, such activities may have been actively discouraged as part of their efforts at 
restoring a form of political normalcy. After the battle of Evesham and the subsequent collapse of 
Montfortian resistance, the royalists had little requirement for the construction of such fortifications 
and the Montfortians little capacity. The construction of easily erected earth and timber castles, 
furthermore, may have been judged as an essentially futile effort in the face of advances in siege 
technology. While the basic timber and earthwork fortifications in the style of 1138-53 remained 
formidable to a poorly equipped force, in the face of new technology their efficacy declined, thus 
undermining the rationale for their spread in 1264-67.14 Combined with the reduction in the number 
of castles in England, the ability to dominate regions with multiple mutually supporting castles had 
been significantly degraded by the Barons’ War. 
Perceptions of political legitimacy and authority are perhaps the last piece of this jigsaw. The 
willingness of a garrison to continue to resist in the face of adversity might be dependent on their 
perception of the political legitimacy and authority behind them. In 1138-53, following the arrival 
of the Empress and then later under her son Duke Henry, their followers were fighting for a rival 
claimant to the throne and as such they denied the validity of Stephen’s right to rule. Again in 
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1173-74, the garrisons of the rebel castles could point to their loyalty to another anointed king of 
England, Henry the Young King, in opposition to Henry II. In 1264-67, by contrast there was no 
legitimate rival to the king’s authority. The Provisions of Oxford might curtail Henry III’s right to 
independent rule, but it was a system still built around Henry’s kingship. 
This difference was less of a problem while fortune favoured the rebel side, but it became one 
when they were losing. The collapse of the Montfortian position in the wake of the battle of 
Evesham was far more dramatic than that of the royalists after the battle of Lewes. The comparably 
more decisive result of Evesham does provide one explanation for this, but it took a far greater 
degree of ideological commitment to continue to resist the king in adversity when the king’s 
victory in the event of a rebel’s continued resistance threatened death, imprisonment or total 
forfeiture. Prompt surrender to the royalist side, however, could potentially lead to the rebel’s 
poltical reintegration. With the right incentives, such as thoses offered to the garrisons of 
Gloucester and Windsor in 1265, the royalists potentially could persuade rebel garrisons to 
surrender in return for the eventual restoration of their lands.15 This issue does much to emphasise 
the gravity of the mistake by Henry III in disinheriting the rebels in September 1265, as it removed 
a key advantage from the royalists and assisted in lengthening the fighting for another two years. 
The royalists, by way of contrast, enjoyed a psychological advantage in the face of reversal. After 
the battle of Lewes they knew they were fighting for the anointed king and as such were less likely 
to feel that the Montfortians could offer them anything. This offers a partial explanation for the 
more sustained resistance by royalist castle garrisons after the battle of Lewes in comparison to the 
Montfortians in the aftermath of the battle of Evesham. 
Perhaps the most significant factor in the different shapes of 1264-67 and 1138-53 was pitched 
battle. Here we again turn to Morillo’s contention that the conduct of civil wars differed from 
external wars in that changing control of the realm was the objective, not territorial conquest.16 
Morillo furthermore argues that in comparison to earlier conflicts ‘castles only played a minor role’ 
in 1264-67, citing the example of the Lord Edward’s battle seeking at Evesham which he takes as a 
demonstration of ‘just how far the parameters of strategy had been transformed by the evolution of 
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central authority in England’.17 On the surface this is quite a compelling argument, but it is guilty to 
a degree of placing the cart before the horse. Castles and fortified towns might have played a minor 
role in the context of the number of sieges being conducted, but they were also a major determiner 
in both the decision to seek battle and in shaping the campaigns that resulted in them. It was the 
threat of the submission of the Cinque Ports as well as the royalist capture of towns and castles 
both in the Midlands and the south-east that spurred Montfort to seek battle at Lewes on 14 May 
1264.18 He sought battle when battle had essentially become the only means of obtaining victory. 
Montfort’s decision to split his forces between Northampton and London at the war’s outset would 
seem to indicate that he had intended to fight a war in the classic ‘Vegetian’ fashion. The forces in 
Northampton and London could threaten royalist activities in both regions, and, in the event of a 
major royalist attack on one of them, the other field army could come to its relief. The failure of 
this strategy in April 1264 was down to the royalists’ decisive efforts to undo it by taking 
Northampton swiftly, much as William Marshal had done at Lincoln in 1217.19 It is possible that 
Montfort had hoped for an opportunity to bring the royalists to battle in 1264, but as his caution 
during the Evesham campaign indicates, it was probably only if it was on terms favourable for 
victory. Montfort demonstrated an unwillingness to give battle under unfavourable circumstances 
at both Monmouth and on his advance to Evesham. The royalists, by contrast, sought battle 
specifically because the situation was in their favour. Montfort’s calculated gamble to fight at 
Lewes paid off, albeit not completely. Ironically perhaps, the entrenchment of Henry III in the 
Priory and the Lord Edward in Lewes castle provided their position with enough strategic strength 
that it necessitated the Mise of Lewes and the resulting freedom for the Marchers.20 Control of the 
castles and towns had caused the battle; now they arguably sowed the seeds for Montfort’s defeat.  
While the royalists seem to have enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage over Montfort’s army 
during the Evesham campaign, the decision to seek battle, just as with that at Lewes, was also 
arguably predicated by castles. The intention was to smash both the core of the Montfortians’ 
leadership and its field army. Assuming for a moment that Montfort had avoided being cornered at 
Evesham and had regrouped in more friendly territory at say Kenilworth, Bristol or even London, 
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how would that have effected the development of the civil war? With the Montfortians in control of 
most of the major castles in the Midlands and South-East, the potential for a protracted war was 
great. A pitched battle at a later date would have been by no means improbable, but depending 
upon Montfort’s ability to maintain support, the resulting conflict risked descending into a series of 
sieges. A siege of Kenilworth in such circumstances would have been a far more dangerous affair if 
Montfort was active with a field army. The seeds of a more protracted conflict dominated by 
castles, like that in Stephen’s reign, would have been laid. It is probable that, barring another 
Lewes-like reversal, Edward’s forces could have prevailed in the longterm, as the divisive nature of 
Montfort’s rule continued to take its toll on his supporters. Such an issue would have been by no 
means certain though. The royalist battle seeking strategy at Evesham specifically sought to 
prevent any such possibility. Not only did it result in the death of Montfort but also many of his 
key supporters, lords like Peter de Montfort and Hugh Despencer, who were critical for the raising 
and maintenance of the Montfortian army.21 In that sense castles played a major, albeit quite 
different role to that in 1138-53, and decisively shaped the actions of the participants and thus the 
course of the war.  
 
 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate the nature of the Barons’ War at both the macro and the 
micro level. The struggle for the control of castles and towns was felt across the social spectrum 
and helped shape the course of the war both at the strategic level, as discussed above, and the local. 
For many participants the raiding committed by both sides and the unleashing of personal conflicts 
over the three years of its duration were the visible faces of the war. The Barons’ War also 
demonstrates continuity and development in warfare in thirteenth century England. Crucially the 
war was a formative experience for many of the participants in Edward I’s wars and as such left 
both a political and a military legacy in the late thirteenth century. This was the nature of war and 
its impact on society in the Barons’ War, 1264-67. 
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Appendix 1: ‘Of noman so sore adrad’? 
.
This appendix examines Robert de Ferrers’ involvement in the complex chain of events 
surrounding the second siege of Gloucester in 1264, discussed in Chapter 3. In particular it seeks to 
interpret Robert of Gloucester’s comment that Edward was ‘of no man so sorely afraid’ than 
Robert de Ferrers, a strange remark that has yet to receive a convincing explanation. This appendix 
will suggest that this remark should perhaps be interpreted in the context of the campaign, an 
important event in the war that has remained understudied despite good surviving sources. This 
does not seek to be a full account of Ferrers’ involvement in the Barons’ War which falls outside 
the purview of the thesis, but rather to provide a further context to an event that has received little 
critical study.1 
 
Figure  0:1 approximate location of Ferrers' lands and castles before the war 
Background 
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Robert de Ferrers’ background played a vital role in shaping his conduct during the war, 
particularly at Worcester and Gloucester in 1264. The Ferrers’ family fortunes had waned 
considerably since the death of Robert’s father, Earl William, in 1254, whose income by the early 
1250s was approximately £1,500 p.a. The Ferrers estates were concentrated in the West Midlands, 
but he had manors scattered across Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire, 
Oxfordshire and Lancashire.2 A third of these lands were part of Robert’s mother Margaret’s 
extensive dower grants, including the major manor of Chartley, to which she was entitled after 
William’s death. Coupled to this diminuation in wealth, Robert was obliged to provide manors for 
his younger brother William and also two manors to his wife Mary, a niece of Henry III, to hold in 
her own right. These factors all resulted in a difficult financial picture for the new earl of Derby 
when he came of age in 1260. His wardship had been held by the Lord Edward from 1254-57 who 
then sold the wardship of most of the estates to his mother the queen and Peter of Savoy, in return 
for 6000 marks. Some estates remained in Edward’s keeping though, even after Robert came of 
age, further compounding Robert’s problems.3 The two men were around the same age and 
Edward’s possession of Robert’s wardship and retention of some of his manors may well have 
influenced the development of Robert’s very apparent enmity towards the heir to the throne at the 
opening of the war and consequently helped to shape the course of events at the siege of 
Gloucester. Coupled with this dramatic reduction in his income (down to only around £100 p.a.) 
were the debts of nearly £800 his father had left the family, which caused him to resort to 
borrowing from the Jews.4  In addition to the parlous state of the Ferrers’ finances in the 1260s, 
Robert also had claims to the honour of Peverel, forfeited to the crown in 1155. In 1199, Earl 
William had gained partial restoration of the honour in return for the resignation of his claims to 
the remainder, which however included the castles of the Peak and Bolsover. The acquisition of the 
Peak in particular would have raised ‘the Ferrers into a different league of power’. It dominated a 
major region of lead mining and large tracts of forest while the castle itself controlled seventeen 
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fees ‘some of them held by important knightly families’.5 The castle was transferred into the hands 
of Edward as part of his appanage in 1254 thereby further increasing the tensions between the two 
men. The desire for control of this region remained a potent influence on Robert de Ferrers and did 
much to dictate the course of events during the war as it did his relations with the Lord Edward.6 
Ferrers’ financial position apparently did not hinder his ability to raise large forces of men, 
presumably from amongst his tenants, although it does suggest that he would have had trouble 
fielding large numbers of stipendiaries. When Ferrers joined the second Montfortian campaign 
against the Marchers in late October to early November 1264 he reportedly led into Cheshire a 
20,000 strong force of horsemen and infantry. While the figure of 20,000 is almost certainly an 
exaggeration, the approach of his army caused the retreat of a Marcher army mustered to meet him 
and led by William de la Zouche, justiciar of Chester, David brother of Llywelyn and James 
Audely.7 Ferrers demonstrated he could raise strong forces through loyalty or threats in the same 
manner as other lords during the war, and it is likely that such men made up much of the army he 
led into Cheshire in late 1264. Ferrers’ officials raised men from many counties, for example an 
Andrew Badekyng in the Berkshire Dictum eyre claimed he had been forced into plundering by the 
bailiffs of Robert de Ferrers and was accused of being ‘against the king in battles, castle sieges and 
in towns’8 Likewise a Gilbert Fraunceys in Buckinghamshire was involved with Ferrers during the 
war.9 There is evidence that he may have recruited prisoners from Worcester gaol as well.10  
Ferrers therefore could command significant resources and was a major threat to the royalist faction 
in early 1264. 
 
‘Of noman so sore adrad’ 
The sequence of events surrounding the second siege of Gloucester in March 1264 has attracted 
little critical analysis. Here it is necessary to contextualise the wider campaign that culminated in 
                                         
5
 D.A. Carpenter, ‘The Struggle to Control the Peak: an Unknown Letter Patent from January 1217’, 
Foundations of Medieval Scholarship: Records Edited in Honour of David Crook, eds., P. Brand and 
S.Cunningham, (York: Borthwick Institute, 2008), pp.35-49, at.39.  
6
 HKW, ii, p.777. 
7
 Ferrers’ pursuit reportedly slew up to a hundred men with many others captured, while only one of his own 
followers was wounded,  Ann. Dun., p.235. 
8
 JUST 1/42, m. 2. 
9
 JUST 1/59, m. 17. 
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 CPR 1266-72, p.127; The Worcestershire Eyre Roll of 1275, ed. J. Röhrkasten, (Worcester: Worcestershire 
Historical Society, 2008), 1270,1284. 
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the siege and the Montfortian withdrawal in order to help explain Robert de Ferrers part in it and 
also Robert of Gloucester’s comment about Edward.  
When the civil war began in earnest in early 1264, Ferrers was the initiator of one of the first 
major acts of the conflict. His attack on Worcester is remarkable both for its brazenness, and the 
comparative lack of comment the assault and capture of an important town has elicited in the 
historiography.11 Ferrers was initially repulsed by the citizens until he broke into the town through 
the old castle. He then sacked the city, ‘destroyed’ the Jews and broke open the city gaol freeing 
(and possibly recruiting) some of the prisoners within.12 Ferrers’ attack may have been partly 
designed to seize the crossing point at Worcester for the rebels following the barring of the 
crossings of the River Severn on 4 February.13 The more pressing motive for the attack, however, 
seems to have been Ferrers’ Jewish debts, as he also removed the chest of chirographs, records of 
debts owed to the Jews, (including presumably those of his own) and took it to his castle at 
Tutbury.14  
We do not know for certain where Robert de Ferrers was following the sack of Worcester. 
Maddicott assumed he was still at Worcester when news was sent to him of Edward’s siege of 
Gloucester.15 There are, however significant reasons to doubt this. The Chronicle of Worcester 
dates the fall of Worcester to the 29 February. Problematically it also describes the attacking army 
as being led by Robert de Ferrers, Peter de Montfort and Henry de Montfort. Peter’s presence was 
possible, but Henry was either in the March or besieging Gloucester at this point .The bridges over 
the Severn had been broken down after Henry and Simon the Younger had ventured into the March 
meaning they could not have assisted in the assault on Worcester from the west bank of the Severn. 
Robert of Gloucester’s account also indicates that the sons of Montfort entered the city over the 
bridge (therefore crossing from the west bank of the Severn) after the seizure of Gloucester’s 
gates.16 While the Chronicle of Worcester’s use requires some caution as, for example, it also fails 
to mention the siege of Gloucester at all, the specificity of the date given for the attack stands, in 
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this instance, in contrast to the usually vague information provided by the chronicle.17 If the attack 
occurred on or around the 29 February, Ferrers’ delay until 13 March in coming to Gloucester, only 
twenty five miles away, is hard to fathom. The Dunstable Annals problematic account of the siege 
reports that a request for aid was sent to Ferrers.18 The pre-existing tensions between Edward and 
Ferrers and the latter’s known aggressive inclinations suggest that Robert would have responded 
swiftly to word of Edward’s arrival at Gloucester on 5 March. If he was still at Worcester, 
however, it should not have taken him eight days to receive the news and arrive at Gloucester. 
If Ferrers was not at Worcester where was he then? One explanation is that he may have 
accompanied the seized chest of chirographs back to Tutbury.  A second explanation behind 
Ferrers’ absence, however, is suggested in the Chronicle of St. Werburg abbey, Chester. Three days 
before Edward’s first relief attempt on Gloucester, Edward’s appointed justiciar of Cheshire, 
William de la Zouche and David ap Gryffudd with an army of men from Cheshire, alongside Hamo 
Lestrange ‘with many men of Shropshire’, launched a large raid into Ferrers’ lands. This force took 
the town of Stafford and, crucially, seized one of the jewels in the Ferrers’ crown, Chartley castle.19 
Chartley was an impressive fortress and had undergone major work in the early thirteenth century 
when in the hands of the earl of Chester, with the addition of a stone keep and curtain walls, so it 
was not an easy target.20  
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 Flores, ii, pp.486-7; Ann. Wint., pp.448-9. 
18
 Ann. Dun., p.228. 
19
 Ann. Cestr., pp.86-7. 
20
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Figure  0:2 Royalist Raid of 2 March 1264 
On their return they also burnt the town of Stone, which lay to the north of Stafford.21 This attack 
may have been revenge partly for the sack of Worcester, but its timing seems suspiciously well co-
ordinated with Edward’s relief attempt at Gloucester. If Ferrers was still at Worcester on 2 March it 
left enough time for him to receive word and return north to confront the royalists before Edward’s 
first attempt to raise the siege of Gloucester. The specifically anti-Ferrers’ focus of the campaign 
by targeting his most valuable lands makes it not unreasonable to suggest that it may have been 
conducted with the deliberate purpose of luring Ferrers away from Gloucester. To reinforce this 
impression the same royalists returned to Stafford on the 12th, but this time ‘they were repulsed 
thence by the barons’. This force of barons included men drawn from the Midlands region, such as 
the Montfortian Ralph Basset of Drayton.22 In revenge the royalists burned Eccleshall, including 
the bishop of Lichfield’s castle there, and ‘broke into many churches’ and ‘took many captives and 
much spoil.’23 The veracity of at least some of the Chester account is proved by subsequent legal 
proceedings against rebels in Staffordshire. One Geoffrey de Gresley was confirmed captured at 
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Chartley by Hamo Lestrange, while a Henry de Verdon and Hugh de Weston admitted they were in 
the retinue of Ralph Basset of Drayton defending Stafford also against Hamo.24 Whether Ferrers 
was with the unnamed barons at Stafford is unknown (only Ralph Basset is confirmed), but in 
terms of geography and motivation this is not unlikely. He certainly had great incentive to head 
north again at the news of the destruction of Chartley which could have arrived by the 3 or 4 
March. Despite the small rebel victory of the repulse at Stafford, de la Zouche’s two large scale 
raids probably fulfilled their purpose, distracting rebel help from the siege of Gloucester.  
Several curious points of Robert of Gloucester’s account of the siege of Gloucester become 
more explicable under the above interpretation of Ferrers’ movements. If Edward had been actively 
trying to distract Ferrers and his powerful forces from Gloucester, the knowledge that Ferrers was 
on his way would, on this reading, have been bad (although not necessarily fatal) news for his 
position in the castle.25 It also helps explain Robert of Gloucester’s report that Edward was of 
noman so sore adrad than Robert de Ferrers.26 Robert’s words have attracted little analysis. 
Powicke and Jobson ignore them while, for example, Maddicott merely notes that the two had a 
feud.27 Robert, a very reliable and detailed source for events at Gloucester chose adrad 
deliberately, yet Edward possessing a personal fear of Ferrers himself would seem odd, particularly 
as it is uncertain how many times the two men had even come into personal contact. Robert only 
came of age in 1260 and played no active role in the politics leading up to the war but rather seems 
to have remained on his lands at Tutbury.28 Robert of Gloucester may, however, have picked up 
reports that Edward had been particularly concerned with Ferrers’ potential aid for the besiegers, 
and this practical fear was subsequently misinterpreted as a personal fear of Ferrers himself.29 If 
Ferrers had participated in the defence of Stafford on the 12th then he would have had around sixty 
miles to cover to reach Gloucester to arrive on the 13th. It was, Robert of Gloucester claims, when 
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Ferrers was sighted from the keep approaching from the direction of Tewkesbury that Edward was 
prompted to make terms. The agreement, according to Robert, was made prior to Ferrers’ arrival, a 
very short space of time, but not impossible, since the terms seem to have been simply for Edward 
to allow the rebels to depart and promise not to harm the townspeople. If Ferrers had been at 
Stafford or at least was in the region trying to defend his lands, he may have had just over twenty-
four hours to cover the 50 to 60 miles to Gloucester riding hard, and the speed of his march is 
strongly suggested in Robert of Gloucester’s account. 
The earl Robert Ferrers, when he came thither, he was well-nigh mad for wrath that they had 
made agreement. He smote his steed with the spur, as did all his company. And turned himself 
for wrath again, as quick as he might hasten. 30 
 
Two points come from this passage in the context of Robert’s involvement at Gloucester. His 
frustration becomes not just about the lifting of the siege but about his missed opportunity to face 
Edward personally, to avenge both old and quite probably new injuries, including the loss of 
Chartley. His anger might also have stemmed from his failure to reach Gloucester in time due to 
the distraction of the attacks. The other pertinent point is that his company is indicated as being all 
mounted; a force capable of covering the required distance, but also indicative that he was not 
based at Worcester if he took so long to arrive. While the above discussion involves a degree of 
informed speculation, the timings of events are highly suggestive of a broader and concerted 
royalist campaign to keep Robert de Ferrers, and probably others, from assisting Montfortian forces 
at the siege of Gloucester in March 1264.  
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Appendix 2 
Names Years connected to Retinue of William de Valence 
Geoffrey Gascelin 1258,60-62,66 
Roger Gascelin 1262,66 
William de Kirketon 1262,66,68 
John de Bussay 1258, 66 
William de Bolleville 1266-7, 70 
Ingram de Vilers 1261?,62 
William de Barentino? 1266? 
John de Gravenel? 1266? 
Imbert Guy? 1261?, 66-8? 
Robert Aiguillon 1260-1, 1271 
Table  0:1 The familiares of William de Valence at the time of the civil war, Ridgeway, ‘William 
de Valence and his familiares’, p.245  
 
 
Name Relationship to 
Gilbert de Clare 
Name Relationship to 
Gilbert de Clare 
More, Robert de la yeoman of, in 
household 
Tracy, William de knight of 
Bragenham, 
Thomas de 
Yeoman of Plessetis, William de Knight of 
Roynges, Hamo de Yeoman of Ingoldesthorp, John 
de 
in service of 
Ardern, Stephen de Yeoman of Walton, Roger de in household in 1257 
for Earl Richard? 
Clerk, William le Yeoman of Borham, Hervey de 
(cleric?) 
in company bearing 
message from 
Tanet, Stephen de Yeoman of Savage, William le familia of 
Stotesbrok, Henry 
de 
Yeoman of Fevere, Robert le faithful to him 
during troubles 
Lung, Hugh le Yeoman of Harewell, William faithful to him 
during troubles 
Chartres, Ralph de Yeoman of Brasur, Thomas faithful to him 
during troubles 
Podelicot, Richard 
son of Henry 
Yeoman of Capilli, Thomas faithful to him 
during troubles 
Haywod, William 
de 
Yeoman of Capilli, Geoffrey faithful to him 
during troubles 
Kingeston, William 
de 
Yeoman of Scarsted, Peter de Esquire of 
Sancto Andrea, 
Thomas de 
Yeoman of Sancto Germano, 
William de 
esquire (armijero) of 
Kelleshale, Thomas 
de 
Yeoman of Leytton, Henry de clerk of 
Tailard, Roger Yeoman of Pyulesdon, Roger de clerk of 
Bello Campo, Peter 
de 
Yeoman of Trillawer, Master 
Robert de 
Carrying message 
from at London 
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Clerc/e?, John de Yeoman of Munteny/Mountney?, 
Robert de 
carrying message 
from at Lond 
Paynel, John Yeoman of fitz John son of 
Geoffrey, John 
carrying message 
from at Lond 
Brusseles, Gys de wth at Roch siege Montfort, Robert de carrying meesage 
from at London 
Banastre, Richard wth at London, let 
off by writ of 
More, Bartholomew 
de la 
bailiff of 
Hardres, Robert wth at London Gricke, John Bahelor of 
Linton, Robert de, 
citizen of London 
wth at London Gouiz, Sir Brian de bachelor of (1267) 
Sendelsham, Adam 
de 
wth at London Colevile, Walter de Bachelor of (1267) 
Wychemal, 
Nicholas de 
wth at London Romenal, John de Bachelor of 
Banastre, William wth at London Penifader, Robert Bachelor of 
Solar, John de with at time of 
troubles 
Marisco, Tristram Bachelor of 
Wodetric/csiche, 
John 
with at time of 
troubles 
Mainard, Robert Bachelor of 
Waleys, John le with at London Bataile, Peter de la Bachelor of 
Chirichull, Thomas 
de (brother of John) 
with at London Veer, John de Bachelor of 
Faber, William of 
Husseburn 
with at London Miners, Roger de Bachelor of 
Despenser, Adam 
(le?) 
with at London Stubbesdon, William Bachelor of 
Chirchull, John de with at London Noers, Robert de Bachelor of 
Atwell, William with at London son of Fulk, Ralph 
(same as 1100?) 
Bachelor of 
Northtoft, Adam de with at London Hameleye, Walter de Bachelor of 
Aston, Richard de with at London Traylli, John de 
(bachelor) 
Bachelor of 
Legeham, John de szed lnds for use of Whytpens, Laurence 
de (baron of 
Sandwich) 
Bachelor of 
Hamstall, Adam del szed land into hnds 
of 
Elphey, Robert Bachelor of 
Champeney, 
Geoffrey de 
of household of, 
adherent 
Hadris, Sir Robert  at siege of Roc wth 
Raggulf, Ellis of household of, 
adherent 
Breton, John le at London with 
Brun, Richard le of household of, 
adherent 
Neville, John de 
(brother of Hugh) 
at London with 
Hauteyn, Sir 
Hamon 
knight/Bachelor of; 
carried mess from at 
Lond 
Hendred, Richard de always a faithful 
adherent of the earl 
Apodorfeld/ 
Apildorefeud, 
William de 
knight of Whytefend, Robert 
de 
acted on warrant of 
Table  0:2 associates of Gilbert de Clare during the War, especially 1267 
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